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Abstract
The European gas market faces declining production, and imports are expected
to increase. In the US, natural gas production has increased by one third during
the last seven years due to the extraction of natural gas from shale formations.
Looking to the US, countries like Poland and Ukraine are starting to invest in
shale gas development. The potential from this could be large, but is charac-
terized by uncertainties in resource estimates, economic viability and political
climate with respect to hydraulic fracturing. Risk is therefore an important
characteristic of the European natural gas market development.
Current models of the European natural gas market have not accounted for
the impact of risk averse behavior in combination with market power and the
possibility of shale gas development. Risk aversion could possibly affect in-
vestment and trade in ways current models cannot predict. For better decision
support, insights in the impacts of risk preferences on investments and trade in
the natural gas market are needed.
In this thesis we have developed a model for a natural gas market that ac-
counts for market power and risk averse behavior amongst producers using
the risk measure conditional value at risk. The model treats different sources of
natural gas as separate resources and accounts for endogenous expansions of
production capacities, pipeline capacities and natural gas reserves. The model
is solved as a multi-stage stochastic mixed complementarity problem.
We have studied a case where producers are moderately risk averse, and found
that shale gas development might increase the total production by 15.8% from
2015 to 2025 and account for 15.9% of the total European production. We have
found that successful shale gas development might reduce Russia’s market
share in Ukraine by up to 44%. Under risk aversion, shale gas investments
were found to be 16% lower in Poland and 1.5% lower in Ukraine compared
to the investment levels in a risk neutral solution of the same problem. This
indicates that modeling risk averse behavior will give important insights when
studying investments in a natural gas market.
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Sammendrag
Det europeiske gassmarkedet sta˚r overfor synkende produksjon, og det er for-
ventet økt import i fremtiden. I USA har produksjon av naturgass økt med
en tredjedel i løpet av de siste syv a˚rene. Denne økningen skyldes hovedsake-
lig utvinning av gass fra skiferformasjoner, kalt skifergass. Land som Polen og
Ukraina er i ferd med a˚ investere i skifergassutvikling. Potensialet fra dette kan
være stort, men er preget av usikkerhet i ressursanslag og økonomisk levedyk-
tighet. Potensialet er ogsa˚ sterkt pa˚virket av den politiske holdningen til hy-
draulisk frakturering. Risiko er derfor et viktig aspekt a˚ ta høyde for i modeller-
ing av den fremtidige utviklingen i det europeiske naturgassmarkedet.
I denne masteroppgaven har vi utviklet og løst et flerstegs stokastisk blan-
det komplementaritetsproblem for et naturgassmarked med markedsmakt og
risikopreferanser blant produsenter uttrykt ved risikoma˚let Conditional Value
at Risk. Modellen tillater flere naturgass-kilder, utvidelser av produksjonskap-
asiteter, rørledningskapasiteter og naturgassreserver.
Na˚værende modeller av det europeiske gassmarkedet har ikke tatt høyde for
virkningen av risikoavers atferd i kombinasjon med markedsmakt og mulighet
for skifergassutvikling. Risikoaversjon kan muligens pa˚virke investeringer og
handel pa˚ ma˚ter dagens modeller ikke kan forutsi. Innsikt i konsekvensene
av risikopreferanser pa˚ investeringer og handel i markedet for naturgass er
nødvendig for a˚ fatte bedre beslutninger.
Vi har studert en situasjon hvor produsentene har en moderat grad av risikoaver-
sjon og funnet at skifergass kan øke den samlede produksjonen i Europa med
15.8% fra 2015 til 2025 og utgjøre 15.9% av den totale produksjonen i 2025.
Vi har funnet at vellykket skifergassutvikling kan redusere Russlands marked-
sandel i Ukraina med 44%. Investeringene ble funnet a˚ være 16% lavere i Polen
og 1.5% lavere i Ukraina na˚r produsentene er risikoaverse i forhold til invester-
ingsniva˚et i en risikonøytral løsning av det samme problemet. Dette indikerer
at modellering med risikoavers adferd vil gi viktig innsikt na˚r investeringer i
et naturgassmarkedet skal studeres.
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“A nation that can’t control its energy sources can’t control its future.”
- Barack Obama, President of the United States of America
1 Background and Motivation
Energy is an important global topic. Energy is needed to keep us warm, to
make our food and to transport us to the places we want to go. All over the
world, energy is used in a many different forms; for domestic applications
such as heating and lighting, industrial uses such as manufacturing, in the
commercial sector for stores, offices etc., and in the transportation sector.1 It is
difficult to imagine a world without energy sources.
Energy is consumed globally. Figure 1.1 shows the world’s geographical distri-
bution of energy use in 2010, and shows that Europe, Asia and America account
for more than two thirds of the world’s annual energy consumption. The En-
ergy Information Agency (EIA) projects that the growth in energy use will be
1.5% per year in the coming 30 years, reaching almost twice of today’s use in
2040 [EIA, 2013a]. Most of the growth in the coming 25 years in energy con-
sumption is expected to come from developing countries, according to British
Petroleum (BP) [2014]. With its global presence and diverse uses, it can be said
that energy is indeed needed to keep the world running. Energy supply and
demand is therefore both an interesting and important topic to explore.
Studying energy supply and demand gives us an opportunity to understand
more about how this important part of our civilization will develop in the
future. This chapter presents the background and motivation for the research
in this thesis. An overview of energy and natural gas as a part of the energy
mix is presented, followed by aspects of the European natural gas market, the
motivation for the thesis and research questions central to the work.
1Energy Information Agency (EIA) shows uses of energy in the United States divided in differ-
ent sectors in [EIA, 2013c]
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Figure 1.1: Primary Energy Consumption By Region. Energy consumption is highest in
Asia, Europe and America. Source: EIA [nd]
1.1 Natural Gas as an Energy Source
Natural gas is among the most important energy sources. According to the
International Energy Agency (IEA) [2013c], natural gas accounted for 25.7% of
the total global primary energy supply in 2012, second only to oil.2 Figure 1.2
illustrates the relative sizes of the different energy types in 1973 and 2012 as
reported by IEA [2013c].
From Figure 1.2, we can see that the share of natural gas has increased during
the past 40 years, while at the same time, total energy consumption also has
increased. The role of natural gas is expected to be even greater in the future,
BP [2014] expects natural gas consumption to grow at a rate of 1.9% per year
from 2014 to 2035, while total energy consumption is expected to grow at a rate
of 1.4% per year. Figure 1.3 shows historical and projected shares for different
sources of energy as presented in BP [2014]. The figure shows a growth in the
shares of gas and renewables, while coal and oil have declining shares. This
suggests that natural gas might become the biggest energy source some time
after 2035. As both a big and growing energy source, natural gas is interesting
to study.3
2Primary energy is a term used when comparing different energy sources. The energy sources
are converted to energy equivalents for comparison. See for example IEA [2013a] for an explana-
tion.
3Even though BP and IEA do not agree on the relative shares between primary energy sources
2
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Figure 1.2: Primary Energy Sources. Natural gas has become more important the last
40 years. Source: IEA [2013c]
Figure 1.3: Shares of Primary Energy Sources. Gas is expected to become more
important in the next 20 years. Source: BP [2014]
(as seen from Figures 1.2 and 1.3) they both agree that natural gas is among the top three energy
sources today.
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1.2 The European Gas Market
The European natural gas consumption is currently the fourth largest in the
world, after being surpassed by the growing consumption in Asia and Oceania
in 2009 [EIA, nd]. The dynamics of such a big market consisting of many
countries and developed infrastructure makes it an interesting market to study.
The size, however, is not the only aspect that makes the European natural gas
market an exciting object of study. The market power held by suppliers and
the need to secure natural gas supplies make the European natural gas market
exciting from both an economical and political point of view.
Today, a few countries account for the majority of supplies to many European
countries. Norway, Algeria and Russia supplied more than half of all natural
gas in the European Union (EU) in 2007, according to the EC [2009]. In certain
countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Finland and Estonia), Russia is the sole provider
of natural gas, as seen in a recent briefing by the newspaper the Economist
[2014]. Figure 1.4 (adapted from the Economist [2014]) shows the amount of
gas supplied by Russia as percentage of total amount of gas supplied. Note
that Russia supplies more than half of the gas in 13 of the 28 EU countries, and
all the gas in four of them.
Figure 1.4: Amount of gas supplied by Russia as percentage of total amount of gas
supplied in 2012. Russia is the sole supplier to several European countries. Adapted
from the Economist [2014]
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Such a situation with only one supplier or a small number of suppliers opens
up for use of market power by the supplier, pushing prices up and volumes
down. With a less diversified supply base, the countries also become more
vulnerable to disruptions in supply. As a consequence, natural gas supply has
become a political topic, and natural gas has been used as a political weapon.
Most notably, Russia’s actions towards Ukraine and other buyers have high-
lighted how natural gas supply is very much a political topic in Europe.
In 2009, Russia first cut all gas supplies to Ukraine because Ukraine did not pay
for gas supplies on time, and subsequently reduced supply to Europe through
Ukraine, affecting several European countries supplies [Rao, 2014; BBC, 2009].
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More recently, Russia has actively displayed the use of gas supply as a polit-
ical weapon against Ukraine, threatening to increase prices as consequence of
Ukraine’s cooperation with Europe and the EU when signing the EU integra-
tion pact [Hille et al., 2014]. As noted by the Economist [2014], this supply
situation has also led Russia’s president Vladimir Putin to believe that Europe
will be unable to impose serious sanctions on Russia following the annexation
of the Crimean peninsula.
Europe’s role as a big customer of Russian gas could give a unified Europe
buyer power over Russia, and this is believed to balance the power situation
because Russia depends on gas revenues just as Europe depends on gas [Mat-
lack, 2014]. Recent developments might reduce Europe’s buyer power. On
May 21st 2014 Russia signed a 400 bUSD gas deal with China. The contract
runs for 30 years and gives Russia a new large customer of natural gas [Perlez,
2014].
Figure 1.5: EU gas consumption, production and imports in TWh. Production is
decreasing faster than consumption, causing imports to increase. Source: EC [2009]
The market power of the biggest suppliers to the European natural gas market
might increase in the future. Figure 1.5 shows that the production of natu-
ral gas has been declining since 2009. Rystad Energy, an energy consultancy,
projects that Europe’s natural gas production continue to decline in the coming
years [Rystad Energy, nd]. At the same time, consumption is also declining,
5
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as can be seen in Figure 1.5. However, this decline is at a lower rate than the
decline in production, which leads to higher imports. This trend is expected to
continue in the future; BP [2013] estimates that Europe’s natural gas imports
will increase by 74% by 2030. With increased demand for imports, Algeria and
Russia’s market power might increase in the future as dependence on imports
increases.
1.2.1 Shale Gas
One possible solution to Europe’s concern for import dependence might be
found in shale gas. The US has in recent years reduced their dependence on
gas imports by developing shale gas [Medlock III, 2012]. Shale gas is natural gas
trapped in shale formations, and is a type of unconventional gas.4 In the last
decade, technological advances in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing5
have made extraction of large shale gas volumes profitable [EIA, 2013d]. In the
United States and Canada, this has led to a ”Shale Gas Revolution” referring to
the USA increasing domestic natural gas production and with that drastically
reducing natural gas imports [Stevens, 2010]. According to EIA [2013d], the US
increased its natural gas production from shale plays6 from 2.7 to 26.9 bcf/d
from January 2006 to January 2013 (Figure 1.6). In January 2013 the total US
natural gas production was 67 bcf/d. Thus, shale gas has gone from being
virtually non-existing to become a major gas supply source.
As a result of the developments in the US, interest in shale resources in the rest
of the world have been fuelled [Weijermars and McCredie, 2011]. For Europe,
this is particularly interesting because of the current reliance on gas imports.
As noted in a report by Chatham House,7 the EU has grown concerned with
increasing dependence on gas imports during the last decades [Stevens, 2010].
Recently Ukraine has taken steps to start development of shale gas, by signing
two 10 billion USD contracts with Chevron and Shell to start shale develop-
ment [LeVine, 2013; Balmforth, 2013]. Analysts report that this can be seen
as a response to Russia’s dominating role as a natural gas supplier [Fernholz,
2013].
4There are two other types of unconventional gas: coalbed methane and tight gas. For more on
unconventional gas, see IEA [2013b] and Section 1.3.
5Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is the process of pumping water, sand and chemical solutions
down into the well in order to crack the sedimentary rock formations in order to extract the trapped
natural gas.
6Shale play refers to a geological region where hydrocarbons such as ethane, methane and
propane can be extracted from a shale formation.
7Chatham House, home of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is a world-leading source
of independent analysis
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Figure 1.6: US Natural Gas Production in bcf/d. Shale gas has led to an increase in
supply since 2007. Source: EIA [2013d]
Elsewhere in Europe, shale gas developments at an early stage are taking place.
As of April 2014, 17 European countries have issued permits for shale gas ex-
traction and six additional countries have allowed shale gas extraction [the
Economist, 2014]. When evaluating whether or not shale gas development
should be permitted one of the biggest concerns is how it affects the envi-
ronment. The next section discusses some environmental concerns related to
the petroleum industry.
1.3 Natural Gas and Environmental Concerns
Climate change in form of global warming is among the most serious environ-
mental concerns in today’s society. Greenpeace [nda] reports that some likely
negative consequences of global warming are loss of biodiversity, more extreme
climate with droughts, floods and heat waves and disruption of agricultural
7
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production. In a 2013 report by the International Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), it is concluded that increases in temperatures globally is attributable to
the increase in the atmospheric concentration of CO2 since 1750 [IPCC, 2013].
As a consequence of this, measures are taken to reduce emissions of CO2. The
European Commission (EC) for example, has committed to work for reducing
CO2 emissions in EU countries by 40% by 2030, leading the United Nations
(UN) general secretary to encourage other UN members to do the same [UN,
2014].
Natural gas might play a role in these reductions. Natural gas has a lower
carbon content than oil and coal, the two other major energy sources. Therefore,
combustion of natural gas leads to lower CO2 emissions relative to produced
energy than oil and coal.8 Therefore, natural gas might be used where coal and
oil is used today to reduce emissions while other, more sustainable sources are
developed.
The key difference between conventional and unconventional natural gas is
the manner, ease and cost associated with extracting the resource [Canadian
Association of Petroleum Producers, nd]. The different types of gas reservoirs
are illustrated in Figure 1.7.
Figure 1.7: Illustration of conventional and unconventional gas reservoirs. Extracting
gas from unconventional reservoirs often requires more complicated processes such as
fracking. Source: EIA [2013d]
8EIA shows a table of CO2 emissions per kWh generated for oil, coal and natural gas on their
website [EIA, 2014]. Here, it is shown that natural gas leads to lower CO2 emissions per kWh
generated power than any other fossil fuel. The second best, distillate oil, leads to 46% higher
emissions.
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Unconventional gas is subject to more environmental concerns than conven-
tional gas due to extraction process differences. Coal bed methane requires
water extraction to lower the well pressure and drive the gas from the sedi-
mentary rock. This waste water may be contaminated and have to be disposed
of in a sustainable way. Shale gas and tight gas9 requires hydraulic fracturing
to free the gas from the sedimentary rock. Fracking involves pumping large
amount of water deep underground. This water is often irretrievable and might
be contaminated by toxic fracking fluids. Greenpeace [ndb] states that:
Though the oil and gas industry claims that fracking has been used
safely for decades, there has been little actual study of the envi-
ronmental effects of the process. In fact, companies engaged in
fracking have consistently warned their investors that drilling op-
erations, which include fracking, involve inherent risks including
leaks, spills, explosions, blowouts, environmental damage, injury
and death.
1.4 Uncertainty and Risk
Assessing what will happen in the future is a difficult task. Due to uncertainty
about the future, for example in demand, technological advances and political
climate, forecasts are often inaccurate. Therefore, decision makers often have
to make irreversible decisions under uncertainty. Often, what will happen in
the future decides to what extent a decision made today will have the desired
outcome. In this sense we say that the decision maker is subject to risk.
Europe’s shale gas potential might be game changing [Jaffe, 2010]. However,
the risks associated with developing unconventional resources will probably
have a significant impact on whether or not these resources will be developed.
The main sources of risk in shale gas development are associated with resource
potential, economic viability and political climate [Richter, 2013]. Risk in re-
source potential is due to the fact that volume estimates are uncertain. The risk
in the economical viability is linked to the fact that development costs, demand
and prices are uncertain. There is therefore a large economic risk when starting
a development project, as it might not turn out to be profitable. Hydraulic frac-
turing is a disputed technology, and has already been banned in France and
several other countries [the Economist, 2014] due to environmental concerns.
9Tight gas is natural gas produced from reservoir rocks (most commonly sandstone) with such
low permeability that massive hydraulic fracturing is necessary to produce the well at economic
rates.
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Therefore shale gas developers run a political risk of shale gas being banned
after irreversible investments have been made.
These risk considerations are important aspects for evaluating the commercial
viability of potential investments [Gracceva and Zeniewski, 2013]. For regula-
tors, it is important to understand how the natural gas sector might develop in
the future, and how development might be affected by governmental policies.
Based on these considerations, a model that assesses the effect of risk and the
potential of shale gas in Europe is needed for better decision making.
1.5 Motivation
Quantitative models provide useful decision support when regulators and com-
panies deal with an uncertain environment like the European gas market. Of-
ten, a model that can capture what will happen today and in the future decades
as a result of choices made today is needed to make better decisions. Such
a long term model is classified as a strategic model and takes the perspec-
tive of strategic planning in the planning framework proposed by Anthony
[1965].10
1.5.1 The Need for Market Models
Market models are useful for a range of applications. Governments and regu-
lators use market models to assess the impacts of different policies and regu-
lations and to plan infrastructural expansions. Organizations and corporations
use market models to predict future prices and determine production levels.
Current energy market models come in a diverse set of shapes and sizes, and
differ in geographical scope, energy sources, form of competition and informa-
tion structure, among many things. Some models incorporate market power,
while others assume perfect competition. The geographical scope ranges from
global models to models of a continent or parts of a continent. A thorough
description of several leading gas market models is given in Chapter 2.
10Anthony [1965] presents three levels of planning: strategic, tactical and operational. Strategic
is long-term and concerns what will happen over several years, tactical planning is concerned with
a shorter horizon, typically a year, and operational planning is about what will happen now and
in the near future, typically weeks from now.
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1.5.2 Research Questions and Main Contributions
This thesis develops and solves a stochastic multi-stage MCP for a natural gas
network with multiple resources (types of natural gas) and endogenous expan-
sions of capacities in the system, where the producers in the natural gas net-
work have varying degrees of both market power and risk aversion. Different
formulations are discussed, and a scheme for solving the model is presented.
The main contributions are:
• Developing a stochastic multi-stage MCP for a natural gas network with
multiple resources (shale gas and conventional gas), endogenous expan-
sions of reserves and pipeline capacities, where the producers in the nat-
ural gas network have varying degrees of both market power and risk
aversion.
• Developing a solution procedure for numerical solution of the model us-
ing mathematical programming.
Further, the model presented in this work will be used to study the following
questions:
• To what extent does shale gas development in Ukraine and Poland have
the possibility to reduce their dependence on Russian natural gas im-
ports?
• How do risk aversion and market power affect investments and trade in
a gas market?
• How does the perceived likelihood of a shale gas ban affect the invest-
ments and trade?
A numerical study will be performed to illustrate these aspects.
This chapter has introduced the subjects energy, the European natural gas mar-
ket and market modeling. The purpose of the report has been presented. The
rest of the report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces important the-
oretical concepts and modeling approaches, Chapter 3 presents a stochastic
multi-stage natural gas market model (first contribution) that account for risk
preferences and market power among producers. Chapter 4 implements and
solves a small instance of the developed model. Chapter 5 implements and
studies a larger data instance, and answers the research questions posed above.
Chapter 6 presents methods used for solving the problem (second contribution)
and discusses the current limitations of the model. Finally, Chapter 7 gives a
summary and concluding remarks on the findings of this thesis.
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This chapter introduces theoretical concepts related to optimization, market
modeling and modeling of risk preferences. First, game theory is presented,
followed by theory on microeconomics. Some mathematical concepts related
to optimization and market modeling are then introduced, followed by a re-
view of current natural gas market models and economic modeling of shale
gas. Finally, risk and energy models incorporating risk preferences are pre-
sented.
2.1 Game Theory
Game theory is the formal study of a situation where two or more players make
decisions that affect their payoffs. Each player’s strategy contains the actions
he will take given what the other players do. A game where the players can
cooperate to coordinate their actions through binding agreements is called co-
operative game theory, while a game where no binding agreements are possible
is called non-cooperative game theory [Tirole, 1988]. In game theory, a Nash
equilibrium is a situation where none of the players have an incentive to change
their strategy given what the other players are doing [Pindyck and Rubinfeld,
2013].
A game with only one stage where all the players act simultaneously is called
a static game. A game with multiple stages where one player first makes a
decision that is observable to the other players, where the other players then
make decisions dependent on the first player’s decision is called a dynamic
game. A single game of rock-paper-scissors, for example, is a static game where
both the players choose an action, and then the payoff is revealed. A game of
chess is an example of a dynamic game; one player makes a move and the other
player makes his move dependent on what the first player did.
12
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Assumptions regarding information differ across different types of games. The
information structure describes what information is available to the players at
any time. If the players have perfect information, they know all the character-
istics of the game (e.g. the marginal cost for a competitor). A situation where
the players do not possess all this information is called incomplete informa-
tion. Harsanyi [1967] showed how situations of incomplete information can be
analysed assuming that the players are able to express their beliefs about the
uncertain parameters assuming that “Each player has a subjective probability
distribution over the alternative possibilities.” [Harsanyi, 1967, p. 159].
2.2 Microeconomics
In microeconomics, different forms of markets and competition are studied. A
market with perfect competition is a market where there are many sellers and
buyers so that none of them can affect the prices in the market through their
own actions alone. In such a market, producers have no market power and are
said to be price takers. In a monopoly, a single producer sells a product to many
buyers, and may decrease his output in order to drive prices upwards. The
producer has market power in this case because he can affect prices by changing
his output. Figure 2.1 shows perfect competition and monopoly prices and
quantums, pC and qC, and pM and qM respectfully. Generally, pM is higher
than pC, and qM is lower than qC.
Figure 2.1: Economic surpluses in a market with perfect competition and monopoly.
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When assessing market regulations, regulators can use a principle called social
welfare [Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2013]. Social welfare is defined as the sum of
the consumer surplus and the producer profit in a market. The consumer sur-
plus is the difference between the consumers valuation of the products bought
and the price they pay for it [Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2013]. In the situation in
Figure 2.1, the consumer surplus can be calculated as the area (A+ B+ C), un-
der perfect competition and as the area A in a monopoly. The producer profit
is the area (D + E) under perfect competition, and the area (B + D) under a
monopoly. Under a monopoly the producer uses his market power to maxi-
mize his profits at the expense of customer surplus. The area (B +D) is larger
than (D+E). The social welfare is (C+E) lower under a monopoly compared to
perfect competition. This is called a dead weight loss [Pindyck and Rubinfeld,
2013]. Regulators might try to impose regulations that seek to maximize the
social welfare of a system.
In an oligopoly, there are several producers who sell to the same market. Here,
each producer might affect prices by adjusting his own output, but he has to
take the other producers’ behaviour into account when making decisions. This
type of situation can be analysed by assuming that each producer knows the
other producers’ marginal cost. This enables them to calculate their competi-
tor’s optimal response curve, a function that describes how the producers will
adjust their output given the other producers’ output. A Nash equilibrium can
be found in the intersection of the response curves, where no producer can do
any better given what the other producers are doing [Pindyck and Rubinfeld,
2013]. In the situation in Figure 2.1, the oligopoly price will be ∈ [pC,pM] and
the total oligopoly quantum ∈ [qM,qC].
Both in a monopoly and in an oligopoly, producers can affect prices by adjust-
ing their output. Therefore, the producers have a higher profit relative to a sit-
uation with perfect competition and the consumers have smaller consumer sur-
pluses. The following small example illustrates some of these concepts.
In a monopoly situation a single producer supplies a market. Assume that the
market’s inverse demand curve is given by p(q) = 30 − q. The supplier knows
this curve and has to choose a quantity, q, that maximizes his profit, Π. If the
producer has a per unit cost of $4 he then wishes to maximize Π = p(q)q−4q. By
setting the ∂Π
∂q
= 30− 2q− 4 = 0 (first order condition for optimality) he obtains
the quantity where one more produced unit will lower Π. In this example this
yields q = 13, p(q) = $17 and a monopoly profit of $169.
If the producer instead supplies a market with a large number of perfect com-
petitive and identical suppliers, the producer is willing to supply while the
price is higher than or equal to his marginal cost. For the market with price
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p(q) = 30−q the quantity supplied by all the producers combined is then given
by 30 − q = 4. This yields q = 26, p(q) = $4 and a profit of $0. By a similar
argument as above, it could be shown that if this market has n identical players
the quantity supplied by supplier i in equilibrium follows qi = 26n .
The Cournot model describes a situation where the producers compete on
the quantity produced. The model gives quantities and prices between those
of monopoly and perfect competition and yields a stable Nash-equilibrium
[Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2013]. Cournot competition is based on the assump-
tions that the output affects the price (they have market power), there is no
collusion and that there is a fixed number of rational competitors who maxi-
mize profit based on their competitors’ decisions. Assume that there are only
two identical producers who are competing a` la Cournot in the market where
p(q) = 30 − q. The two producers wish to select a quantity that maximize their
individual profits. Producer 1 supplies a quantity q1 while producer 2 supplies
q2. The price is then given by p(q1,q2) = 30 − (q1 + q2). Producer 1 maximizes
it’s profit by selecting q1 so that ∂Π1∂q1 =
∂((30−(q1+q2))q1−4q1)
∂q1
= 30−2q1−q2−4 = 0.
This yields the optimal reaction curve q1 = 26−q22 . By symmetry, the optimal q2
follows the reaction curve q2 = 26−q12 . This yields q1 = q2 = 8.67, p(q) = $12.67
and Π1 = Π2 = $75.11. Note that the combined profit of the two producers, in
this example, is lower than the profit in the case with a single producer in the
same market.
In the preceding examples an equilibrium solution was easy to find analytically.
This is however not the case when we in Chapter 3 try to model a gas market
with several non-identical actors who maximize their own objectives. In the
following section we describe how an equilibrium solution can be found in a
more general setting.
2.3 Mathematical Concepts
2.3.1 Karush Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
The Karush Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are necessary conditions for opti-
mality of a non-linear problem. If the problem is convex, the KKT conditions
are also sufficient for optimality [Lundgren et al., 2010].
The KKT conditions can be formulated as follows. Take a non-linear problem in
15
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
minimization form1 with constraints of the form g(x) 6 0 and h(x) = 0:
min f(x) (2.1)
s.t. gi(x) 6 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m (2.2)
hj(x) = 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . , l (2.3)
The KKT conditions of this problem are as follows:
Stationarity:
∇f(x∗) +
m∑
i=1
µi∇gi(x∗) +
l∑
j=1
λj∇hj(x∗) = 0 (2.4)
Primal feasibility:
hj(x
∗) = 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . , l (2.5)
gi(x
∗) 6 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m (2.6)
Dual feasibility:
µi > 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m (2.7)
Complementary slackness:
µigi(x
∗) = 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m (2.8)
A common way to rewrite the KKT conditions is by using the notation x ⊥ y
to indicate that either x or y has to be zero. The conditions become the slightly
more compact by combining Equations (2.6)-(2.8):2
0 6 ∇f(x∗) +
m∑
i=1
µi∇gi(x∗) +
l∑
j=1
λj∇hj(x∗) ⊥ x∗ > 0 (2.9)
0 > gi(x∗) ⊥ µi > 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m (2.10)
hj(x
∗) = 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . , l (2.11)
1A maximization problem max f(x) can be rewritten as min− f(x).
2Later in this thesis, 0 6 −gi(x∗) ⊥ µi > 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m will be used instead of Equation
(2.10) because the programming language GAMS does not support complementarity conditions
with equations on less-than-or-equal form.
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2.3.2 Complementarity Problems
A Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP) is to find x such that 0 6 Ax + b ⊥
x > 0 [Gabriel et al., 2012a]. By letting Ax + b be replaced by a nonlinear
expression, the result is a nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP). If the
lower and upper bounds for the decision variables are allowed to be different
from zero, a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) arises.
An MCP is a general type of mathematical problem. For the purposes of this
work, it is sufficient to note that when the KKT conditions of the players in
a market model are formed, the resulting set of equations form an MCP. For
more on MCP and how problems can be represented as MCP’s, see [Rutherford,
1995].
2.4 Gas Market Modelling
Gas market modelling can be defined as an effort to create a mathematical
representation that reflects the most relevant properties of an actual gas market.
Commonly, such models include sources of supply and demand spread out
geographically, and a transportation network to move commodities between
supply and demand regions. By some mechanism, equilibrium between supply
and demand is found, and prices and quantities for commodities in the markets
can be calculated.
Several approaches have been used for modelling gas markets, and they differ
in multiple ways, including the perspective on competition, the objective of
the mathematical program and how uncertainty is handled. Some models are
highlighted here.
Gabriel and Smeers [2006] present different models that could be used for gas
markets, including both models of perfect competition (system optimization)
and imperfect competition. In a system optimization model, social welfare is
maximized. Social welfare is calculated as the sum of the consumer surplus and
the producer surplus for all producers and consumers [Pindyck and Rubinfeld,
2013]. One way of modeling imperfect competition is with an MCP. These
types of MCP models are developed using microeconomic and game theoretic
principles where each player’s individual optimization problem is tied together
by equilibrium conditions. The KKT conditions of the resulting set of problems
form a complementarity problem (see Section 2.3.2). Gabriel and Smeers [2006]
show how this can be done for a gas market. Gabriel and Smeers further argue
that a model with perfect competition might not create the most realistic model
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of the natural gas market in Europe due to market power considerations.
The World Gas Model (WGM) [Egging et al., 2010] is an MCP. The WGM cap-
tures the effect of market power in a natural gas market. Each player (producer,
storage operator, transmission system operator etc.) decides on quantities that
maximize its profits given what the other players are doing, and thus the mar-
ket is modeled as a Cournot game. The model also introduces modeling of
uncertainty through stochastic programming, and [Egging, 2013] shows how
such a problem can be solved efficiently using a Benders decomposition algo-
rithm. [Gabriel et al., 2012b] use WGM to investigate the potential for a ”Gas
OPEC” where gas producers form a cartel. They show that a successful gas
cartel will influence the natural gas market, and have significant consequences
for European gas consumption.
The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System (TIMES) model is an energy market
model that models competitive markets [Loulou and Labriet, 2008]. By assum-
ing perfect competition, maximizing the social welfare leads to the maximiza-
tion of both supplier surplus and consumer surplus [Pindyck and Rubinfeld,
2013]. Loulou and Labriet [2008] point out that this can justify the concept of
maximizing social welfare in settings where the profit of suppliers is of inter-
est.
Gracceva and Zeniewski [2013] use TIMES to explore possible outcomes of
shale development. In their application of TIMES, the deterministic version of
the model is run for different scenarios. The results highlight the fact that dif-
ferent scenarios might lead to shale gas playing different roles in the world’s
energy mix. There exists a stochastic version of the TIMES model with an
alternative objective function where a sum of expected costs and upper abso-
lute deviation is minimized in order to capture risk aversion for the suppliers
[Loulou and Labriet, 2008].
Gas mArket System for Trade Analysis in a Liberalising Europe (GASTALE) is
a model of the European natural gas market including LNG imports and mar-
ket power. Boots et al. [2003] present GASTALE as a static deterministic model
with no possibility for investments in capacities in production or transporta-
tion and uses the model to analyse the effects of different forms of competition
between the traders and producers. Lise and Hobbs [2008] build on GASTALE
by separating LNG trade from pipeline transport and adding endogenous in-
vestments in expansions of transmission and storage capacities. A stochastic
version with risk-neutral actors named S-GASTALE is developed in Bornaee
[2012] where the Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI) is found to be
almost 10% for a multistage model presented.
Framework of International Strategic Behaviour in Energy and Environment
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(FRISBEE) is a model developed by Statistics Norway, and has a global geo-
graphical scope [Aune et al., 2010]. The model is a partial equilibrium model
that does not include market power, but includes oil, coal and electricity as en-
ergy sources in addition to natural gas [Rosendahl and Sagen, 2009]. Rosendahl
and Sagen [2009] argue that in a global perspective, perfect competition is an
acceptable simplification because even big producers such as Russia that hold
a quarter of the world’s natural gas reserves only export 5% of the global pro-
duction.
The ICF Gas Market Model is an Non-Linear Programming (NLP) model that
describes North America with a model that spans several years and has a
monthly density, thus operating on the border between tactical and strategic
modeling [ICF, 2014]. The model features 110 regional markets in North Amer-
ica, and is used to project future developments in pipelines and other infras-
tructure as well as prices and production levels.
2.5 Shale Gas
So far, the academic contribution to the topic of shale gas in Europe has focused
on resource estimation and economic assessment of potential shale plays. Wei-
jermars studies five shale plays in continental Europe using an economic ap-
proach [Weijermars, 2013]. The study develops expected production curves
(type curves) for the different plays, and models development of each play us-
ing a ten-year drilling campaign. Based on this and expected capital and oper-
ational expenditures, a discounted cash flow analysis is performed to evaluate
the profitability of the shale plays, measured in net present value (NPV) and
internal rate of return (IRR). Weijermars shows that the NPV and IRR are sen-
sitive to small changes in expected ultimate recovery (EUR3) and that concepts
like stochastic modelling and time value of money are crucial aspects in assess-
ing shale play development potential. The fact that the profitability measures
NPV and IRR are sensitive to the EUR highlights that uncertainty in resource
potential is important when considering risk in shale gas developments.
Some authors have used stochastic modelling to assess shale play development,
among them Stabell et al. [2007]; Williams-Kovacs et al. [2011]. In both these
articles, the focus is on the development of tools for portfolio optimization for
a single company considering several prospects. Neither of the two articles
consider market implications on an aggregated level. With regards to market
modelling, contributions have thus far been limited to application of general
energy market models (e.g. TIMES, [Loulou and Labriet, 2008]).
3EUR is the amount of shale gas that will be produced over the lifespan of a well.
19
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.6 Risk
In many situations future outcomes are uncertain. When we write about un-
certainty we mean situations where it is possible to list different outcomes and
assign a probability to each of them. When uncertainty is present in such a
way that it affects a decision maker’s payoff, his payoff is associated with risk.
In our setting risk means that the payoff is affected both by uncertainty and
the decision maker’s decision. Risk is therefore affected by decisions, while
uncertainty is a characteristic of nature. A decision maker’s attitude towards
risk is known as his risk preference. To illustrate different risk preferences, let
A be an investment with certain payoff x, and let B be an investment with an
uncertain payoff with expected value E[B]. A decision maker is said to be risk
averse if his utility function u(·) is such that: u(A)  u(B) when E(B) > x. Risk
neutral investors have the same utility for both A and B given that E(B) = x.
For a more detailed discussion, see Luenberger [1997].
The risk associated with developing unconventional resources will probably
have a significant impact on whether or not these resources will be developed.
In shale gas development, the main sources of risk are, associated with resource
potential, economical viability and political climate (Richter [2013], see Chapter
1). Controlling these types of risks are important aspects for evaluating the
commercial viability of potential investments (see for example Gracceva and
Zeniewski [2013]).
Risk measures can be used to encapsulate the risk associated with a distribution
of an outcome. “A risk measure is a functional mapping of a profit (or loss)
distribution to the real numbers.” ([Hardy, 2006, p. 2]). In the following, some
common risk measures will be introduced.
Markowitz (1952) (as cited in Krokhmal [2007]) suggested that risk could be
quantified and controlled by controlling the volatility of the returns. This ap-
proach is still widely used in many areas of decision-making. However, this
approach has been criticized for treating positive and negative deviations from
the expected value in the same manner [Gutjahr and Pichler, 2013; Krokhmal,
2007; Quintino et al., 2013]. For an investor or a decision maker this would be
unreasonable because he would want to penalize losses but not high profits.
Because of this observation several downside risk measures were developed.
Markowitz (1959) (as cited in Krokhmal [2007]) proposed replacing the vari-
ance with the lower semi-deviation to account for the losses only. One problem
with this type of risk measure is that it does not quantify the probability of
falling below a given critical value [Quintino et al., 2013].
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A risk measure that solves this problem is the Value at Risk (V@Rα(X)). V@R
has for a long time been used in the insurance industry and has in the last
20 years also become increasingly popular within finance and banking [Hardy,
2006]. For a random variable X the V@Rα(X) at confidence level α is given
as V@Rα(X) = F−1X (α), where F
−1
X (α) is the inverse of the cumulative distribu-
tion of X [Gutjahr and Pichler, 2013]. Thus V@Rα(X) is the negative α-quantile
of random variable X and answers the question: ”With probability α, what
is the minimum profit?” One problem with V@R is that it does not give in-
formation about the outcomes below the α threshold. Also, V@R does not
satisfy Artzner, Delbaen and Eber (1999)’s sub-additivity axiom and is thus not
a convex risk measure (as cited in Quintino et al. [2013]). The fact that it is
non-convex as a function of the decision variables also makes it methodically
difficult [Krokhmal, 2007]. Fortunately, the risk measure Conditional Value at
Risk (CV@Rα(X)) does not suffer from the V@R’s shortcomings. CV@Rα(X) ex-
presses the expected value of a random variable X given that the outcome is
lower than a critical value [Hardy, 2006]. Pflug and Ro¨misch [2007] show that
CV@Rα(X) is concave in X.
Figure 2.2: CV@R and V@R
Based on these considerations CV@R can be used to account for the risk in the
following form [Gutjahr and Pichler, 2013]:
CV@Rα(X) =
1
α
∫α
0
F−1y (v)dv (2.12)
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Or, equivalently:
CV@Rα(X) = max
k
(k−
1
α
E[k− X]+) (2.13)
where k is the α-quantile and X is a random variable, see Figure 2.2. To illus-
trate how this can be used, let h(X) represent a profit dependent on the random
variable X. Then Equation (2.13) expresses the expected profit in the α ∗ 100%
worst scenarios. If risk neutrality is assumed, α = 1, Equation 2.13 is reduced
to the the expected value, E[X]. Equation 2.13 is not defined for α = 0. When
α ∈ (0, 1) risk aversion CV@R is lower than E[X]. The difference is larger for
low values of α (high risk aversion).
In Equation (2.13), CV@R is given as an optimization problem. The dual rep-
resentation4 of this problem is given in [Pflug and Ro¨misch, 2007, Chapter
2]:
CV@Rα(X) = min{E[XZ] : E(Z) = 1, 0 6 Z 6
1
α
} (2.14)
In Equation (2.14), Z is the set of dual variables corresponding to X. The dual
representation has the desirable property that it is easier to form partial deriva-
tives of than the primal representation. This is used in Section 3.6. In addition
to this, the dual representation can be used to show that CV@Rα(X) is concave
in X, see proof in [Pflug and Ro¨misch, 2007, Chapter 2].
The previous figure and equations present CV@Rα(X) with a continuous dis-
tribution of the random variable X with density f(x). The following example
shows how CV@Rα works when X is represented by a set of discrete outcomes
with positive probabilities in a scenario tree.
An investor is considering an investment of 0.6$ that will give an uncertain
payoff in the future. He knows that there are five different outcomes for the
payoff, each with a probability of 15 . The payoff could be 0.4$, 0.8$, 1.2$, 1.6$
or 2.0$, and the expected payoff is therefore 1.2$ and the expected profit is
0.6$. Let the payoff be the random variable Y, and let the investment be I. The
CV@Rα of his profit is:
CV@Rα(Y − I) = max
k
(k−
1
α
E[k− (Y − I)]+) (2.15)
4For more on duality, see [Lundgren et al., 2010, Chapter 6].
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If the investor is risk neutral, α = 1, CV@Rα is equal to the expected value, 0.6$.
If the investor is risk averse and has a value of α of 0.4, he disregards the profit
in the 60% best outcomes. The only remaining outcomes are payoffs of 0.4$ and
0.8$, and the value of k (the best outcome amongst the considered outcomes)
becomes 0.8$ − 0.6$ = 0.2$. The CV@Rα becomes:
0.2 −
1
0.4
1
5
[
(0.2 −−0.2)+ + (0.2 − 0.2)+
+ (0.2 − 0.6)+ + (0.2 − 1.0)+ + (0.2 − 1.4)+
]
= 0.2 −
1
2
(0.4) = 0.0
In this case, the CV@Rα of the investors profit is 0, and he will be indifferent
between investing and not investing.
If the investor is risk averse and has a value of α of 0.5, k becomes 0.6$ and
the CV@Rα becomes 0.12$ by a similar computation as above. In this case the
investment is worthwhile for the risk averse investor.
If the investor has a value of α of 0.55, the quantile does not change because
the 50% worst outcomes and the 55% worst outcomes are the same outcomes
when there are five outcomes with the same probabilities. This means that
when analysing the effects of increased risk aversion, the number of scenarios
needs to be large in order for small changes in the value of α to have any
effect. When there are n scenarios, increments of α of more than 1
n
are the
smallest increments that will be guaranteed to change which outcomes the
investor regards.
2.7 Energy Models Incorporating Risk Preferences
Although it is most common to assume risk neutrality in energy market mod-
els, there have been a few attempts at using risk measures in market model-
ing.
Cabero et al. [2010] present a stochastic model for an electricity market where
each producer has a risk neutral objective. Risk preferences are considered
in the model by including a constraint that sets a lower bound on CV@Rα.
The model is an LCP, and the work is based on [Cabero, 2007], where KKT
conditions for the model are presented. A similar application of including a
lower bound on CV@Rα is found in Werner et al. [2014], which is a model for
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strategic planning in the LNG market. The model is a stochastic multistage
mixed-integer linear problem, including investments in infrastructure and ves-
sels.
A drawback of the method used in these models is that when a lower bound
on CV@Rα is to be imposed, it is first necessary to find a suitable lower bound.
This requires either experience with the problem at hand in order to find a good
value, or multiple iterations to adjust the bound on CV@Rα to a reasonable
level.
In this chapter current literature on gas market modelling and shale gas re-
search has been reviewed. The findings indicate that shale gas has not been
modelled in a market setting using stochastic optimization and risk prefer-
ences. TIMES [Loulou and Labriet, 2008] has been used for shale gas modeling,
but does not account for market power. FRISBEE [Aune et al., 2010] suffers un-
der the same shortcoming as TIMES. [ICF, 2014] includes shale gas production,
but the geographical scope is limited to North America. WGM [Egging et al.,
2010] and S-GASTALE [Bornaee, 2012] model market power and uncertainty,
but do not account for risk preferences. Shale gas development is highly as-
sociated with risk, in particular with regards to reserves. A stochastic market
model that includes shale gas and accounts for risk preferences could therefore
give new insights to the field of natural gas market modeling. Taking this into
account, the following chapter develops the natural gas market model used in
this work.
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3 Model
This chapter develops a multi-resource stochastic mixed complementarity prob-
lem for a natural gas market that accounts for market power and risk averse
behaviour amongst producers. The starting point for the model is [Egging,
2013], but the producers and traders are combined into one set of actors as in
[Egging and Huppmann, 2012]. The main differences in this model are that
that it allows for several resources, and that the producers are allowed to be
risk averse.
Overview
The situation is modeled as a non-cooperative static game over several stages.
The uncertainty is handled a` la Harsanyi [1967] by assuming that the actors
are able to express their beliefs about the future by several outcomes from a
probability distribution. It is therefore a game of imperfect information. The
producers are risk averse, and maximize the CV@R of their profits.
Actors
The producer has the opportunity to expand the production capacity for the
resources, as well as expansions in available reserves, thus representing the
option of developing shale gas. A restriction is added on production capacity
expansion and reserves expansion to represent limited budgets. Producers can
have production in one or more country nodes. Similarly, the Transmission
System Operator (TSO) has the option of expanding pipeline capacities, subject
to a budget limit. The market is modeled as a network of country nodes where
each country node has its own inverse demand curve.
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Market Power and Competition
The gas market is characterized by relatively few producers with varying de-
grees of market power. The presented model represents the market as an
oligopoly, and the producers compete on quantities. Each player individu-
ally maximizes his profits. The model allows for different levels of market
power for each player, ranging from perfect competition to competition a` la
Cournot.
Uncertainty
Reserves expansions are treated as random variables. Thus, there is uncer-
tainty in how large the realised reserves from the expansions invested in will
be. Other variables that could have been treated as random variables include
demand, expansion costs and political climate regarding bans or licenses for
developing shale gas. However, we want to analyse the risk associated with
shale gas development. Demand does not distinguish between shale gas and
conventional gas. Making demand uncertain therefore does not capture the
risk associated with shale gas development. Costs associated with developing
shale gas are definitely not certain, and could therefore have been treated as
random variables. However, we argue that the historical cost data from the US
can be assumed to give a reasonable indication of the cost levels for shale gas
development in Europe. The analogy between costs is assumed to be more ac-
curate than comparisons between resource potential because cost depends on
the cost of input factors with known prices such as labor and materials where
data is readily available, while resources depend on unexplored geology. Politi-
cal climate is highly relevant for future development, and will here be captured
through what-if analysis in regard to bans.
Risk Aversion
The producers in the natural gas industry face uncertainty and can be risk
averse. The model allows for risk preferences through a risk measure that will
be implemented based on [Gutjahr and Pichler, 2013]. The risk measure CV@R
will be used in the objective function of the producers. By using CV@R in the
objective, the feasible region does not change when the value of the degree of
risk aversion, αp, is changed. CV@R also has other favorable properties that
other risk measures lack, see Section 2.6 and for example [Krokhmal, 2007],
[Sarykalin et al., 2008] and [Pflug and Ro¨misch, 2007, Chapter 2].
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. First, the natural gas supply
chain is presented. Then, the modeling of the different parts of the supply chain
is presented and discussed together with the resulting mathematical problems.
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Following this, KKT conditions will be derived in order to be able to reformu-
late the model as an MCP.
3.1 Nomenclature
The nomenclature for the model is presented here. The reader can refer back
to this when reading the equations for the mathematical model presented be-
low.
3.1.1 Indices and Sets
Set Explanation
a ∈A arcs between two country nodes
n ∈N country nodes (e.g. NOR, NED, POL, ESP)
p ∈ P producers (e.g. NOR, NED, POL)
r ∈ R resource types (shale, conventional gas)
s ∈ S stages in the model
u ∈U nodes in the scenario tree
a+(n) inward arcs to country node n
a−(n) outward arcs from country node n
u(s) ∈U set of scenario tree nodes that belong to stage s
n(p) ⊂N country nodes where producer p can produce
n+(a) end node of arc a
n−(a) start node of arc a
u− ∈U direct predecessor node of u in the scenario tree
b(u,u ′) ∈U direct successor from u that is in pred(u ′)∪u ′
pred(u) ∈U predecessor nodes in the scenario tree
succ(u) ∈U successor nodes in the scenario tree
E ⊂U scenario tree nodes in the last stage
m(u) ⊂ E end nodes succeeding from u. In the last stage m(u) = u
Explanation of Sets
Several sets are used in the model formulations. Some are needed for the model
itself, and some are needed for the KKT conditions that will be developed later
in this chapter.
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Figure 3.1 shows the predecessors of scenario tree node u3 for a simple tree.
Predecessor nodes pred(u) is the set of nodes in the scenario tree that precedes
u.
Figure 3.1: Predecessor nodes of u3
Figure 3.2 shows the successors of scenario tree node u2 for a simple tree.
Successor nodes succ(u) is the set nodes in the scenario tree that succeeds
u.
Figure 3.2: Successor nodes of u2
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Figure 3.3 illustrates the set m(u) for u1. This set is defined as the end nodes
that succeed from node u. When u is itself an end node, m(u) = u.
Figure 3.3: Endnodes m(u) for (u1)=(u3,u4)
Figure 3.4 illustrates u− for u5. u− is defined as the empty set ∅ when u does
not have predecessor.
Figure 3.4: Direct predecessor u− for u5
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Figure 3.5 illustrates b(u,u ′) for (u0,u3) (top) and for (u0,u2) (bottom). b(u,u ′)
is the direct successor from u that is in pred(u ′).
Figure 3.5: b(u,u ′): direct successor from u that is in pred(u ′) ∪ u ′ shown for
(u0,u3)=u1 (top) and (u0,u2)=u2 (bottom)
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3.1.2 Parameters
Parameter Unit Explanation
αp [-] risk aversion parameter in CV@Rpαp for producer p
BPpu [bUSD] budget for expansions for producer p in scenario tree
node u
BTSOu [bUSD] budget for expansions of arc capacity for the TSO in u
CAPA0a [bcf/d] initial flow rate capacity on arc a
CAPP0prn [bcf/d] initial production capacity for p in n for resource r
CLPprn [bUSD/(bcf/d)] linear production cost for p in n for resource r
C
QP
prn [bUSD/(bcf/d)
2] quadratic production cost for p in n for resource r
CFa [bUSD] operational cost term for TSO
C∆Aa [bUSDbcf/d ] cost per unit of arc flow rate capacity expansion on a
C∆Pprn [bUSDbcf/d ] cost per unit of production capacity expansion in p of
resource r in country node n
C∆Rprn [bUSDbcf ] cost per unit of reserves expansion in resource r for pro-
ducer p in country node n
Du [d] number of days in a stage
∆Rprnu(ξ) [bcf] realised reserve expansion, for resource r, in country
node n, in scenario node u
δpn [-] market power parameter for producer p in country node
(market) n
γu [-] discount factor for scenario tree node u
INTnu [bUSDbcf ] intercept of inverse demand curve in scenario tree node
u, country node n
Pr(u) [-] probability for scenario tree node u
RP0prn [bcf] reserves of resource r available for producer p in coun-
try node n initially
SLPnu [
bUSD/bcf
bcf/d
] slope of inverse demand curve in scenario tree node u,
node n
Where bUSD is billion US Dollars, bcf is billion cubic feet and d denotes
days.
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3.1.3 Variables
Variable Unit Explanation
eAau [bcf/d] arc flow rate capacity expansion invested in by TSO on
arc a in scenario tree node u
ePprnu [bcf/d] production capacity expansion invested in, in scenario
tree node u for resource r by p in country node n
eRprnu [bcf] expansion of reserves of type r invested in by producer
p in country node n in scenario tree node u
fpau [bcf/d] arc flow rate on arc a for producer p, in scenario tree
node u
kp [-] quantile related to αp in CV@Rpαp for producer p
pinu [bUSD/bcf] price from the inverse demand function in node n in u
qprnu [bcf/d] production rate of r produced by p in node n in sce-
nario tree node u
qSpnu [bcf/d] gas rate sold by p in scenario tree node u, to country
node n
sau [bcf/d] sold arc flow rate by TSO on a in scenario tree node u
ypu [-] variable for linearization of CV@Rpαp
zpu [-] variable for dual representation of CV@Rpαp
All these variables are nonnegative except kp, which is free. Non-negativity
restrictions are not written explicitly in the following model.
3.1.4 Dual Variables
Variable Sign Unit Explanation
piMnu free [bUSD/bcf] duals to the sales market clearing con-
straints
τau free [bUSD/bcf] duals to the arc flow market clearing
constraints
λPprnu non-negative [bUSD/bcf/d] duals to the producer’s capacity con-
straints
λTa,u non-negative [bUSD/bcf/d] duals to TSO arc expansion constraints
φPpnu non-negative [bUSD/bcf/d] duals to the producer’s mass balance re-
striction
µPpu non-negative [-] duals to the producer’s budget restric-
tion
µTu non-negative [-] duals to TSO budget constraint
ρPprnu non-negative [bUSD/bcf] duals to the producer’s reserve con-
straint
σpu non-negative [-] duals to the linearization constraint
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Throughout this chapter the corresponding dual variable is given in parenthesis
to the right of the constraints.
3.2 The Natural Gas Supply Chain
The natural gas supply chain can be divided into activities upstream and down-
stream. Upstream refers to the processes from exploration to development of
production to production. Downstream processes are what happens after pro-
duction. Figure 3.6 illustrates the natural gas supply chain. First, natural gas is
located and produced in the upstream part of the supply chain. Following this,
it is processed and then transported to either liquefaction into LNG, storage or
consumption by one of several sectors (downstream processes). The following
sections look at production and exploration, transportation and demand and
consumption in the natural gas supply chain and present the modeling of the
entire system.
Figure 3.6: The natural gas supply chain. Source: American Petroleum Institute
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3.3 Production
Exploration and production (E&P) is performed by oil and gas companies such
as Total, Chevron, Shell, Statoil and BP and their suppliers. There are four ma-
jor steps in exploration and production, as shown in Figure 3.7, adapted from
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Figure 3.7: Steps in Exploration & Production. Source: American Petroleum Institute
the website of the American Petroleum Institute. The first stage is to identify
natural gas resources using geological data and seismic surveys. On land, this
is done by truck, while ships are used for seaborne surveys. The second stage,
exploration, is carried out in promising areas by drilling exploration wells to
further assess the amount of gas available for extraction. Drilling an explo-
ration well typically takes a little less than a month. After this, the well has
to be tested. The results of this could be that very little gas is found, or the
amounts found could be as expected or sometimes substantially higher than
expected. If the exploration wells are successful, stage three is started, as plans
to build production facilities and plans to start production are made.
The construction or development of a field consists of drilling several produc-
tion wells and building production facilities. A number of well sites are identi-
fied, and a drilling schedule is made to plan the drilling of production wells. A
suitable size of processing facilities is also constructed at this stage. For shale
gas development, an extra stage follows after drilling. Big pumps are used
to pump, water, sand and chemicals down in the well in order to fracture the
shale rock containing the gas so that the gas flows freely from the shale and
up to the ground [EIA, 2013d]. This extra step increases development time and
capital expenditures for shale gas development.
For onshore natural gas, the time between the first exploration well is drilled
and the production starts often range around two to three years. For offshore
projects, the lead time is often more than three times longer because offshore
projects require big production facilities to be placed on the seabed or on plat-
forms, which takes time to plan and execute.
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The fourth stage is production. When production starts, production rate is typ-
ically planned to first build up to a plateau and then produce at approximately
that level for as long as there is gas left that is profitable to extract. During the
late years of production in a field, production rates will typically decline as the
pressure in the reservoir decreases.
Following the upstream parts of the natural gas supply chain are the down-
stream processes. Processing removes any unwanted substances such as sul-
phur, water, oil and CO2 from the gas. Natural gas liquids (mainly butane,
propane and heptane) are separated out and sold separately. Next, the gas is
either transported by pipe or liquefied to LNG and transported by ship and
regasified again. After this, the gas is either stored or sold for use to different
sectors. The producer can sell its produced gas either by long-term contracts
or to the spot market. Currently, the volume of spot marketed gas is increas-
ing in Europe, and long-term contracts are being linked to spot prices [EC,
2013].
3.3.1 Producer
In this model, production is modeled in the following way: a producer p is an
actor that produces natural gas in one or more country nodes n and sells the
gas to different country nodes n. A producer can deliver gas to a country node
n by transporting gas, for a cost, τau, consisting of a base cost plus a congestion
fee, through a gas pipeline network. The producer wants to maximize his profit
given a preference towards risk. This risk preference is expressed through the
CV@Rpαp , meaning that producer p maximizes the profits in the αp ∗ 100%
worst scenarios.
3.3.2 Assumptions
• The producer selects production, transportation and sales rates for a pe-
riod at a time, taking future periods into account.
• The producer sells all the gas directly to the consuming country, and pays
for transportation in the pipeline network to transport the gas to market.
• The producer has a risk preference that can be described by CV@R.
• Expansions of production capacities and reserves are possible in a con-
tinuous range of values. In reality, expansions are stepwise. Continuous
values are needed because the MCP solvers needed for this kind of equi-
librium problem cannot handle integer variables.
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• The producers have imperfect information, meaning that they know the
probability tree, but not which tree node they and their competitors will
end up in.
• There are no losses in transportation.
• There is no option of storing gas for later periods.
• A field comes on stream five years after the decision of exploring the field
has been made, regardless of location and whether or not it is a shale gas
field or a conventional field.
• Production facilities take five years to build and set into operation.
• Production costs are quadratic.
• Processing costs are assumed to be included in production costs.
• The role of trading natural gas is merged with the producer, so that the
producers decide sales volume to end markets instead of traders.
3.3.3 The Producers’ Problem
The producer is concerned with maximizing the CV@R of his profit, subject to
the technical limitations he faces. The next sections present the building blocks
of his objective and the constraints he has to respect.
In order to maximize the CV@R of the profits, the producers make the following
decisions for each country node n in each scenario tree node, u:
• production rate of resource r, in country node n, in scenario tree node u,
qprnu
• sales rate to country node n, in scenario tree node u, qSpnu
• investments in reserves expansion for resource r, in country node n, in
scenario tree node u, eRprnu
• investments in production capacity expansion for resource r, in country
node n, in scenario tree node u, ePprnu
In addition, the producer decides the arc flow capacity bought from the TSO,
fpau, for each arc a and scenario tree node u.
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3.3.3.1 Expected Profit
The producer’s profit is the discounted sum of his revenues from sales minus
operational costs (transportation and production costs) and capital expendi-
tures (costs of exploration and development). The producer’s expected profit,
E[profitp], can be calculated as:
E[profitp]
=
∑
u∈U
Pr(u)
[
γu
(∑
n∈N
Duq
S
pnuδpn(INTnu − SLPnu ∑
p′∈P
qSp′nu) + (1 − δpn)pi
M
nu

−
∑
n∈N,a∈a+(n)
Duτaufpau (3.1)
−
∑
r∈R,n(p)∈N
(
ePprnuC
∆P
prn + e
R
prnuC
∆R
prn +Du(C
LP
prnqprnu + C
QP
prn(qprnu)
2)
))]
Using the notation from Section 2.6, Xwould correspond to the terms inside the
square brackets in Equation (3.1). Note that Equation (3.1) is linear except for
the two squared terms with a negative sign in front of them. This means that
the expression for the profit (and thus the expected value) is concave.
If the producer wants to produce a low amount of gas from a well, the pressure
is typically high enough to get the desired gas flow without great effort. When
the producer wants to increase production, however, costs increase. This is
because more effort has to be put in to increase flow by increasing workload
on pumps, compressors and processing facilities. These increasing production
costs are assumed to follow the shape of a quadratic function. The production
cost function is Cost = CLPprnqprnu + C
QP
prn(qprnu)
2.
The costs of expansions of reserves and production capacities are assumed to
be linear. In reality, the fixed costs associated with acquiring drilling rigs or
constructing facilities would give decreasing costs per unit of expansion, but
the model assumes that these costs are linear. Depending on choice of input
parameters, this will either make small expansions less expensive than in reality
or make big expansions more expensive than in reality.
As discussed in Chapter 2, some of the producers in the natural gas market may
exert market power. Therefore, the price term in the producer’s expected profit
37
CHAPTER 3. MODEL
function (Eq. (3.1)) is composed by a weight between the inverse demand curve
and the competitive price, where δpn ∈ [0, 1] expresses the weight between pure
Cournot competition (δpn = 1) and competitive market price (δpn = 0). Thus, a
higher δpn implies greater market power.
3.3.3.2 Objective
The objective for a risk neutral producer would be to maximize Equation (3.1).
This is similar to what is done in [Egging et al., 2010]. Here however, the pro-
ducers are assumed to have varying degrees of risk aversion expressed through
αp. Therefore, they might want to control the downside risk by making optimal
decisions in the αp ∗ 100% worst outcomes. This approach adds the decision
variable kp for each producer p (see Section 2.6).1
The producer’s objective is given by:
max
qprnu, qSpnu, ePprnu
eRprnu, fpau
CV@Rpαp
(
profitp(qprnu, qSpnu, e
P
prnu, e
R
prnu, fpau)
)
= max
qprnu, qSpnu, ePprnu
eRprnu, fpau
max
kp
(
kp −
1
αp
E[kp − profitp]
+
)
(3.2)
Here, profitp is the term inside the brackets in Equation (3.1). The producers’
objective expresses the risk adjusted expected profit. The value of CV@Rpαp is
the expected profit given that the profits are lower than the lower αp-quantile
of the profit distribution. To calculate the expected profit for a given optimal
solution of Equation (3.2), Equation (3.1) has to be evaluated with the optimal
decisions. This is useful for comparing profits for different levels of risk aver-
sion. It should also be noted that for αp = 1 Equation (3.2) is equal to Equation
(3.1). When αp = 0, Equation (3.2) is not defined.
3.3.3.3 Production Constraints
When the producer develops a field, a certain production capacity is selected
and built. The production rate in a field cannot exceed this capacity unless the
1kp is not a variable the producer explicitly decides, but an implicit decision that is a conse-
quence of the other decision variables. It is a decision variable in the mathematical model.
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facilities have been expanded in previous time periods. Equation (3.3) describes
this relation.
qprnu 6 CAPP0prn +
∑
u′∈pred(u)
ePprnu′ ∀ p, r,n,u (λPprnu) (3.3)
The production rate of each resource type r, by p in country node n and sce-
nario tree node u, must be less than or equal to the initial maximum production
rate (CAPP0prn), plus the capacity invested in (ePprnu), in all preceding scenario
tree nodes.
Here, expansion in production capacity is allowed to be a continuous amount.
In reality, capacity expansions are only available in steps. Here, however, we
keep the variables continuous by allowing the producer to expand in fractions
of these steps. When a solution from the model is obtained, very small expan-
sions might be regarded as marginal projects that might not have been realized
in reality.
3.3.3.4 Mass Balance Constraints
The producer is responsible for transporting the gas to the market. As the gas
has to flow through the existing pipelines, the amount a producer sends into a
country plus the amount it produces there must equal the amount is sends out
of the country plus the amount it sells there.
∑
r∈R
qprnu +
∑
a∈a+(n)
fpau − q
S
pnu −
∑
a∈a−(n)
fpau = 0 ∀ p,n,u (φPpnu) (3.4)
Equation (3.4) states that for every node n, each producer’s production rate in
that node plus the producer’s total inflow rate to n must equal the producer’s
sales rate to the node n plus the producer’s total outflow rate from n, for every
resource r and scenario tree node u.
3.3.3.5 Expansion Constraints
The producer produces natural gas from its reserves. The cumulative produc-
tion in a field cannot exceed the reserves in that field. However, the reserves can
be expanded through exploration. The costs of exploration of natural gas and
construction of production facilities have to be within the limits of the capital
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available to the producer. These two relations are described in the following
constraints:
∑
u′∈pred(u)
Du′qprnu′ +Duqprnu 6 RP0prn
+
∑
u′∈pred(u)
∆Rprnu′(ξ)e
R
prnu′−
+∆Rprnu(ξ)e
R
prnu− ∀ p, r,n,u (ρPprnu) (3.5)
∑
r∈R,n(p)∈N
(
C∆Pprne
P
prnu + C
∆R
prne
R
prnu
)
6 BPpu ∀ p,u (µPpu) (3.6)
Equation (3.5) states that the total produced quantity of each resource type
for each producer in each node n and each scenario tree node u, must be less
than or equal to the original reserves plus the stochastically determined reserve
expansions invested in, in previous time periods. Equation (3.6) states that
for each time period and scenario, a producer can only incur costs related to
expansions of reserves and production capacity within a budget limit.
Figure 3.8: Illustration of Constraint (3.5)
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Figure 3.8 illustrates Equation (3.5) over three time periods for one resource
type and the scenario tree in Figure 3.1. For each different scenario, the increase
in the limit per unit of reserves expansion invested in will be different.
Figure 3.9: Illustration of reserve expansion cost and payoff timing
The timing of investments in reserves, costs of these investments and reserve
expansions from investments are illustrated in Figure 3.9 for the first two stages
in the scenario tree in Figure 3.1. Costs are incurred at time t (node u0) and
reserves are expanded at time t+ 1 (node u1 and u2).
All the constraints in the producers’ problems are linear. In combination with
the concave objective functions, this leads to convex problems for the produc-
ers.
3.4 Natural Gas Pipelines
Figure 3.10 illustrates the natural gas pipelines in Europe. After the natural
gas is produced and input to the transmission pipelines, the TSO is responsible
for gas transportation from the producers and delivery to marketers, storage
operators and local distribution companies. Legislation regulating the owner-
ship, operation and revenue scheme of the transmission network differs from
country to country. In the past it was common that the TSO sold gas to end
customers and/or participated in production related activities. Due to the
large infrastructure investments required for effective transmission, the TSO
often forms a natural monopoly on transport. The monopoly gave the TSO a
41
CHAPTER 3. MODEL
market position that was sub-optimal from a socioeconomic point of view. To
counter this effect the European Commission made legislation aimed at func-
tional and ownership unbundling.2 In Europe this process started in the late
1990’s [Egging, 2010].
Figure 3.10: Natural gas pipelines in Europe. Source: IEA
The pipelines in Figure 3.10 are in reality operated by many different TSOs. In
this model it is assumed that all pipelines are operated by a single TSO. There
are no storage operators in the model and gas is sold by producers to end
customers. In Figure 3.10 it can be seen that there are two types of pipelines,
one for L-gas (yellow pipes) and one for H-gas (blue and red pipes).3 To reduce
the network complexity it is assumed that all gas has the same calorific value,
that no more than one pipe goes from one country to another and transmission
losses are ignored.
The TSO revenues should be such that the TSO has an incentive for neces-
sary expansions and reliable operations, while at the same time prohibiting
2Process of making sure that the TSO is independent in regards to organisation, ownership and
decision making from activities not related to transportation and distribution.
3H-gas (high calorific gas) consists of 87-99% methane. L-gas (low calorific gas) consists of
80-87% methane and higher quantities of nitrogen and carbon dioxide. L-gas is cheaper than
H-gas because its energy content is lower. The calorific value of L-gas is between eight and ten
kilowatt hours per cubic meter, while the range for H-gas is between ten and twelve kilowatt hours
[WINGAS, nd].
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the extraction of monopoly profit. To achieve this, regulatory intervention is
needed. In Europe this is done differently in various countries [Ruester et al.,
2012]. Typically, the TSO revenues are comprised of two factors; a fixed tariff
aimed at recovering costs and a congestion fee resulting from saturation of the
pipelines. In our model we assume full Third Party Access4 and that the un-
bundling is fully implemented. The TSO then allocates transportation based on
the producers demand and the revenue scheme is the same for all pipes.
When market dynamics change, capacity expansions are needed in order to
maintain an effective network. Due to the physical nature of the pipes, these
expansions will happen in steps in reality. In order to keep the model convex,
so that the resulting MCP is solvable, we assume that continuous expansions
are possible.
3.4.1 Assumptions
• The TSO is a regulated player.
• There is one TSO who operates the entire pipeline network.
• The operational costs are linear.
• It is possible to invest in a continuous range of pipeline expansions.
• Congestion pricing is used for the natural gas pipelines.
• There are no losses in transportation.
• There is no storage.
• Full Third Party Access.
• The many smaller natural gas pipelines that might exist between two
countries are modeled as one aggregated pipe.
3.4.2 The Transmission System Operator’s Problem
The TSO is concerned with maximizing revenues from transportation and con-
gestion less the cost of operation and expansion. The TSO therefore maximises
the expected profit over all scenarios by deciding on arc capacities expansions
of each arc a, in scenario tree node u, eAau and the flow rate on each arc a in
each scenario tree node u, sau.
4No discrimination among pipeline users.
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3.4.2.1 Objective
max
eAau,sau
E[profittso]
=
∑
a∈A,u∈U
Pr(u)γu
(
sauDu[τau − C
F
a] − C
∆A
a e
A
au
)
(3.7)
Note that the price of transport, τau is not a decision variable for the TSO,
but a price given by the dual to the market clearing constraint (Eq. (3.11)). In
this implementation τau represents two things; one part that covers the TSO’s
cost of operation and one part representing congestion fees. When there is no
congestion there will be no expansions, and τau equals the cost of operation.
Without congestion the TSO will have zero profit. When pipes are congested
the part of τau that represent congestion fees is larger than zero and gives the
TSO an investment incentive. Note that this part of τau is not actually payed
to the TSO, put provides a mechanism for efficient allocation of scarce capacity.
For more on congestion fees see [Gabriel et al., 2012a, Chapter 9].
3.4.2.2 Constraints
In reality pipeline capacities are dependent on flows and pressure differences
in neighbouring pipes. This can be modeled with nonlinear equations, but
this greatly complicates the MCP. More importantly, the technical modeling
of pipe flows is not needed for the strategic research questions of this work.
We therefore ignore pressure differences, in line with the recommendations by
Gabriel et al. [2012a]. The flow rates sold by the TSO are then constrained
by the pipe flow rate capacities. Since the model allows for expansions, the
flow rate capacities may increase over time. This situation is modeled by Eq.
(3.8).
sau 6 CAPA0a +
∑
u′∈pred(u)
eAau′ ∀ a,u (λTa,u) (3.8)
Eq. (3.8) makes sure that the sold arc flow rate in scenario tree node u is less
than or equal to the initial flow rate capacity plus flow rate capacity invested
in in all preceding scenario tree nodes.
The expansions of the flow rate capacities are constrained by the TSO budget.
This is modeled in Eq. (3.9).
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∑
a∈A
C∆Aa e
A
au 6 BTSOu ∀ u (µTu) (3.9)
All the constraints in the TSO’s problem are linear. In combination with the
linear objective function (in the TSO’s decision variables), this leads to a linear
problem for the TSO.
3.5 End Users
Natural gas consumption can be split in four main sectors: industrial, resi-
dential and commercial, electricity generation and transport. In the industrial
section, natural gas is used for heating, cooking and as a feedstock for creating
other chemicals. In the residential and commercial sector, natural gas com-
monly is used for heating and cooking. In electricity generation, natural gas is
combusted in order to drive generators for electricity. Natural gas is used in
the transportation section, mostly for heavy duty vehicles and vessels [NGSA,
nd].
In some of these sectors, demand for natural gas is seasonal. This is especially
true for the residential and commercial sector, where the temperature affects
how much gas is needed for heating. In the winter, natural gas demand is
therefore much higher than in the summer. Figure 3.11 shows the natural gas
consumption in the EU from 2009 to 2013. The consumption (the blue series)
is much higher in the first and last quarters, the winter months, than in the
second and third quarters. Since it is more efficient for the production to be
more stable throughout the year than demand is, gas is supplied in a steady
stream by producers and an inventory of stored gas is built during the spring
and summer for use in the winter months.
3.5.1 Consumers
In this model, the consumers are modeled as one combined demand sector
in each country. The demand is also deseasonalized so that each period of
the model has one level of demand. The demand is represented as an inverse
demand curve for each country that represents the relationship between price
and demand, namely that there should be some price sensitivity such that a
higher price leads to lower demand.
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Figure 3.11: EU gas consumption, production and imports in TWh. Source: EC
3.5.2 Assumptions
• The demand in the different sectors are aggregated in the model.
• Demand can be represented by a linear inverse demand curve.
• Demand is independent of seasons.
• There is no storage of gas by the consumers.
3.5.3 Market Clearing in the Natural Gas Market
The inverse demand function in country node n in scenario tree node u ex-
presses the relation between price and sold gas flow. As the total demand is the
sum of the demand in each sector, the inverse demand function can be found by
summing the inverse demand functions horizontally as shown in Figure 3.12.
The resulting function is then approximated by a linear function.
46
CHAPTER 3. MODEL
pinu = INTu − SLPu
∑
p∈P
qSpnu ∀ n,u (piMnu) (3.10)
Equation (3.10) clears the market between consumers and gas-selling produc-
ers.
The aggregation of the different sectors into one inverse demand function
means that the model is not concerned with which sector buys the gas. The
aggregation is illustrated in Figure 3.12. The demand functions are summed
horizontally to form one demand function. However, it is possible to split the
sold gas into the separate sectors after solving the model. What is lost, however,
are price differences between the sectors.
Figure 3.12: Illustration of demand curve aggregation
The inverse demand function used in the model is linearized as shown in Fig-
ure 3.12. Clearly, such a demand function is not an optimal description of de-
mand, as the slope of the inverse demand curve (the amount the price changes
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when the quantity sold changes) should be different at different quantity lev-
els. Consumers might be willing to pay much less for the second unit of natural
gas as the first, but the difference in valuation between the hundredth and the
hundred-and-first unit might not be as big.5 Therefore, other forms of inverse
demand functions might be suggested. However, the lack of information avail-
able on price elasticities in different ranges of sold quantities makes estimating
the parameters of such curves less likely to give significantly better model-
ing of natural gas demand. Therefore, the linear inverse demand function is
used.
3.5.4 Market Clearing in the Pipeline Transportation Market
The sales of flow capacity to all producers must match the amount of flow
on the given pipeline for all pipelines and time periods. Therefore, this flow
constraint must hold for each arc a:
sau −
∑
p∈P
fpau = 0 ∀ a,u (τau) (3.11)
Equation (3.11) ensures that the flow rate sold by the TSO on each arc equals
the sum of the producers’ flow rates on the given arc and thus clears the market
for transportation of natural gas.
This part of Chapter 3 has presented a model formulation for a natural gas
market. The model has multiple objectives, one for each actor. It is therefore
not possible to solve it as an ordinary optimization problem, because these
need to have one single objective. One way of finding a solution to such a
multi-objective model is to reformulate it as an MCP.
Another option is to assume perfect competition. In this case, the solution can
be found by maximizing the social welfare (see Gabriel and Smeers [2006]).
However, market power cannot be captured in a model maximizing social wel-
fare.6 Therefore, this approach is not used.
The next part of this chapter develops the MCP for the presented model.
5It is possible to get the slope approximately right in a small domain of the inverse demand
function, making the linear inverse function a first order approximation of the true inverse demand
function in a given point.
6It is possible to add a markup for the producers to model market power in a social welfare max-
imization model, but with this approach geographical diversification is not captured, see [Egging,
2010].
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3.6 MCP Formulation
In this section, an MCP formulation of the problem is derived using KKT con-
ditions.7 Before the KKT conditions are derived, the model is put in standard
form (see Section 2.3.1), which means that the objective is minimized and the
constraints are of the form g(x) 6 0 and h(x) = 0. This is easily achieved
by changing signs of some of the expressions in the previously presented
model.
All the constraints in the model presented are linear. The profit of the producers
are concave, differentiable functions, and the profit function for the TSO is
linear. Therefore, the problem is convex and the solution to the KKT conditions
of the presented model gives a solution that is guaranteed to be optimal.
3.6.1 Deriving KKT Conditions with CV@R
When the KKT conditions for the producers’ problems are formed, special at-
tention has to be paid to the producers’ stationarity conditions. This is because
the partial derivatives of CV@Rpαp have to be derived for the stationarity con-
ditions. Deriving the partial derivatives of the CV@Rpαp is complicated by the
fact that only the positive part of the term in brackets in Equation (3.2) adds
to the objective. Therefore, the partial derivatives of CV@Rpαp should be zero
for the scenarios where the term in brackets in Equation (3.2) is negative (the
scenarios where the profits are above the quantile kp). Two methods for dealing
with this are presented and discussed.
3.6.1.1 Partial Derivatives of CV@Rpαp Using Auxiliary Variables
To find the appropriate partial derivatives using auxiliary variables, we start
with the partial derivatives of Equation (3.1) (If Equation (3.1) was the ob-
jective, the producer would be risk neutral and would therefore consider all
scenarios). In this case, the producer’s objective would have been to minimize
the following:
7When taking partial derivatives with respect to variables that appear in constraints and equa-
tions in several scenario tree nodes, special care has to be taken. An explanation of this with an
example is given in Appendix B.
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− E[profitp]
= −
∑
u∈U
Pr(u)
[
γu
(∑
n∈N
Duq
S
pnuδpn(INTnu − SLPnu ∑
p′∈P
qSp′nu) + (1 − δpn)pi
M
nu

−
∑
n∈N,a∈a+(n)
Duτaufpau (3.12)
−
∑
r∈R,n(p)∈N
(
ePprnuC
∆P
prn + e
R
prnuC
∆R
prn +Du(C
LP
prnqprnu + C
QP
prn(qprnu)
2)
))]
The partial derivatives of Equation 3.13 is as follows:
∂E[profitp]
∂qprnu
= Pr(u)γuDu(C
LP
prn + 2C
QP
prnqprnu) ∀ p, r,n,u (3.13)
∂E[profitp]
∂qSpnu
= −Pr(u)γuDuδpnINTnu − SLPnu(∑
p′∈P
qSp′nu + q
S
pnu)
 ∀ p,n,u (3.14)
∂E[profitp]
∂ePprnu
= Pr(u)γuC
∆P
prn ∀ p, r,n,u (3.15)
∂E[profitp]
∂eRprnu
= Pr(u)γuC
∆R
prn ∀ p, r,n,u (3.16)
∂E[profitp]
∂fpau
= Pr(u)γuDuτau ∀ p,a,u (3.17)
∂E[profitp]
∂kp
= 0 ∀ p,a,u (3.18)
To ensure that only the outcomes in the α ∗ 100% worst scenarios affect the
producer’s decisions, the following steps are taken.
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Let zpu be defined as:
zpu =

1
αp
if profitpu < kp
0 if profitpu > kp
zpu(·) if profitpu = kp
(3.19)
Where zpu(·) is defined implicitly through the equation:
∑
u∈u(s)
Pr(u)zpu = 1 ∀ s ∈ S (3.20)
The zpu are part of the dual representation of CV@R (see Section 2.6, [Pflug and
Ro¨misch, 2007]). These are used to form the partial derivatives for CV@Rpαp .
The zpu variables make sure that the partial derivative is zero for the scenar-
ios where the profit is larger than the quantile kp. This makes sure that the
outcomes in the scenarios that we want to disregard (the (1 − α) ∗ 100% best
scenarios) do not affect the optimal decisions.
The partial derivatives of the CV@Rpαp in the directions qprnu and qSpnu, are
given by the following equation:
∂CV@Rpαp(profitp)
∂qprnu
= zpu
(
∂E[profitp]
∂qprnu
)
(3.21)
∂CV@Rpαp(profitp)
∂qSpnu
= zpu
(
∂E[profitp]
∂qSpnu
)
(3.22)
The partial derivatives in other directions have a similar form. Finally, this
yields the following stationarity conditions for the producers:
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zpu
[
Pr(u)γuDu(C
LP
prn + 2C
QP
prnqprnu)
]
+ λPprnu − φ
P
pnu
+(Duρ
P
prnu +
∑
u′∈succ(u)
Du′ρ
P
prnu′) = 0 ∀ p, r,n,u (3.23)
−zpu
[
Pr(u)γuDuδpnINTnu − SLPnu(∑
p′∈P
qSp′nu + q
S
pnu)
]+ φPpnu = 0 ∀ p,n,u (3.24)
zpu
[
Pr(u)γuC
∆P
prn
]
−
∑
u′∈succ(u)
λPprnu
+C∆Pprnµ
P
pu = 0 ∀ p, r,n,u (3.25)
zpu
[
Pr(u)γuC
∆R
prn
]
+ C∆Rprnµ
P
pu
−
∑
u′∈succ(u)
∆Rprn,b(u,u′)ρ
P
prnu′ = 0 ∀ p, r,n,u (3.26)
zpu [Pr(u)γuDuτau] − φ
P
pn+(a)u
+φPpn−(a)u = 0 ∀ p,a,u (3.27)
3.6.1.2 Partial Derivatives of CV@Rpαp(profitp) Using Linearization
Another approach is to linearize the CV@Rpαp(profitp) expression and then
take the partial derivatives of the resulting expressions. Recall the producers’
objective:
max
qprnu, qSpnu, ePprnu
eRprnu, fpau,
CV@Rpαp(profitp)
= max
qprnu, qSpnu, ePprnu
eRprnu, fpau,
max
kp
(
kp −
1
αp
E[kp − profitp]
+
)
(3.28)
This could be reformulated as:
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min
qprnu, qSpnu, ePprnu
eRprnu, fpau, kp, ypu
−CV@Rpαp(profitp) = −kp +
1
αp
∑
u∈E
Pr(u)ypu (3.29)
s.t.
kp − Xpu − ypu 6 0 ∀ p,u ∈ E (σpu) (3.30)
Here, Xpu, defined for all p and u ∈ E is the discounted profit for producer
p along the path from the first node in the scenario tree to node u. ypu is
non-negative.
For example, following the scenario tree in Figure 3.4 for a producer p:
Xp,′u3′ = profitp,′u3′ + profitp,′u1′ + profitp,′u0′ (3.31)
Where profitpu is:
γu
[∑
n∈N
Duq
S
pnu
δpn(INTnu − SLPnu ∑
p′∈P
qSp′nu) + (1 − δpn)pi
M
nu

−
∑
n∈N,a∈a+(n)
Duτaufpau
−
∑
r∈R,n(p)∈N
(
ePprnuC
∆P
prn + e
R
prnuC
∆R
prn +Du(C
LP
prnqprnu + C
QP
prn(qprnu)
2)
)]
(3.32)
With the linearized producer objectives (Equation (3.29) and (3.30)) the produc-
ers’ stationarity conditions can be expressed as follows (see Section 2.3.1):
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−1+
∑
u∈E
σpu = 0 ∀ p (3.33)
1
αp
Pr(u) −σpu = 0 ∀ p,u ∈ E (3.34)
γuDu(C
PL
prn + 2C
PQ
prnqprnu)
∑
u′∈m(u)
σpu′ + λ
P
prnu −φ
P
nu
+ρPprnuDu +
∑
u′∈succ(u)
Du′ρ
P
prnu′ = 0 ∀ p, r,n,u (3.35)
−γuDu
[
δpn
INTnu − SLPnu(∑
p′∈P
qSp′nu +q
S
pnu)
+ (1− δpn)piMpnu] ∑
u′∈m(u)
σpu′
+φPpnu = 0 ∀ p,n,u (3.36)
γuC
∆P
prn
∑
u′∈m(u)
σpu′ −
∑
u′∈succ(u)
λPprnu′ +µ
P
puC
∆P
prn = 0 ∀ p, r,n,u (3.37)
γuC
∆R
prn
∑
u′∈m(u)
σpu′ −
∑
u′∈succ(u)
∆Rprn,b(u,u′)ρ
P
prnu′
+µPpuC
∆R
prn = 0 ∀ p, r,n,u (3.38)
γuDuτau
∑
u′∈m(u)
σpu′ −φ
P
pn+(a)u +φ
P
pn−(a)u = 0 ∀ p,a,u (3.39)
3.6.1.3 Discussion of Methods for Partial Derivatives
The two proposed methods for calculating the partial derivatives both give the
partial derivatives without too much effort.
The method with the auxiliary variables utilizes the principles of CV@R to say
that the partial derivatives can only be non-zero when the outcome is in the
critical quantile. Implementations of this formulation requires the values of
zpu in Equation (3.19) to be calculated during the solution process, because it
is dependent on kp and profitpu. This situation might require a master-sub-
structure to the solution procedure, where the master problem updates zpu and
the sub-problem finds a solution that the master-problem uses to update zpu.
An obvious issue with this approach is convergence, as zpu is defined in such
a way that it might alternate between 0 and 1
αp
between iterations. This means
that convergence might be difficult to prove.
The method where CV@R is linearized is based on basic optimization tech-
niques for linearizing expressions, and gives a set of stationarity conditions
where some of the terms are bilinear8 because a dual variable is multiplied by
8A bilinear function is a function where variables are multiplied, for instance f(x,y) = xy.
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a primal variable. One implication of this is that a solution method that uses
derivatives of these bilinear expressions might have difficulties if their starting
point is zero (see Chapter 6). Therefore, implementations of this method might
need to state starting points different from zero for some of the decision vari-
ables. Fortunately, this is easily achieved in most optimization languages, for
example by starting from a previous solution. From this discussion, we con-
clude that there are fewer difficulties with implementation of the method with
linearizing CV@R than with using auxiliary variables. Therefore, the lineariza-
tion is used for the rest of this report and for the implementation of the model.
Note that even though CV@R is linearized, the model still accounts for market
power and increasing marginal costs through a quadratic cost function. The
next section gives the entire set of KKT conditions for the natural gas model.
Equation (3.41) - (3.57) are the equations that will be implemented to solve the
problem.
55
CHAPTER 3. MODEL
3.6.2 KKT Conditions
3.6.2.1 KKT Conditions for the Producers
0 6 −1+
∑
u∈E
σpu ⊥ kp > 0 ∀ p (3.40)
0 6 1
αp
Pr(u) −σpu ⊥ ypu > 0 ∀ p,u ∈ E (3.41)
0 6 γuDu(CPLprn + 2CPQprnqprnu)
∑
u′∈m(u)
σpu′ + λ
P
prnu −φ
P
nu
+ρPprnuDu +
∑
u′∈succ(u)
Du′ρ
P
prnu′ ⊥ qprnu > 0 ∀ p, r,n,u (3.42)
0 6 −γuDu
[
δpn
INTnu − SLPnu(∑
p′∈P
qSp′nu +q
S
pnu)

+(1− δpn)piMpnu
] ∑
u′∈m(u)
σpu′
+φPpnu ⊥ qSpnu > 0 ∀ p,n,u (3.43)
0 6 γuC∆Pprn
∑
u′∈m(u)
σpu′ −
∑
u′∈succ(u)
λPprnu′
+µPpuC
∆P
prn ⊥ ePprnu > 0 ∀ p, r,n,u (3.44)
0 6 γuC∆Rprn
∑
u′∈m(u)
σpu′ −
∑
u′∈succ(u)
∆Rprn,b(u,u′)ρ
P
prnu′
+µPpuC
∆R
prn ⊥ eRprnu > 0 ∀ p, r,n,u (3.45)
0 6 γuDuτau
∑
u′∈m(u)
σpu′ −φ
P
pn+(a)u +φ
P
pn−(a)u ⊥ fpau > 0 ∀ p,a,u (3.46)
0 6 ypu − kp +Xpu ⊥ σpu > 0 ∀ p,u ∈ E (3.47)
0 6 CAPP0prn +
∑
u′∈pred(u)
ePprnu′ −qprnu ⊥ λPprnu > 0 ∀ p, r,n,u (3.48)
∑
r∈R
qprnu +
∑
a∈a+(n)
fpau −q
S
pnu −
∑
a∈a−(n)
fpau = 0 φPpnu free ∀ p,n,u (3.49)
0 6 BPpu −
∑
r∈R,n(p)∈N
(
C∆Pprne
P
prnu +C
∆R
prne
R
prnu
)
⊥ µPpu > 0 ∀ p,u (3.50)
0 6 RP0prn −
∑
u′∈pred(u)
Du′qprnu′ −Duqprnu
+
∑
u′∈pred(u)
∆Rprnu′(ξ)e
R
prnu′− +∆Rprnu(ξ)e
R
prnu− ⊥ ρPprnu > 0 ∀ p, r,n,u (3.51)
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3.6.2.2 KKT Conditions for the TSO
0 6 Pr(u)γuC∆Aa −
∑
u′∈succ(u)
λTau′ +C
∆A
a µ
T
u ⊥ eAau > 0 ∀ a,u (3.52)
0 6 −Pr(u)γuDu(τau −CFa) + λTau ⊥ sau > 0 ∀ a,u (3.53)
0 6 CAPA0a − sau +
∑
u′∈pred(u)
eAau′ ⊥ λTau > 0 ∀ a,u (3.54)
0 6 BTSOu −
∑
a∈A
C∆Aa e
A
au ⊥ µTu > 0 ∀ u (3.55)
3.6.2.3 KKT Conditions for Market Clearing
INTnu − SLPnu
∑
p∈P
qSpnu −pinu = 0 pi
M
nu free ∀ n,u (3.56)
sau −
∑
p∈P
fpau = 0 τau free ∀ a,u (3.57)
This chapter has presented a multi-stage stochastic model with multiple pro-
ducers for the natural gas market with expansions in reserves, production and
transportation capacity and competitive markets where the producers can ex-
press risk averse behaviour. Further, the KKT conditions for the mathematical
problem have been derived, forming an MCP and thereby making the problem
solvable. In the following two chapters, the model is first verified with a small
example, followed by a numerical study of a larger scale model.
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4 Model Testing and Preliminary Study
This chapter implements and solves a small instance of the model developed
in Chapter 3. The purpose of this is twofold. The first goal is to verify the
model with respect to risk preferences and competition. Risk preferences and
competition are particularly important aspects that set this model apart from
other natural gas models, and are therefore important to verify. The second goal
is to study the effects of risk preferences and market power on investments and
trade in a gas market, a research question posed in Chapter 1.
4.1 Test Case Setup
The developed model describes a natural gas market where each actor maxi-
mizes their objectives as presented in Chapter 3 while constrained by player-
specific and market-wide restrictions. In this chapter, a test case is studied. The
test case characteristics are:
• There are two producers, P NOR with production in Norway and P NED
with production in the Netherlands.
• Both producers can invest and expand both their resources and produc-
tion rate capabilities, but only in the country node where they are situ-
ated.
• The producers start with both reserves and production capacity in the
first stage.
• There is one demand node, NED, in the network situated in the Nether-
lands.
• Consumers are represented through an estimated inverse demand curve.
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• The TSO operated flow network consists of a single directed pipe from
Norway to the Netherlands.
• Input parameters are based on estimates from Rystad Energy AS. See
Section 5.1 for more info on the input parameters.
The scenario tree models different outcomes of shale gas reserves expansion. In
each stage, there can be either a much lower amount of shale gas than expected,
an amount in the middle that is slightly lower than the expected amount or
a much higher amount than expected. This is chosen to get a distribution
that is skewed to the right, a simple three-point approximation of a lognormal
distribution as proposed by Demirmen [2007]. The values have been scaled so
that the expected realization of reserves expansion is one bcf per bcf invested
in. The three different outcomes have the same probabilities, 13 , for each branch.
This gives each node in the second stage a probability of 13 and each node in the
third stage a probability of 13 ∗ 13 = 19 . We do not possess the expertise required to
set realistic probabilities of the shale gas realizations and have therefore chosen
to let each scenario tree nodes in each stage be equally likely as the others in the
same stage. A more realistic modeling might be possible based on experience
from working with shale gas reservoirs. It is assumed that the amounts of shale
gas found are perfectly correlated between Norway and the Netherlands, while
there is no correlation between the findings in two different stages. There are
three stages, and the different scenarios can be designated by for example ”Low
low” for the scenario where a low amount of shale gas is found in both stage
two and three. Figure 4.1 shows both the probabilities and outcomes in the
scenario tree.
A complete listing of the input data used in this chapter is found in Appendix
A. The problem is implemented and solved using the programming language
GAMS. For more information on the implementation see Section 5.1.
To analyse the situation we compare solutions for different levels of risk aver-
sion, αp, and for different levels of market power, δpn, while keeping other
data inputs constant. By using a relatively small model with realistic data in-
puts, two things are achieved. First, a small model makes it easier to isolate the
effects of different levels of market power and risk aversion. Second, getting
a visual overview of the results of a small model is easier than with a large
model.
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Figure 4.1: Scenario tree
4.2 Verification and Results
Based on economic theory, there are several concepts that a model with risk
aversion and market power is expected to fulfill. We call these concepts the
verification criteria. The ones we focus on are listed below.
• Lower market power leads to lower prices, higher sales rates and lower
expected producer profits. This is based on the concepts in Section 2.2.
• Risk aversion leads to lower investments. When a risk averse producer
is considering investing in something that has an uncertain outcome, he
will regard the uncertain outcome as less valuable than the expected out-
come, and therefore invest less than a risk neutral actor, who regards the
uncertain outcome as just as valuable as the expected outcome.
• The CV@Rpαp of the producers’ profits is a decreasing function of increas-
ing risk aversion. Increasing risk aversion means that the producer will
include fewer of the good scenarios when calculating CV@Rpαp (see Sec-
tion 2.6), thus causing CV@Rpαp to decrease when risk aversion increases.
These criteria will be investigated in the following. If these criteria are not met,
the model is very likely to be incorrect, and will have to be improved so that it
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operates as intended. If these criteria are met, the model appears to be working
correctly.1
4.2.1 The Effects of Risk Aversion and Market Power on Investments and
Trade in a Gas Market
This section studies the effects of different levels of risk aversion and market
power in a small gas market, with focus on investments and trade.
4.2.1.1 Two Risk Neutral Producers
As a benchmark, we first look at a situation when both producers are risk
neutral, αp = 1. We compare solutions where P NOR and P NED compete a` la
Cournot, perfect competition, and a solution where P NOR and P NED both have
moderate market power. The different combinations of market power and risk
aversion are shown in Table 4.1. To represent a moderate level of market power
exertion, a value of 0.6 is chosen for the market power parameter δpn. This is
slightly closer to Cournot than perfect competition.
Table 4.1: Level of risk aversion, αp, and market power, δpn, for three competitive
settings.
αp δpn
Perfect Competition 1.0 0.0
Moderate Market Power 1.0 0.6
Full Cournot 1.0 1.0
Note that when αp = 1, CV@Rpαp(profitp) = E[profitp]. The optimal objective
values for the different actors and economic surpluses for the three cases are
listed in Table 4.2. When producer market power increase, producer profits in-
crease, while social welfare and consumer surpluses decrease. In the moderate
market power case P NOR’s profit is 93 bUSD. This is 15% lower than under full
Cournot competition. For P NED the profit is also 15% lower in the moderate
market power case. Due to quadratic costs the profits are larger than zero in
the perfect competition case as well. According to the basic economic theory
presented in Section 2.2 this is as expected. The TSO has zero profits in all of
the three cases since the pipeline never gets congested.
1In principle it is not possible to prove that a model gives a correct representation of the real
world. Falsification is always possible, so this is the verification approach chosen.
61
CHAPTER 4. MODEL TESTING AND PRELIMINARY STUDY
Table 4.2: Optimal Economic surpluses [bUSD] for different actors in various forms of
competition.
Actor Attribute Perfect
Competi-
tion
Moderate
Market
Power
Full
Cournot
P NOR Expected Profit 42.51 92.98 108.91
P NED Expected Profit 30.85 94.60 110.94
TSO Expected Profit 0.00 0.00 0.00
Consumers Expected Surplus 379.49 238.93 184.32
System Expected Social Welfare 452.85 426.50 404.17
Investments
Figure 4.2 illustrates the levels of investments in the three cases. With the
given input data, the production capacity is so high that investments in capacity
expansions are not needed. Therefore, all investments are in expansions of
reserves. The general trend in Figure 4.2 is that lower market power leads to
higher investments by P NED. Under moderate market, P NED invests 2.2 bUSD
in the first stage, 35% of the investments they make under perfect competition.
Under full Cournot competition, P NED invest 1.6 bUSD in the first stage, 25%
of the perfect competition investments level. Under perfect competition, P NED
uses it’s cost advantage in production costs to capture the entire market from
stage 2 and onwards. Therefore, it is not worthwhile for P NOR to invest in
expansions, and all expansions therefore occur in the Netherlands in the perfect
competition case. When both producers have moderate market power, prices
are higher than P NOR’s marginal cost, and both producers will therefore take a
share of the market. This is in accordance with the theory presented in Section
2.2. Therefore, they both invest in reserves expansions, though at a lower level
than under perfect competition because they can achieve increased prices at
lower sales rates and therefore need less gas to market. When they both behave
as full Cournot players, the investments are even lower, down from a total of
6.7 bUSD in the first stage for the two players combined to 1.8 bUSD, a 73%
decrease from perfect competition case.
Another effect observed in Figure 4.2 is that the total investments are quite high
in the first stage (2014), and lower in the following stage (2019). This can be
explained as follows. If the producers find themselves in the scenario tree node
where they find only a small amount of shale gas, they need to invest again in
order to have enough natural gas to sell in the following period. If they find
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Figure 4.2: Investments with risk neutrality and various forms of competition
themselves in the scenario tree node where a moderate amount of shale gas is
found, only a small amount of shale gas reserves expansions is needed for the
next stage. In the scenario where a high amount of shale gas is found, reserves
are plentiful and no further investments in expansions are needed.
The investment behaviour is found to be as expected for the two natural gas
producers. In the second stage of the model, the horizon is just one more
stage in the future, spanning from 2019 to 2024. In reality however, the horizon
would be just as long in the second stage as in the first stage. This would cause
investments in late stages to be greater than in our results. Specifically, invest-
ments might have been seen in the scenario tree nodes where a moderate or
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high amount of shale gas is found, and also in the last stage (2024, not shown).
In a bigger study aimed at more realistic modelling of a natural gas market,
extra stages can be added to the scenario tree to give a stronger incentive for
investments in later stages. For example, if the investments in 2024 are of in-
terest, stages for 2029 and 2034 could be added. This would give producers
reason to plan for the future from 2024, and give a more realistic picture of
investments in 2024. Poor representation of investments in the last stage is a
shortcoming of the scenario tree chosen as input in this test case.
Figure 4.3: Prices and sales rates with risk neutrality and various forms of competition
Trade
Figure 4.3 illustrates the producers’ sales rates and prices in the equilibrium
solutions of the three risk neutral cases. It can be seen from the figure that the
sales rates are higher in the perfect competition case than in the two cases with
market power. In the perfect competition case the average total sales rate is
4.2 bcf/d. This is 45% higher than in the full Cournot case, where the average
total sales rate is 2.9 bcf/d. Higher sales rates when market power is lower was
expected from the first criterion in the start of this chapter, indicating that the
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model operates as intended with respect to market power. Figure 4.3 further
shows that the average price in each stage is higher when the sales rates are
lower (caused by a higher value of δpn).
It is interesting to study the scenario wherein the reserve expansion realization
is the lowest. Here, the producers have a low amount of reserves. There is
therefore a supply deficit that leads to a steep increase in prices. The relative
price increase is largest in the perfect competition case and especially in the
third stage where P NOR has depleted its reserves. In this scenario tree node, the
price increase is 409% compared to the first stage. Such a price increase could
be observed in reality, but would be moderated because when prices increase,
consumers switch to natural gas substitutes. This leads to lower demand and a
moderation of the price increase. This is especially true in the long run, because
natural gas dependent equipment could be replaced by equipment that uses
other energy sources.
An interesting implication of increased market power is that the producer’s
incentive for holding back the sales rates (and thus not depleting reserves)
makes the society better off in bad scenarios. In a world where the worst
scenario plays out, the social welfare (calculated as the social welfare in scenario
tree nodes u0 + u1 + u4) is 6.7% lower under perfect competition, where the
social welfare is 312 bUSD, than when both producers have full market power,
where the social welfare is 333 bUSD. To counter this, a policy maker might
encourage producers to have certain levels of reserves available or encourage
storage of natural gas for use in such situations.
4.2.1.2 One Risk Averse Producer
To study the effects of risk averse behavior, we now look at a variation of the
test case used above. In this variation, P NOR is assumed risk neutral while
P NED is assumed risk averse. The value of αp for P NED is 0.6. This represents a
high level of risk aversion where the producer disregards the 40% best scenarios
when making decisions. Both the producers have full market power and are
therefore competing a` la Cournot. The setting is presented in Table 4.3.
Figure 4.4 compares the investments made when P NED is risk averse and P NOR
is risk neutral, to the investments made when both producers are risk neutral.
The expected result, as hypothesized by the second criterion in the start of
this chapter, is that investments decrease when risk aversion increases. The
results show that the first stage investment made by the risk averse P NED is
0.24 bUSD (15%) lower than in the risk neutral case. Thus we see that the
model operates as intended with respect to this aspect. P NOR responds to
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Table 4.3: Risk preferences and market power setup when one producer is assumed
risk averse.
Producer αp δpn
P NOR 1.0 1.0
P NED 0.6 1.0
P NED’s lower investments by investing 0.12 bUSD (59%) more compared to the
case where both producers are risk neutral. This shift of investments allows
P NOR to supply a larger share of the market and therefore capture more of the
profits. P NOR’s profit is 3% higher when P NED is risk averse. The investment
shift can be seen in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Investments with risk neutrality vs. one risk averse and one risk neutral
producer under Cournot competition.
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Figure 4.5 gives CV@Rpαp , expected profits and consumer surplus when P NED
is risk averse and P NOR is risk neutral and compares them to values of the same
variables when both producers are risk neutral. The competition form is full
Cournot for both combinations of risk aversion. It is evident that P NOR’s ex-
pected profit increases, while P NED’s expected profit and CV@Rpαp decreases.
Consumer surplus decreases by 1.6% and social welfare also decreases by ap-
proximately 1% when P NED becomes risk averse.
Figure 4.5: CV@R, expected profits and consumer surplus with risk neutrality vs. one
risk averse and one risk neutral producer
4.2.1.3 Overall Trends
The previous cases have illustrated different combinations of risk aversion and
market power. Many more are possible, but we do not analyse every one
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of them in detail. To show some overall trends Figure 4.6 gives the optimal
CV@Rpαp values for the two producers for a few different value combinations
of αPNED and δpn.
Figure 4.6: CV@R as a function of αP NED for δpn 0, 0.6 and 1. P NOR is risk neutral
(αP NOR = 1).
The main insight from Figure 4.6 is that, as expected from the third criterion,
CV@Rpαp appears to be falling when αp is lowered.
In the full Cournot and the Moderate market power cases, E[profitP NOR] in-
creases and CV@RP NEDαNED decreases when P NED’s risk aversion increases
(lower value of αP NED). This can be explained as follows. P NED invest less
when their risk aversion is higher. This leads to lower reserves for P NED. As a
consequence, P NED is not able to produce and sell as much natural gas. This
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gives P NOR the opportunity to supply a larger part of the market and increase
its expected profit.
Under full Cournot competition, P NED’s CV@Rpαp is 111 bUSD when they are
risk neutral, and 100 bUSD when they are very risk averse (αP NED = 0.4).
When P NED is risk neutral, P NOR’s expected profit is 109 bUSD, and it is 114
bUSD, 5% higher, when P NED is very risk averse.
Under moderate market power, P NED’s CV@Rpαp is 95 bUSD when they are
risk neutral, and 85 bUSD when they are very risk averse (αP NED = 0.4). When
P NED is risk neutral, P NOR’s expected profit is 93 bUSD, and it is 104 bUSD,
12% higher, when P NED is very risk averse.
In the perfect competition case the trend is a little different. Here, both produc-
ers get higher profits when P NED is more risk averse. P NED’s CV@Rpαp is 31
bUSD when they are risk neutral, and 32 bUSD when they are very risk averse
(αP NED = 0.4). When P NED is risk neutral, P NOR’s expected profit is 43 bUSD,
and it is 45 bUSD, 5% higher, when P NED is very risk averse.
The following provides an explanation of this. As we have noted earlier, in this
case P NED takes the entire market from the second stage and onwards except
in the scenario tree node where the producers find a low amount of shale gas
in the second and third stage. However, when P NED is risk averse they invest
less. P NOR still does not invest and this leads to a shortage in the risk averse
cases. The investments are lower and the shortage is bigger when P NED is more
risk averse. This in turn leads to lower sales rates than they would have been if
investments were at the risk neutral level. This means that both producers get a
higher price and larger profits, while the consumer surplus and social welfare
decrease.
4.3 Summary of Findings
This chapter has tested that the model behaves as expected and studied how
risk aversion and market power affects investments and trade in a natural gas
market. The verification criteria were met by the results:
• Lower market power leads to lower prices, higher sales rates and lower
expected producer profits. In the first stage prices are 54% lower, the total
sales rate is 38% higher and producer profits are 67% lower with perfect
competition than with full Cournot competition.
• Risk aversion leads to 15% lower first stage investments by the risk averse
actor compared to investments when both producers are risk neutral. This
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lowers the expected consumer surplus by 1.6% due to lower production
and sales rates.
• The CV@Rpαp of the producer P NED’s profits decrease from 111 bUSD to
107 bUSD when comparing the risk neutral to the risk averse case with a
value of αp = 0.6.
In the scenarios where a low amount of shale gas is found market power might
make consumers better off. The reason for this is as follows. Market power
creates an incentive for producers to hold back on sales, which in turn leads
to more reserves left for later stages. Therefore, their reserves might not be
depleted in scenarios where very low amounts of new resources become avail-
able. This means that they are able to sell more natural gas even when they
only find very small amounts of gas. This leads to higher consumer surplus in
later periods compared to the perfect competition case.
Under Cournot competition and under moderate levels of market power, the
expected profit of the risk neutral producer increases by 5% under Cournot
competition and 12% under moderate market power as the expected profit of
the risk averse producer decreases, as is seen in Figure 4.6. Under perfect com-
petition we have found that both producers get higher profits when one pro-
ducer is more risk averse. This is because lower investments creates a shortage
in some scenario tree nodes and pushes prices up from the perfect competitive
level.
From this chapter we conclude that the model appears to be working as ex-
pected. In the next chapter we will implement and analyse a larger data in-
stance.
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5 Computational Results and Analysis
In this chapter we use the developed model to answer and discuss the research
questions presented in Chapter 1. The developed model is intended to describe
a general natural gas market, and many different topics can be analyzed using
the results from the model, including infrastructure developments, exploration
strategies for producers and regional price differences. The scope of this chap-
ter is to shed light on the research questions posed in Chapter 1:
• To what extent does shale gas development in Ukraine and Poland have
the possibility to reduce their dependence on Russian natural gas im-
ports?
• How does risk aversion and market power affect investments and trade
in a gas market?
• How does the perceived likelihood of a shale gas ban affect the invest-
ments and trade?
The last question has already been treated in Chapter 4. Therefore, the two first
questions will be given priority.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, the implementation of
the presented model is discussed. First, implementation in the programming
system General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) is presented. Second, an
overview of collection and calibration of data inputs is given. The second sec-
tion looks at different results from the model. First, a general overview of the
results is given. Second, the impact of shale gas developments and risk prefer-
ences is assessed. Third, the effects of the perceived likelihood of a shale gas
ban in Ukraine and Poland is studied.
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5.1 Implementation
When the model is implemented, several aspects have to be considered. The
mathematical model has to be implemented in a suitable programming lan-
guage, data inputs have to be selected and calibrated, and a scenario tree has
to be developed. These aspects are treated in the following.
5.1.1 Implementation in GAMS
To solve the problem, the model has been implemented in the modeling system
GAMS. All constraints, functions, variables and parameters from the model
formulation in Chapter 3 are included in the GAMS code. GAMS does not
distinguish between lower case and capital letters. Therefore certain names
differ between the mathematical model and the code.
The problem is coded in several files. The input data, model equations, solu-
tion procedures and post solve calculations are separated. The problem is then
run from a main file. The separation allows for easy transitions between dif-
ferent data sets. The code is available in Appendix C and in the attached .zip
archive.
To solve the problem, the PATH solver is used. It solves MCPs by using a
modified Newton-search [GAMS-Development-Corporation, nd]. In addition,
the NLP solver CONOPT is occasionally used in order to find an initial point
from which PATH starts its procedures from. For more details on this, see
Chapter 6.
5.1.2 Data Input
Data collection and calibration are important tasks in developing a model that
realistically represents the European natural gas market. The process of collec-
tion and calibration is an iterative process. It starts with collection of data for
the coefficients and parameters of the model. After this, the data are put into
the model without any adjustments. The results from the model then typically
highlights certain aspects of the data that could be calibrated in order to create
results that reflect the current situation in the natural gas market in the first
stage of the model. The data inputs are then adjusted, and the model is run
again. This is repeated until an acceptable picture of the current situation is
reflected in the first stage results of the model. Data of this kind can never
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represent reality perfectly, and the results are affected by the input data cho-
sen. However, we feel confident in the data from Rystad Energy AS and our
calibration.
5.1.2.1 Data Collection
The model presented in Chapter 3 contains a great number of parameters. Data
regarding cost of development and production of shale gas and conventional
gas, potential resources of natural gas, natural gas demand and production and
transportation capacities are needed to run the model. Most of the data have
been provided by the energy consultancy Rystad Energy AS, and are available
in their proprietary database of upstream oil and gas activity called uCube.
Demand data and pipeline capacities are based on publicly available sources.
The data inputs are presented in Tables 5.1 to 5.10.
Table 5.1: Misc. parameters
Attribute Value Unit
Du 1825 days
Discount factor 5% per year
BTSOu 1 bUSD
The model has stages of five years (1825 days) and an annual discount factor of
5%.
5.1.2.2 Data Input for the Producers
The model is set up to give a sufficiently realistic picture of the European nat-
ural gas market to get meaningful results for analysis, while at the same time
keeping the problem size low enough to be solvable. By including the biggest
producers in Europe, the model captures 88% (24 bcf/d) of the production in
Europe in 2014. The producers are represented as national producers, with one
producer in each country. The producers included are Norway, the Nether-
lands, the UK, Russia, Poland and Ukraine. Since the focus of this work is the
European gas market, the producer in Russia, P RUS, is modeled as an exoge-
nous supply source. In order to account for the European supply portion of
P RUS’s production, the production is capped at the current export level and
there is no Russian domestic market or investment opportunities. This is done
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in order to represent P RUS’s exports to Europe only.1 With this aggregation of
the real world situation (where there are several producers in each country) the
number of suppliers are lower, and the sales should therefore come closer to
the monopoly quantities than with more suppliers. This can be remedied by
adjusting the market power parameter down.
Market Power
The presented model allows the modeler to set a market power parameter for
each producer in each market. The real levels of market power are hard to
assess because it is difficult to prove the exertion of market power with the
available information. In order to determine the producers’ market power, the
following approach is used: For each country (market), the number of suppli-
ers is determined by looking at imports to that country as of today. The level
of market power is then determined by the number of suppliers. Many suppli-
ers suggest low market power for each supplier, while few suppliers suggests
high market power for the suppliers in that market. Using this proxy for de-
termining market power, all the producers supplying to a market are assumed
to have the same level of market power in the same market. In reality different
producers could have different levels of market power in a market. This is not
captured by the model, and leads to results where the most powerful suppliers,
such as Russia, get a smaller advantage than what they have in reality.
In order to make the number of possible levels of market power manageable,
increments of 15 are used when setting the market power parameters. Table
5.2 lists the levels of market power in each market. Ukraine has few suppliers
(mainly Russia), and suppliers therefore have a high level of market power in
Ukraine. The UK and Germany on the other hand have a larger set of suppliers
and suppliers therefore have less market power. The Netherlands and Poland
fall in between Ukraine and UK with respect to the amount of market power
given to suppliers.
Reserves Investments
According to EIA [2013b], the three European countries with the largest shale
gas reserves are Ukraine, Poland and France. Shale gas development is banned
in France [the Economist, 2014] while Poland and Ukraine has some of Europe’s
most favorable infrastructure and largest public support for shale gas develop-
ment. Other European countries have much lower shale resources. The input
data therefore only allow for shale gas investments in Ukraine and Poland. In
1Theoretically, Russia could decide to sell all its gas to Europe, but this is not seen as likely.
Their production is therefore capped at their export level.
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Table 5.2: Levels of market power in each market.
Country Market power, δpn
Ukraine 1.0
United Kingdom 0.2
Germany 0.2
Netherlands 0.6
Poland 0.8
the solutions studied here, investments in reserves can only be made in nodes
where producer p already is present. For example, the producer P UKR is the
only producer who can invest in reserves in country node UKR (Ukraine). In
reality producers are able to invest in several countries, but this is not needed
in order to study how shale gas development could take place on a national
level. If the producers were allowed to invest in several countries, the amount
of shale gas developed in a country could be calculated by adding the different
producers’ investments in the given country. In this case, producers who are
risk averse would be expected to invest less in shale gas in a country than risk
neutral producers.
Risk Preferences
The problem is solved for two different cases of risk preferences (see Table 5.3):
a risk averse situation where αp is 0.85 for P UKR and P POL and a risk neutral
setting where all the actors are risk neutral. Lower values of αp, representng
higher degrees of risk aversion, could also have been used. However, the cur-
rent limitations of the model limits the value of αp to [0.85, 1]. For more on
αp-value limitations see Chapter 6. As seen in Chapter 4, a value of αp of 0.85
is sufficient to have a significant impact on the solution. If lower values of αp
had been possible, the impacts of risk aversion on the solution would have been
larger.
Table 5.3: Risk preferences in two cases.
Case αp (p=P UKR and P POL)
Risk averse (RA) 0.85
Risk neutral (RN) 1.00
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Today, 80% of Ukraine’s and 59% of Poland’s natural gas consumption is cov-
ered by Russian imports. Since Poland and Ukraine also have the largest avail-
able shale gas resources they are the most interesting with respect to the risk
associated with shale gas development. We therefore focus on them in par-
ticular and let αUKR and αPOL vary over the two cases. This enables compar-
isons between the results in the two settings so that it is possible to study the
effects of different risk preferences. The rest of the actors are assumed risk
neutral.2
The remaining parameters for the producers are based on data from Rystad
Energy AS, and are presented in Table 5.4-5.7.
Table 5.4: Budgets in bUSD and initial reserves in bcf for producers.
Producers BPpu [bUSD] RP0conv [bcf] RP0shale [bcf]
P NOR 60.0 72075 0
P NED 10.8 39539 63
P POL 3.7 3655 498
P UKR 16.0 11930 166
P RUS 0.0 200000 0
P UK 7.7 15768 0
Table 5.5: Initial capacities in bcf/d for producers.
Producers CAPP0conv [bcf/d] CAPP0shale [bcf/d]
P NOR 10.3 0
P NED 7.6 0
P POL 0.5 0
P UKR 0.8 0
P RUS 20.0 0
P UK 4.2 0
2The model allows for letting more actors be risk averse. Letting the other producers be risk
averse, however, will not make big differences when studying a situation where only P POL and
P UKR are making risky investments.
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Table 5.6: Linear and quadratic cost function coefficients CL: [bUSD/(bcf/d)] CQ:
[bUSD/(bcf/d)2]
Producers CLconv C
Q
conv C
L
shale C
Q
shale
P NOR 0.0027 0.002 - 0.002
P NED 0.0019 0.002 0.0018 0.002
P POL 0.0016 0.006 0.0015 0.006
P UKR 0.0016 0.020 0.0015 0.002
P RUS 0.0020 0.002 - 0.002
P UK 0.0052 0.002 - 0.002
Table 5.7: Costs of expansions for producers, [bUSD/(bcf/d)]
Producers C∆Rconv C∆Rshale C∆Pconv C∆Pshale
P NOR 0.00029 - 0.0028 -
P NED 0.00029 0.0230 0.0013 0.003
P POL 0.00230 0.0053 0.0035 0.022
P UKR 0.00090 0.0030 0.0043 0.014
P RUS - - 0.0018 -
P UK 0.00073 - 0.0033 -
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5.1.2.3 Data Input for the Transmission System Operator
As stated in Chapter 3, the model aggregates pipes so that at most one pipe
transports gas from one country to another. For the country nodes included,
pipes are needed between several markets in order to let the natural gas flow
from producers to markets. Figure 5.1 illustrates the pipeline network and the
country nodes in the model.
Figure 5.1: Pipelines in the model.
The capacities of the pipelines (see Table 5.8) have been chosen based on the
current sales rates of producers split on markets.3 For producing countries
that only have pipelines for flow out of the country, this works very well. For
example from Norway, the production rate from Norway is split on continental
Europe and the UK, and the capacities of the pipelines to continental Europe
and the UK are set based on these rates. For countries with both ingoing and
outgoing pipes, such as the Netherlands, the capacities are set such that the
sales of the country and other countries sending gas through the country are
able to flow. For the pipeline from the Netherlands to Germany, for instance,
the sales rate of both Norway and the Netherlands to Germany are included
when setting the pipeline capacity.
3Current sales rates of producers splits on markets are obtained from Rystad Energy AS.
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Table 5.8: Pipeline capacities, operational costs and expansion costs
Pipeline CAPA0 [bcf/d] CFa [bUSD/bcf/d] C∆A [bUSD/(bcf/d)]
NOR UK 2.20 0.0010 1.5
NOR NED 8.10 0.0010 2.0
NED UK 3.00 0.0010 1.2
NED GER 3.00 0.0005 1.0
GER NED 2.00 0.0005 1.0
POL GER 0.10 0.0005 1.0
GER POL 0.50 0.0005 1.0
RUS POL 5.40 0.0005 1.0
RUS UKR 5.40 0.0005 1.0
RUS GER 5.40 0.0010 2.0
UKR POL 1.00 0.0005 1.0
5.1.2.4 Data Input for the Markets
The markets included are the Netherlands, Germany, the UK, Poland and
Ukraine. By selecting these markets, 50% of the consumption in the EU plus
the entire demand of the Ukrainian market is covered in the model. For each
of these markets, a linear inverse demand function is formed by finding an
intercept and a slope for each stage. The intercepts and slopes are found by
using a reference price and sales rate and assuming a price elasticity. Since the
model aggregates different demand sectors into one inverse demand curve per
country, the price elasticity has to be chosen so that it is a reasonably good fit
for several sectors. Liu [2004] studies price elasticities of natural gas in Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Liu
finds long-term price elasticities of −0.36 for the residential sector and values
of −0.25 for the industrial sector. We do not have estimates for the price elas-
ticities for the commercial and transportation sectors, but assume that they are
closer to the industrial sector than the residential sector. This is based on the
observation that, just like the industrial sector, the two sectors are dominated by
corporations. We therefore assume a price elasticity of −0.25 for the aggregated
inverse demand function.4
4Values of price elasticities for natural gas differ greatly between different models and sources.
For example, Egging [2010] uses values between -0.25 and -0.75.
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The following relations are used, where  is price elasticity (see Pindyck and
Rubinfeld [2013]):
SLP =
Pref
Qref
∗ 1
−
(5.1)
INT = Pref + SLP ∗Qref (5.2)
For the Netherlands for example, with a reference price of 0.01 bUSD per bcf
and a reference demand of 4.74 bcf/d, the slope becomes 0.008 (rounded to 0.01
in the data set), and the intercept becomes 0.05. Demand data were gathered
from [CIA, 2012].
To capture the expected growth in demand, the intercepts of the future periods
are adjusted by a growth factor found from EIA [nd] by taking the expected
demand for the given stage and dividing it by the 2015 estimated demand.
The intercept for stage two (2020) is then found by multiplying the intercept of
stage one by the growth factor. Intercepts and slopes are found in Tables 5.9
and 5.10.
Table 5.9: Intersects of the inverse demand curve.
INT
Countries 2015 2020 2025
NED 0.050 0.052 0.053
POL 0.034 0.035 0.036
UKR 0.060 0.062 0.063
UK 0.090 0.093 0.095
GER 0.085 0.088 0.090
5.1.3 Scenario Tree
In a stochastic model, different scenarios are needed in order to model the
uncertainty. As discussed in Chapter 1 and 3, the main sources of uncertainty
relevant for the research questions are uncertainty in resource estimates and
shale gas legislation. Therefore, the scenario tree needs to reflect these two
aspects.
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Table 5.10: Slopes of the inverse demand curve.
Countries SLP
NED 0.010
POL 0.015
UKR 0.010
UK 0.010
GER 0.010
When a producer decides to develop shale gas resources, he decides how much
to invest in shale gas. The outcome of the investment is uncertain, as there
can be a large amount or a small amount of shale gas in the ground. This
uncertainty is captured by letting each stage have two distinct outcomes for
each producer: one outcome where a low amount of shale gas is found relative
to expectation and one where a high amount of shale gas is found relative to
expectation. In the next stage, the producers face the same uncertain situation,
which is modeled by the same two possible outcomes.
Our initial idea was to have three outcomes with respect to the amount of
shale gas found (low, medium, high) as in Chapter 4. However, in combination
with modeling a shale gas ban (described in the Section 5.1.3.1), this made
the scenario tree very large. Therefore, two outcomes (low, high) were used.
To capture the effects of risk preferences, two distinctly different outcomes for
shale gas exploration is sufficient. This allows for capturing the effects of risk
preferences while at the same keeping the scenario tree at a solvable size. As
in Chapter 4, the two outcomes are chosen to be equally likely,5 with the low
outcome giving 0.2 times the expected findings and the high outcome giving
1.8 times the expected findings. It is very difficult to model the probability
distribution of shale gas resources in unexplored areas because few studies
have been done and development is at a very early stage. However, these
two outcomes reflect possible results of exploring a prospective natural gas
reservoir and serve the purpose of capturing the uncertainty. Before drilling,
the seismic surveys show that there is gas, but there might not be much, giving
just 20% of the expected volumes. On the other hand, it might be that there
is more gas than one was able to prove using seismic surveys, giving almost
twice the expected amount. The chosen values have an expectation of 1 cf
per cf invested in, and therefore give a good representation of the expectation.
However, extreme events (tail values) where a lot of shale gas (or none) is found
5The argumentation for this is given in Section 4.1.
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are lost using this estimate of the distribution.
Another option could have been to model the outcomes of shale gas exploration
after a probability distribution assumed to fit well with natural gas reservoirs.
Demirmen [2007] suggests that a lognormal distribution would be a good fit
for petroleum reservoirs. However, approximating a distribution requires more
knowledge about the actual probability distribution of shale gas resources for
the effort to be worthwhile. Available estimates for shale gas resources in Eu-
rope are typically one-point estimates as in EIA [2013b]. Also, more outcomes
would be required to approximate the distribution. This would make the sce-
nario tree significantly bigger and make the problem harder to solve.
5.1.3.1 Modeling a Shale Gas Ban in the Scenario Tree
The current situation regarding shale gas legislation is uncertain. As presented
in Chapter 1, several European countries have banned shale gas production
while others have not. This situation has led us to investigate the impacts of
the perceived likelihood of a shale gas ban. In order to capture the possibil-
ity of a shale gas ban in the scenario tree, a branching is added from the first
stage, where one branch reflects the situation where shale is legal and the other
branch reflects a shale gas ban. Once a decision on legislation is made between
the first and the second stage (2015-2020), we assume that the legislation will
not change over the model horizon (until 2025). The probability of such an
event is difficult to estimate, but signals by the Ukrainian government by sign-
ing deals with oil companies for shale exploration and Poland’s current pro-
posal to cut taxes on shale gas suggest that a ban is not very likely [Wasilewski,
2014]. Based on this, the probability is set to 5%. If the probability is in fact
lower, shale gas investments will look less attractive in the model than in the
real world, and vice versa if the probability of a ban is higher in reality. The
model is also solved for 25% probability of shale gas ban to study the effects of
different perceptions of the likelihood of a shale gas ban.
In scenario tree nodes where there is a ban in effect, already producing shale
reserves are allowed to continue production until the reserves are depleted.
This can be interpreted as a situation where no new production licenses are
issued. In reality regulators might also close down existing production of shale
gas when a ban issued. This could be modeled by adding a restriction on the
quantity of shale gas produced. Such a constraint could be:
qprnu 6 bprnu ∀ p,n,u = bannode, r = shale (5.3)
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bprnu, the bound on the produced amount for shale gas, would be zero for the
scenario tree nodes where a shale gas ban is in effect. The constraint above
would not exist for the scenario tree nodes where there is no shale gas ban.
In scenario tree nodes without ban Equation (3.3) (repeated below) would con-
strain the production rate.
qprnu 6 CAPP0prn +
∑
u′∈pred(u)
ePprnu (5.4)
This would however increase the size of the problem, and the realized reserves
expansions parameters are therefore used to model the shale gas ban instead.
This is done by setting the realized reserves, ∆Rprnu, to 0 in the scenario tree
nodes where a ban is in effect. Ban on production from existing shale gas
fields is not accounted for in the model. However, there exists very little shale
gas production in Europe today, so this model shortcoming will not affect the
produced volumes significantly.
5.1.3.2 Reducing the Scenario Tree Size
Given that the scenario tree includes both different shale gas legislation and
different amounts of shale gas found, the scenario tree grows quite quickly.
For a situation with only two producers, there are 16 combinations going from
stage one to stage two. Figure 5.2 shows this for the two producers Ukraine
(UKR) and Poland (POL). ”HIGH” refers to a large amount of shale gas found,
and ”LOW” refers to a low amount. ”BAN” indicates that shale gas is banned
in the respective country from that stage and onwards. As a great number of
nodes in the scenario tree increase the problem size, we want to reduce the tree
size. In order to do this, the following observation is used.
In nodes u1, u5, u9 and u13, there is a ban in both Ukraine and Poland. This
means that the amount of shale gas found is irrelevant. These four nodes are
therefore combined into a single node where the amount of shale gas found is
set to zero. This has the same effect as a ban. Likewise, the same can be done
for the nodes where there is a ban in one country and the findings in the other
country (”HIGH” or ”LOW”) are the same. This happens in the pairs u3-u7,
u6-u14, u11-u15. These pairs can each be combined into one node each. In
this way, the 16 nodes are reduced to nine. In the next stage, the same logic is
applied, reducing the number of nodes in the third stage from 36 to 25.
The scenario tree used in the numerical study is presented in Figure 5.3. The
node numbers do not match the numbers above and in Figure 5.2 because of
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Figure 5.2: Small Scenario Tree
the reductions made. The scenario tree shows which elements are treated as
uncertain in the numerical study: the amount of shale gas found in Ukraine
and Poland and whether or not shale gas is banned in the two countries. The
figure shows the outcome in each stage for each of the 25 scenarios.
In summary, there are 25 scenarios and 35 scenario tree nodes over 3 stages.
Note that the number of scenarios is large enough to see a difference in CV@R
when αp is reduced by increments of more than 125 . This is discussed in Section
2.6 and is sufficient for the purpose of our analysis where we are comparing
αp = 0.85 to αp = 1.
There is perfect correlation between stages with respect to bans on shale gas
production, while the amount of reserves found is assumed to be independent
both between stages and producers. Independence between producers is rea-
sonable because they are situated in different countries. Independence between
stages within a country is less realistic. The reason for this is the following. If a
large amount of shale gas is found in the first period, the shale formation prob-
ably contains a high amount of extractable shale gas. Findings would therefore
be more likely to be high in later periods since the same formation could be tar-
geted. Estimating the correlation, however, is very difficult because very little
information exists that could support an estimation of the correlation.
The probabilities of each scenario tree node is given in Figure 5.4, and are
calculated in the following way. For each scenario tree node, the probability
of the corresponding shale gas reserves event (low, high) and the probability
of the corresponding shale gas ban event (ban, no ban) are multiplied to form
the scenario tree node probability. For example, Pr(u11) is the product of the
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probability of a ban in Ukraine ( 120 ) times the probability of a low amount of
shale gas in Poland in 2020 ( 12 ) and a low amount of shale gas in Poland in
2025 ( 12 ). Therefore, Pr(u11) =
1
20
1
2
1
2 = 0.0125. In Figure 5.4, the probabilities
are rounded to three decimals, and their values do therefore not sum to 1 (in
the figure). In each stage, Pr(u) gives the probability of ending in node u. For
example, the probability of coming to node u3 in stage two is 0.024, while the
probability of ending in node u13 is 0.012, and the probability of ending in
node u13 when standing in u3 (Pr[u13|u3]) is 0.5.
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Figure 5.3: Three Stage scenario tree with outcomes.
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Figure 5.4: Three stage scenario tree with probabilities rounded to three decimals.
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5.2 Results and Discussion
In the following we present and analyze solutions of the large scale model. The
discussion is divided in three parts. First, we look at the solution of a case
where the level of risk aversion is such that αp is 0.85 for the two producers
P UKR and P POL and the probability of a ban is 5%. This case is called the ”Risk
Aversion Case” (RA Case). Second, we compare the RA case to a risk neutral
solution of the same problem to isolate the effect of risk aversion on shale gas
development. Third, we investigate the effects of the perceived likelihood of a
ban on shale gas exploration.
5.2.1 Solution of the RA Case
The model makes several decisions for all the actors of the system. The model
looks at a situation of the European natural gas market where there is a pos-
sibility for the two risk averse producers P UKR and P POL to explore shale gas
resources. The costs of producing a given quantity of shale gas is lower than
the cost of producing the same quantity of conventional gas for both producers
(see Table 5.6). Therefore, it would be expected that an economically rational
and risk neutral actor would prefer shale gas to conventional gas and there-
fore invest in shale gas development.6 This should also lead to changes in the
producers’ trade balances, as P UKR and P POL might be able to supply shale
gas to markets. This could reduce Russia’s role as a dominating supplier to
Ukraine and Poland. The following investigates how these hypotheses play out
in the natural gas market by looking at production, sales, prices and invest-
ments.
5.2.1.1 Increasing Supply with Shale Gas
The European natural gas system has four major producers: Russia (not in
Europe, but an important supplier), Norway, the Netherlands and the UK.
Ukraine and Poland are relatively small producers, but might increase their
production significantly by developing shale gas. Figure 5.5 shows the devel-
opment of production for each country in three paths in the scenario tree. The
scenario where shale gas exploration is banned in Poland and Ukraine in 2020,
the ”ban” path, is u0-u1-u10. The scenario where both P UKR and P POL find
6Note that the quadratic costs can make it optimal to produce a mix of the two resources. If
they produce both shale and conventional gas, the quantities of each resource will be such that the
marginal cost for the two are the same, given that there are no shortages.
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lower amounts of shale than expected in 2020 and 2025, the ”low” path, is u0-
u5-u34 and the scenario where both P UKR and P POL find higher amounts of
shale than expected in 2020 and 2025, the ”high” path, is u0-u9-u34. There are
25 different scenarios in the third stage and therefore 25 different paths that
could have been presented. To make the comparisons manageable, three paths
are chosen. We have chosen to highlight these three because they illustrate the
span of different scenarios, with respect to shale gas bans and the amount of
shale gas found.
Figure 5.5: Production from 2015 to 2025 for different producers.
The results show that Russia, the Netherlands and Norway are the largest pro-
ducers in 2015 with shares of the production of 28%, 25% and 24%, respec-
tively.7 They remain the biggest producers throughout 2025 regardless of sce-
nario.
7In reality, the relative production levels are different. Our model only includes the proportion
of Norwegian exports that supplied to the markets in the model in 2014 and therefore appears
lower in the results than in reality.
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In the scenario where shale gas is banned, the production among the four
biggest producers increases by 3.7% (16.2 to 17.0 bcf/d) from 2015 to 2025.
Here, P NED shows the greatest increase in production with an increase of 6.3%
(4.1 to 4.4 bcf/d) from 2015 to 2025 (compare u10 to u0 in Figure 5.5).
In the scenario where shale gas exploration gives a low amount of shale gas in
Poland and Ukraine, the increase in production for the four biggest producers
is 3.0% from 2015 to 2025 (compare u17 to u0 in Figure 5.5). The increase is
lower than from u1 to u10 where shale gas is banned. The reason for this is the
following. When a low amount of shale gas is found by P UKR and P POL, they
increase their total production by 74% from 2015 to 2025, and take shares of the
market that otherwise would have been supplied by the four largest producers.
The increased production by P UKR and P POL also increase the total quantum
supplied, by all producers, with 7.9% (17.4 to 19.0 bcf/d) from 2015 to 2025 (u0
to u17).
In the scenario where a high amount of shale gas is found in 2020 and 2025,
total production increases by 15.8% (17.6 to 20.4 bcf/d) from 2015 to 2025 (com-
pare u34 to u0 in Figure 5.5). This increase is driven by increases in production
by P UKR and P POL, and is slightly offset by a decrease in the four biggest
producers production levels. The four biggest producers’ total production is
4.3% lower in 2025 compared to 2015 in this scenario. Russia faces the biggest
decrease in this scenario, with an 8.4% reduction. Successful development of
shale gas harms Russian production most due to the fact that Russia has to
compete with domestic shale gas in both Ukraine and Poland. In this scenario,
shale gas production is 3.3 bcf/d and represents 15.9% of the total production
by 2025, underlining the potential impact of shale gas in the European natural
gas market as a means to increase supply.
From 2015 to 2025, P UKR and P POL increase their production by investing in
expansions in a mix of shale gas and conventional gas. Figure 5.6 shows P UKR’s
and P POL’s production split on shale gas and conventional gas. P UKR increases
its production by developing shale gas only. In the scenario where they find a
high amount of shale gas in both 2020 and 2025, they increase their total pro-
duction rate from 0.7 bcf/d to 2.8 bcf/d, an increase of 298%. In the scenario
where they find a low amount of shale gas in 2020 and 2025, they increase their
total production by 35% from 2015 to 2025. When there is a ban on shale gas ex-
ploration, P UKR is not capable of increasing its production, and produces all its
initial shale gas reserves by 2020. This shows that shale gas development might
have a very large impact on the total production of natural gas in Ukraine. In
the light of this potential, it seems reasonable that the Ukrainian governments
is interested in signing deals for shale gas development with major petroleum
producers.
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Figure 5.6: Detailed Production for P UKR and P POL. Successful shale gas developments
increases production greatly.
At the current production levels, the marginal cost of producing shale gas is
lower than the cost of producing conventional gas. Therefore production of
conventional gas is reduced at the expense of shale gas when P UKR finds shale
gas. The reduction of conventional gas production is 0.05 bcf/d from 2015
to the scenario tree node in 2025 where a low amount of shale gas is found.
The reduction is 0.4 bcf/d from 2015 to the scenario tree node in 2025 where
a high amount of shale gas is found. This can be seen in Figure 5.6. A profit
maximizing producer will increase shale gas production to the point where the
marginal costs of shale gas production and conventional gas production are
equal. The reason for the lower reduction of conventional gas production in the
scenario where a low amount of shale gas is found is because in the scenario
where a low amount is found, the shale gas reserves are not large enough to
replace as much of the conventional production as when a high amount of shale
gas is found.
P POL increases its production rate by developing both shale gas and conven-
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tional gas. The production of conventional gas is more than doubled from the
2015 level of 0.5 bcf/d by 2025. In the scenario where there is a ban on shale
gas exploration the increase is 171% (to 1.3 bcf/d). When there is found high or
low amounts of shale gas, the increase is 125% and 127% (to 1.1 bcf/d for both),
respectively. In the scenario where shale gas exploration is banned, the existing
shale gas reserves are depleted by 2025. When a high amount of shale gas is
found in 2020 and 2025, shale gas production reaches 0.73 bcf/d in 2025.
So far we have seen that shale gas development can significantly increase pro-
duction in Ukraine and Poland. This might increase the European production
of natural gas by as much as 15.8% by 2025. The next section will focus on
prices.
5.2.1.2 Downwards Pressure on Prices from Shale Gas Supply
When the production increases, more gas also has to be sold at some point in
time. As storage is not included in the model, the increased production in a
period will give increased sales in the same period. Where the increase in sales
takes place, however, is not clear without further investigation.
Figure 5.7 displays the development of both sales and wholesale prices for
natural gas in each demand country. The stacked columns show sales split on
producers and are plotted on the primary axis (left hand side). The x-marks
show prices and are plotted on the secondary (right hand side) axis. The figure
shows a trend of growing sales from 2015 to 2025. This is caused by an increase
in demand that is met by increased production by the producers. The prices
are found to be quite similar in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK,
and substantially higher in Ukraine. Further, each country is supplied by at
least two producers.
The highest changes in prices are seen in Poland and Ukraine. In Poland, the
prices are quite stable in the scenarios where shale gas exploration is banned
and where low amounts of shale gas are found in both 2020 and 2025. In the
scenario where a high amount of shale gas is found, however, prices decrease
by 19% (25 to 20 USD/kcf) in 2020 and by 12% (25 to 22 USD/kcf) in 2025
relative to 2015 prices.
In Ukraine, prices go up in the scenario where there is a ban on shale gas
exploration, and down in the scenarios where shale gas exploration is allowed.
When shale gas is banned, P UKR is not able to increase sales to Ukraine at the
same rate as demand is growing because they have no big increase in shale gas
production. Therefore, prices increase. In the scenario where a low amount of
shale gas is found in 2020 and 2025, prices are a little lower than they would
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Figure 5.7: Sales and prices. High shale gas findings lead to lower prices in Ukraine
and Poland.
have been if shale gas had been banned because P UKR increases its shale gas
production and sells more to Ukraine. In the scenario where a high amount of
shale gas is found in 2020 and 2025, P UKR increases sales to Ukraine, causing
total sales to Ukraine to increase by 35.3% and prices to go down by 12.5%
compared to 2015. In this scenario, P UKR takes market shares in several markets
in both 2020 and 2025. In 2020, P UKR sells 0.4 bcf/d to Germany, 0.02 bcf/d to
the Netherlands, 0.5 bcf/d to Poland and 1.8 bcf/d to the Ukrainian market. In
Ukraine, this reduces Russia’s dominating role by shrinking their market share
from 68% in 2015 to 38% in 2020. In 2025, P UKR’s sales are approximately the
same as in 2020, with the exception of the Netherlands, where the sales rate
increase to 0.1 bcf/d, from zero in 2015.
The scenario where a high amount of shale gas is found in Poland and Ukraine
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in 2020 and 2025 shows that successful shale gas development can push down
gas prices in Europe. In this scenario, volume weighted average prices de-
crease by 6.6% from 2015 to 2025. This is good for the consumers because
higher quantities at lower prices will increase the consumer surpluses. The
total European consumer surplus is 4.4% higher in the scenario where a high
amount of shale gas is found compared to the scenario where there is a ban
on shale gas development. The findings therefore indicate that regulators who
wish to increase the consumer surpluses could do this by encouraging shale
gas development.
5.2.1.3 Trade-offs Between Reserves Investments
The producers have the option of investing in expansions of reserves and pro-
duction capacity, both are needed in order to increase the production of natural
gas. Both conventional gas and shale gas production face increasing marginal
costs. The best option for a producer in such a situation would be to produce
a mix of the two types in order to keep the costs as low as possible for the
production rate desired. The investments of P UKR and P POL should reflect this
desire.
Table 5.11: Reserves quantities invested in by producers in bcf.
Stage 2015 2020
Producer Scenario u0 u1 u5 u9
P UK Conventional Reserves 0.0 980.9 778.7 458.6
P UKR Shale Reserves 4959.1 0.0 2730.5 0.0
P POL Conventional Reserves 482.2 1608.5 1000.7 424.0
P POL Shale Reserves 486.2 0 263.9 363.1
Table 5.11 shows the quantities the producers try to expand reserves by through
investing in reserves expansions in 2015 and in the three highlighted scenarios
in 2020. The reserves expansions in shale gas in 2015 are larger than invest-
ments in conventional gas in both P UKR and P POL. In the first stage P UKR try
to expand their shale gas reserves with 4959.1 bcf. P POL try to expand their
shale gas reserves with 486.2 bcf and their conventional gas reserves by 482.3
bcf. In the scenario where there is a ban on shale gas exploration (u1), P POL
shifts completely over to conventional gas, while P UKR does not find investing
in conventional gas profitable and does not invest. In the scenario where a low
amount of shale gas was found in 2020, P UKR invests in shale gas once more.
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The lower level of investments by P UKR in 2020 in this scenario compared to
2015 is due to the fact that the horizon does not go any longer than 2025, and
there is therefore no use in having too much reserves in 2025, while having too
much reserves in 2020 simply means that you can invest less in 2020. However,
this is more costly than delaying parts of the investment to 2020 because of
discounting. The overinvestment is seen in P UKR in the scenario where a high
amount of shale gas is found in 2020. Here, P UKR’s reserves have become so
big that there is no need to invest in further reserves expansions. In reality,
one would have investments in 2025 as well, but due to the fact that the model
horizon ends in 2025, the producers have no incentive for investments in the
third stage. In Chapter 4, adding extra stages is presented as a way to describe
investments behavior in 2025 more realistically.
P UK invests in conventional gas reserves in 2020, because P UK depletes it’s re-
serves after the first ten years and needs to expand them in order to be able
to produce enough gas in 2025. The amount depends on which scenario they
find themselves in. In the scenario where there is a ban on shale gas explo-
ration, P UK has to invest in 981 bcf. In the scenario where both P UKR and
P POL have found low amounts of shale gas, P UK’s investments are lower be-
cause in this case P UKR and P POL are able to supply gas to P UK’s potential
markets, decreasing the amount that P UK can gain from expanding reserves.
In the scenario where P UKR and P POL find high amounts of shale gas, P UK’s
investments are down to 459 bcf.
5.2.1.4 Expanding Pipelines to Germany
Investments in pipeline capacity expansions made by the TSO are shown in Ta-
ble 5.12. In 2015, the pipeline between Poland and Germany is congested. It is
therefore expanded by 1 bcf/d in 2015. This expansion facilitates exports from
P POL and P UKR (via Poland) to Germany and the Netherlands in 2020.
Table 5.12: Investments in pipeline capacity [bcf/d]
Stage 2015 2020
Scenario u0 u1 u5 u9
NED GER 0 0.88 0.25 0.00
POL GER 1 0.12 0.63 0.97
UKR POL 0 0.00 0.12 0.03
In 2020, the investments depend on which scenario occurs. In the shale gas ban
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scenario, the pipeline from the Netherlands to Germany is expanded by 0.88
bcf/d. This lets P NOR and P NED sell more gas to Germany (note the increase
in sales from P NOR and P NED to Germany in u10 in 2025 compared to u1 in
2020 in Figure 5.7). In the the scenario where a high amount of shale gas has
been found in both Ukraine and Poland in 2020, the pipeline from Poland to
Germany is expanded once more, allowing both P UKR and P POL to sell more
to the German, British and Dutch markets. In the scenario where a low amount
of shale gas is found in Ukraine and Poland, both the pipeline between the
Netherlands and Germany and the pipeline between Poland and Germany are
expanded. However, the expansion is twice as big for the latter. Since the TSO
has a limited expansion budget, there is a tradeoff between expanding different
pipes, and the most congested pipeline will get the biggest expansion.
These findings suggest that if shale gas development is successful in Poland
and Ukraine, new pipeline capacity from these countries to big consumption
regions such as Germany might become profitable. However, actual invest-
ments in pipelines will depend on political will as well as economic viability.
Therefore, this finding has to be viewed in a bigger context: the countries that
a proposed pipeline is flowing through will have to agree on investments and
regulations for such a project to be realized. Also, since the model allows for
continuous values of pipeline capacities, the size of the expansions found in the
results have to be compared to existing and proposed pipelines. If the expan-
sion is much smaller than any projects found, the expansion is seen as marginal
and is not likely to be built. The proposed expansions are smaller than many
real cross border pipelines, but there are some pipelines either under planning
or existing in the range of the proposed expansions. For instance, Balticconnec-
tor between Finland and Estonia, WEDAL between Germany and Belgium and
Tyra West F3 between Denmark and the Netherlands all have capacities in the
range of 0.2-1.0 bcf/d. In light of these observations, it would not be reasonable
to think that the smallest expansions in Table 5.12 would be built in reality, but
the bigger ones (greater than 0.25 bcf/d) appear possible.
5.2.2 The Impact of Risk Preferences on Shale Gas Development
The purpose of this section is to study the effects of risk preferences on shale
gas development in the European gas market. In order to do this, we compare
the RA Case to a risk neutral solution of the same problem. The risk neutral
solution will from now on be called the RN Case. Since it is assumed in the RA
case that only P POL and P UKR are risk averse these two producers will be the
focus of the analysis.
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5.2.2.1 First Stage Investments
In Chapter 4 we saw that higher risk aversion leads to lower shale gas invest-
ments in the first stage. As can be seen in Table 5.13 and Table 5.14 this is still
the case in the large scale implementation. P POL’s shale gas reserves invest-
ments are 16% lower, and P UKR’s shale gas reserves investments are 1.5% lower
in the RA case compared to the RN case. The table shows that P POL in addition
shifts its reserves investment mix from 69% Shale in the RN Case to 50% in the
RA Case. This is to be expected as the risk averse producers make decisions
which are better suited for the bad scenarios where shale gas resource expan-
sions are less profitable. Note that risk aversion seems to have a bigger impact
on investment decisions when there is a less risky alternative present.
Table 5.13: Comparison of first stage investments [bcf] for the RN and RA case
Producer Case Conventional Shale Total % Shale
P UKR RN 5033 5033 100 %
P UKR RA 4959 4959 100 %
P POL RN 266 580 846 69 %
P POL RA 482 486 968 50 %
Table 5.14: Difference in first stage investments in the RA case compared to the RN
Case.
Case Conventional Shale Total
P UKR RA 0.0 % -1.5 % -1.5 %
P POL RA 81.4 % -16.2 % 14.5 %
Table 5.14 shows that P POL’s total investments are 14% higher in the RA case
compared to the RN case, due to 81% higher conventional investments and 16%
lower shale gas investments. This is a direct consequence of risk aversion and
is explained as follows. P POL’s risk aversion affects the tradeoff between risky
shale and more expensive conventional gas. In the RA case P POL finds it bet-
ter to pay more for guaranteed conventional gas than to pay less for shale gas
even though the investments should yield the same amount of gas in expecta-
tion. In addition, when P POL in the RA case makes decisions better suited for
bad outcomes it makes sense to increase the total quantity. By doing so they
hedge against the possibility that they find very little shale or there is a ban by
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still being able to sell conventional gas at a lower profit. In this way account-
ing for risk aversion can describe and account for a more realistic investment
behaviour.
5.2.2.2 Robustness of Expected Profit when Risk Aversion Affects the Optimal
Decisions
CV@Rpαp and expected profits for P POL and P UKR for the two cases are listed
in Table 5.15. As one would expect, the CV@Rpαp is lower in the RA Case than
in the RN case. The CV@Rpαp is 5% lower for P UKR and 4% lower for P POL in
the RA case compared to the RN case.
Table 5.15: CV@R and Expected profit in the RN and the RA case
Case Producer CV@Rpαp [USD] Expected Profit [USD]
RN P UKR 124.90 124.90
RA P UKR 119.16 124.90
RN P POL 60.58 60.58
RA P POL 57.95 60.20
It is interesting to find that the expected profits are only slightly affected by the
increased risk aversion. P UKR’s expected profit is unchanged between the cases
while P POL experiences 0.6% lower expected profit. Between the two cases,
Poland changes its action the most, and therefore experiences the biggest drop,
but Table 5.15 clearly shows that risk aversion does not affect the expected
profits by a large amount, even if investments are shifted. The reason for this
is explained in the following.
The total sales rates and prices in the different markets are not changed much
between the cases. If the individual producer in addition has the same sales
rate in all markets in the RA and in the RN case the producers’ expected profits
should therefore not change much either.
P POL’s expected profit is not affected significantly by the increased risk aver-
sion in the RA case even though investments are different. The reason for this
is as follows. In the scenarios where shale gas is banned or shale gas findings
are low, the increased conventional investments makes P POL able to sell more
conventional gas (and have higher profits) than in the RN case. This is espe-
cially notable in the second stage in the scenario where shale gas exploration
is banned (u10) where P POL increases sales rates by 4.4% compared to the RN
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case. In the scenarios where shale gas findings are high, P POL can sell a mix
of conventional gas and shale gas at a cost that is only a little higher than in
the RN case. The combination of these two effects therefore only reduces the
overall expected profit by a fraction between the cases.
P UKR’s expected profit is not affected significantly by the increased risk aver-
sion in the RA case even though investments are slightly lower. In the RA case
P UKR invest 1.5% less in shale gas reserves than in the RN case. This results
in very small corrections in sales rates and production in the different scenario
tree nodes. In the second stage the biggest change happens in the scenario
where both P POL and P UKR find high amounts of shale gas (u9), where the
sales rate is lowered by 1%. In the third stage the biggest reduction is 3% and
happens in the scenario where shale gas is banned in Poland and findings are
high in Ukraine (u26). In some scenarios P UKR gets slightly higher sales rate
in the RA case because of a reduction in P POL’s shale gas production. This
happens because in these scenarios P POL has invested in less shale gas when
they are risk averse than in the RN case. Therefore, P UKR gains more from high
shale gas findings relative to the RN case. However, the sum of these changes
is so small that the overall expected profit appears to be unchanged.
5.2.3 The Impact of Government Policies on Shale Gas Development
Currently, shale gas is banned in several European countries, while others have
allowed shale gas production, and yet others have issued production permits
[the Economist, 2014]. The decisions of governments differ with their motives:
some want to promote energy independence and welcomes shale gas, while
others are more concerned with environmental concerns and have banned it.
The producers who want to develop shale gas are at the mercy of the gov-
ernments in the countries they wish to operate. When the producers face the
possibility of a ban in the future, they might be hesitant about investing too
much in shale gas developments in case shale gas exploration is banned so that
their investment is wasted. Does the perceived likelihood of a shale gas ban
affect production, sales or prices in the natural gas market?
5.2.3.1 Perceived Likelihood of a Shale Gas Ban
In the results presented above, the probability of a shale gas ban in Poland and
Ukraine is 5%. For the purpose of this analysis, two additional cases of the
model are solved. The new results are used together with the results from the
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RA case and the RN case to investigate the effects of the perceived likelihood
of a shale gas ban. The two new cases are set up as follows:
• A Risk Averse, High Ban Probability case where risk preferences are as in
the case presented above and the probability of a ban is 25%.
• A Risk Neutral, High Ban Probability case where all actors are risk neutral
and the probability of a ban is 25%.
These four cases allow for comparison of the effects of a higher probability for
a shale gas ban with and without risk aversion, which gives the possibility of
assessing the impact of risk preferences in this setting.
5.2.3.2 Reduced Investments in Shale Gas
As expected, a higher perceived likelihood of a shale gas ban leads to lower
investments. Figure 5.8 shows the first stage investments in shale gas and
conventional gas reserves expansions for P UKR and P POL in the four different
cases.8 By comparing the investments for the same risk preferences, it becomes
evident that shale gas investments are lower in the first stage when the per-
ceived likelihood of a shale gas ban is higher. When P UKR and P POL are risk
neutral, reserves expansion investments decrease by 6.0% (5033 to 4734 bcf)
and 36.7% (580 to 367 bcf), respectively. When they are risk averse, the invest-
ments decrease even more: by 10.5% (4959 to 4437 bcf) and 48.7% (486 to 249
bcf).
Risk aversion amplifies the effect of the perceived likelihood of a shale gas ban.
Policy makers who wish to facilitate investments in shale gas development,
should therefore try to reduce the degree of risk aversion among the producers
as well as the perceived likelihood of a shale gas ban. This could be done by
offering risk sharing, by letting losses on exploration be applicable for tax de-
duction, similarly to the Norwegian petroleum tax model. This would make the
producers less afraid of not recouping their shale gas exploration expenses be-
cause they would be able to deduct the losses from later profits. However, such
a tax model leads to lower income for the government that has to be compen-
sated for elsewhere. One option would be to increase tax rates on petroleum
profits, but this might discourage investors.
8By comparing first stage investments and not investments in general, we are able to isolate the
effects of the perceived likelihood of a ban, that is, how the producers think the scenario tree is best
represented, regardless of what the actual probability of a ban (as seen by the government). When
we later compare production in the second stage, we can then do so for the scenarios where shale
gas is not banned. This holds because conditional on that there is no ban on shale gas ban, the two
scenario trees are the same.
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Figure 5.8: First stage investments in the different cases of ban probability and risk
aversion.
P POL increases the level of investments in conventional gas reserve expansions
when the probability of a shale gas ban is seen as high. P UKR does not do this
because the marginal cost of producing conventional gas is already so high that
they produce at a rate that will not deplete their resources by 2025.
5.2.3.3 Lower Production - Lower Sales?
The investments are found to be lower when the perceived likelihood of a shale
gas ban is higher. With lower investments in shale gas reserves, the producers
are able to produce less shale gas.
The lower production of shale gas when the perceived likelihood of a ban is
higher is offset by increased production of conventional gas. Therefore, the
impact on total production is attenuated. The decrease in total production
when the perceived likelihood of a shale gas ban is higher is less than 0.1 bcf/d
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Figure 5.9: Total 2020 production rate in selected scenarios
for all the producers combined when P UKR and P POL are risk averse (less than
1% decrease). The effect is smaller when the producers are all risk neutral.
Figure 5.9 illustrates the production rates in 2020 in the three scenarios used in
Section 5.2.1 for the two cases where P UKR and P POL are risk averse. When
there is a shale gas ban, P POL is able to produce more conventional gas if
they believed the probability was 25% because in that case they invested more
in conventional reserves expansions in 2015. In the scenario where there is
no ban and a low amount of shale gas is found in both Poland and Ukraine,
P POL is able to produce more if they believed the probability of a ban was
25% because in the case where shale gas findings are low, a higher proportion
of conventional gas reserves investments in 2015 gives them the opportunity to
produce more natural gas than if they invested mostly in shale gas. In the same
scenario, P UKR is able to produce 0.04 bcf/d (4%) less if they believed that the
probability of a shale gas ban was 25% because this leads them to invest in less
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shale gas reserves expansions in 2015 out of fear of a ban. The largest effect is
seen in the scenario where a high amount of shale gas is found in both Ukraine
and Poland in 2020. Here, P UKR’s production is reduced by 6% if they believed
the probability of a shale gas ban was 25% and invested accordingly in 2015.
The other producers, however, see larger production rates when this happens,
because competition from P UKR is less fierce.
Figure 5.10: 2020 sales rate in Ukraine and Poland
The slight decrease in total production rates pushes volume weighted average
prices in 2020 up by a mere 0.5% in the scenario where a high amount of shale
gas is found. By taking a closer look, however, we find that some markets see
bigger changes. The sales to Poland decrease by 0.05 bcf/d, increasing prices
by 3.6% to 21 USD/kcf. Sales to Ukraine decreases by 0.04 bcf/d, increasing
prices by 1.2% to 32 USD/kcf. This is illustrated in Figure 5.10, which shows
the sales to Ukraine and Poland and the prices in these markets in 2020 in the
103
CHAPTER 5. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
scenario where a high amount of shale gas is found.
5.2.3.4 Suggestions for Policy
We find that the perceived likelihood of a shale gas ban has clear effects on
investments in shale gas reserves. However, due to the fact that there is pro-
duction capacity available for conventional gas, the impacts on total production
and sales prices are small.
The impact could be larger in a situation where conventional gas is not an
option or when producers of conventional gas do not have enough capacity to
satisfy demand. In these situations, investments in shale gas could be necessary
to supply enough gas in the future. Sub-optimal (too low) investments in these
situations could decrease the consumer surplus and social welfare by pushing
sales down and prices up.9 In such a situation, governments and regulators
could do the following to signal that a ban on shale gas is unlikely if they want
to encourage investments:
• Issue long-term permits for shale gas exploration. This will make the
producers certain that they will be able to produce shale gas for a long
enough time to recoup their investments. A drawback of this is that it
reduces the flexibility of the government in case it wants to stop shale gas
production due to environmental concerns in the future.
• If they believe that supply security is more important than environmental
concerns, this could be signaled. This signal might reduce the perceived
likelihood of a shale gas ban, but the signal is not guaranteed to be cred-
ible because there is no risk sharing between the government and the
corporations. Furthermore, a change of government could render old
promises and signals useless.
• Take ownership in shale gas development by creating national shale gas
companies or joint ventures with natural gas producers. This could show
other producers that the government and corporations share the risk and
encourage others to start shale gas development.
This could reduce the perceived likelihood of a shale gas ban and encourage
investments by producers.
9The producers could increase their profits in this case, recall that the monopoly quantity is
lower than the Cournot quantity. However, there will be a dead weight loss because consumer
surpluses decrease more than producer profits increase.
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5.3 Summary of Findings
In this chapter the developed model has been applied to analyze a portion
of the European gas market. Outcomes from a equilibrium solution that ac-
count for market power, risk aversion and uncertainty have been analyzed and
compared to a risk neutral solution of the same problem. An investigation of
how different probabilities of a shale gas ban affect the outcome has also been
undertaken.
Shale gas investments in Ukraine and Poland can be profitable and might re-
duce Russia’s market share in Ukraine from 68% in 2015 to as low as 40% in
2025. In Poland, successful shale gas development can reduce Russia’s mar-
ket share down to 13% in 2025. Further, shale gas developments can increase
the total European production of natural gas by 2.8 bcf/d, and might reduce
natural gas prices in Poland by 12% to 22 USD/kcf and Ukraine by 13% to 33
USD/kcf in 2025.
The perceived likelihood of a shale gas ban affects the investments made in
Ukraine and Poland, lowering shale gas exploration by up to 49% in Poland and
11% in Ukraine when the perceived likelihood goes from 5% to 25%. This effect
is larger for a risk averse actor than a risk neutral one. This leads to a lower
production of shale gas in the future, but increased production of conventional
gas makes up for low investments in shale, with the result that sales rates and
prices are not severely affected by the increased fear of a ban on shale gas
exploration.
If policy makers wish to facilitate investments in shale gas development, they
should try to lower the perceived likelihood of a shale gas ban and reduce the
degree of risk aversion among the producers. The first can be achieved by issu-
ing long-term licences, clearly communicating the commitments to not enforce
either moratoriums or bans on shale gas exploration or starting joint ventures
with producers. The second is a more difficult undertaking, but one option
might be to offer a risk sharing by letting losses on exploration be applicable
for tax deduction and putting a higher tax on profits instead, similarly to the
Norwegian petroleum tax model.
A comparison of a risk neutral solution to a solution where P POL and P UKR ex-
hibit risk averse behaviour shows that P POL’s and P UKR’s risk aversion leads to
lower investments in shale gas in the first stage. Shale gas investments are low-
ered by 16% in Poland by P POL. This is offset by increased investments in con-
ventional gas reserves. P UKR only invest 1.5% less in the first stage compared
to the risk neutral case. Due to the hedging with conventional gas exploration
by P POL and the fact that changes by P UKR are small, the expected profits are
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not noticeably smaller in the risk averse solution, even though CV@Rp is re-
duced by 4-5%. Also, Russian imports are only slightly affected by higher risk
aversion. For the profit maximizing producers, risk aversion seems to be of less
importance. However, we have shown that risk aversion alters the decisions
on investments and that shale gas in itself could be an effective way to reduce
Russian imports. Therefore, modeling with risk aversion gives a better picture
of how investments in shale gas would play out in the real world.
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6 Solution Procedures and Model Limitations
The previous two chapters have studied equilibrium solutions for several data
instances. However, the inclusion of risk aversion complicates the structure of
the problem greatly, and the standard solution procedures in PATH is not able
to find solutions for all our data instances. Therefore special solution proce-
dures have been developed for solving the problem. The procedures developed
for solving the presented model, the second contribution of this thesis listed in
Chapter 1, are given in this chapter. In addition, numerical limitations of the
model are discussed.
The model developed in Chapter 3 is an MCP, and is solved with the PATH
solver. The model includes bilinear terms as a consequence of the inclusion
of CV@R in the objective. For instances where all the actors are risk neutral,
the solver finds solutions without difficulties. However, when risk aversion
increases, finding optimal solutions becomes increasingly more difficult. For
the instances presented in Chapter 5, the standard solution procedures of PATH
was unable to find a solution when risk aversion increased so that αp 6 0.94
for the producers P UKR and P POL. Therefore, special solution procedures were
developed for solving the problem. Two approaches were used, starting from a
different initial point and changing the solver settings. Both these approaches
are explained in the following.
6.1 Changing the Initial Point
PATH is a stabilized Newton method for solving MCPs. When PATH solves an
MCP, it works in three general steps. First, it uses a first-order approximation,
in the current point, to linearize the problem. Second, it finds a search direction
by generating a path. Third, it does a search along the generated path to find
a new point [Dirkse and Ferris, 1995]. This is repeated until a convergence
107
CHAPTER 6. SOLUTION PROCEDURES AND MODEL LIMITATIONS
criterion for the equilibrium solution is met, and the problem is solved, or
PATH terminates without finding an equilibrium solution.
In two of the KKT conditions for the model, Equations (3.42) and (3.43) re-
peated below, there are terms where a primal variable is multiplied by a dual
variable (qprnu, σpu and qSpnu, σpu). When PATH starts the solution in the
point zero (All variables and dual variables zero. This is the default starting
point for PATH.), the initial point contains different information on this bilin-
ear relationship than when starting in a non-zero point. Specifically, when two
multiplied variables are zero, the effect of changing either one of them depends
on whether or not the other variable is changed. For example, if the variable
qprnu is changed, the effect of this depends on whether the dual σpu below
remains zero, or not. Therefore, we believe that the second step of the PATH
procedure, finding a good search direction, should be more difficult when start-
ing in the point zero because the impact of the bilinear terms are represented
more poorly than in a non-zero starting point.
0 6 γuDu(CPLprn + 2CPQprnqprnu)
∑
u′∈m(u)
σpu′ + λ
P
prnu −φ
P
nu
+ρPprnuDu +
∑
u′∈succ(u)
Du′ρ
P
prnu′ ⊥ qprnu > 0 ∀ p, r,n,u (6.1)
0 6 −γuDu
[
δpn
INTnu − SLPnu(∑
p′∈P
qSp′nu +q
S
pnu)

+(1− δpn)piMpnu
] ∑
u′∈m(u)
σpu′ +φ
P
pnu ⊥ qSpnu > 0 ∀ p,n,u (6.2)
A numerical example of a non-zero starting point in Equation (6.1) is given
later in this section.
6.1.1 Algorithm for Solution via Proximal Solutions
Based on the hypothesis that a good starting point should improve the solution
procedure, a new solution approach was developed. The main principle be-
hind the algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 1. First, the problem is initialized
as usual by setting all parameters to their respective values, and defining equa-
tions and variables. Next, the model is attempted to be solved using different
methods for finding a good starting point. In Algorithm 1, method(i) refers to
the different methods, with i ranging from 1 to 9. All the methods are different
variations of first finding a solution that lies in the proximity of the solution to
the actual problem by altering the degree of risk aversion and market power,
and then solving the original problem with the proximal solution as a starting
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point.1 If a method is successful in finding an equilibrium solution to the orig-
inal problem, the loop is stopped and the solution is returned, along with a
variable indicating which method worked.
Algorithm 1: Solving the problem using proximal solutions as initial
points
initialization: methodNumber = 0, i = 0, flag = 1, numMethods = 9 ;
while i lessThan numMethods & flag = 1 do
try method(i);
if method(i) successful then
methodNumber = i;
flag = 0;
end
i = i + 1;
end
Since risk aversion and market power complicates the problem, it might be
easier to solve the problems if the degrees of risk aversion and market power
are changed in the direction of something we know is solvable. For αp = 1 ∀ p,
a risk neutral problem, we have never had any difficulties, while it seems to be
harder for lower values of αp. Therefore, it might help to start with a solution
found from the same problem but with lower risk aversion. The same principle
applies to market power. This idea forms the basis for the methods that are
used to solve the problem. The different methods can be read in the code in
Appendix C. The methods that were most successful for the problem studied
in Chapter 5 are outlined below in Algorithm 2.
For the instance in Chapter 5 where αp = 0.85 for P UKR and P POL, and the
probability of a ban was low, the method that solved the problem was method 2.
This method works by first storing the original values of αp, and then increasing
the value of the αp’s that are less than 1 by half the distance between αp and
1. This is essentially the same as solving the problem for a lower degree of
risk aversion. If this solution is found, the values of αp are reset to the stored
values, and the proximal solution is used as an initial point for the problem
with the original values for αp.
1Here, proximity refers to a solution that is believed to be close to the equilibrium solution. For
example, the solution obtained from a version of the problem where producers have slightly more
market power.
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Algorithm 2: Selected methods for solving the problem via initial points.
Methods are run by the loop in Algorithm 1.
method 1;
solve social welfare maximization;
set solution as initial point for mcp;
solve mcp;
if optimal solution then
return optimal solution
end
;
method 2;
store alpha(p) as storedAlpha(p) ;
if alpha(p) is not 1 then
set alpha(p) = alpha(p) + 0.5 * (1 - alpha(p));
end
solve mcp;
if optimal solution from mcp then
reset alpha(p) to storedAlpha(p);
set solution as initial point for mcp;
solve mcp;
if optimal solution then
return optimal solution
end
end
;
method 7;
store delta(p,n) as storedDelta(p,n) ;
set alpha(p) = 1;
if delta(p,n) is not 1 then
set delta(p,n) = delta(p,n) + 0.25 * (1 - delta(p,n));
end
solve mcp;
if optimal solution from mcp then
reset delta(p,n) to storedDelta(p,n);
set solution as initial point for mcp;
solve mcp;
if optimal solution then
return optimal solution
end
end
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In the instance where αp = 0.85 for P UKR and P POL, and the probability of a
ban was high, the method that solved the problem was method 7. This method
works by setting αp = 1 for all producers and adding
1−δpn
4 to δpn, thus making
the producers risk neutral and giving them slightly more market power. This
value of δpn is fairly close to the original value, and could therefore provide a
good starting point. This solution is used as a starting point after resetting αp
and δpn to the stored values.
It is possible to speed up the new solution procedure by observing which meth-
ods work most often and placing them before the other methods. Currently, the
methods are sorted in the following sequence: 1, 7, 8, 6, 5, 2, 3, 9, 4. This is
done so because it is more efficient overall to put the most effective methods
early, like 1 and 7.
The new starting points apparently make PATH’s path generation and search
along the path more effective. Here, we compare two starting points in order
to try to understand what is going on. The approximation of
eq qStat(P NOR,conv,NOR,u34) (an instance of Equation (6.1)) when starting
in zero is:
1 eq qStat(P NOR,conv,NOR,u34).. (0)∗q(P NOR,conv,NOR,u34)
2 + lambdaP(P NOR,conv,NOR,u34) + 1825∗rhoP(P NOR,conv,NOR,u34)
3 + (20.9046007369089)∗sigma(P NOR,u34) − phi(P NOR,NOR,u34) =G= 0 ;
4 (LHS = 0)
The approximation of eq qStat(P NOR,conv,NOR,u34) with a different initial
point:
1 eq qStat(P NOR,conv,NOR,u34).. (0.246539289996078)∗q(P NOR,conv,NOR,u34)
2 + lambdaP(P NOR,conv,NOR,u34) + 1825∗rhoP(P NOR,conv,NOR,u34)
3 + (20.0470356279112)∗sigma(P NOR,u34) − phi(P NOR,NOR,u34) =G= 0 ;
4 (LHS = 0)
The second approximation contains a nonzero term of 0.2465 in front of the
variable q(P NOR,conv,NOR,u34) in line 1. PATH therefore ”sees” the effect of
changing the variable, while in the first approximation, this effect is lost. We
believe that this is part of the reason that starting from a proximal solution
helps the solution process.
Table 6.1 presents solution times in seconds for the model when run with PATH
with standard options in the column ”MCP” and for Algorithm 1, presented
above, in the column ”NewSolve”. The ”-” indicates that PATH was not able
to find the equilibrium solution. The algorithm solves the problem in many
instances where no solution is found by PATH with standard option values.
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Table 6.1: Solution time in seconds for different variations of the instance from Chapter
5.
Pr(ban) = 0.05 Pr(ban) = 0.25
αp MCP NewSolve Method MCP NewSolve Method
1.00 1.9 28.3 1 1.78 14.6 1
0.95 9.5 234.5 7 - 467.7 5
0.90 - 304.5 7 - 356.6 7
0.85 - 664.3 2 - 325.6 7
0.80 - - - - - -
In the cases where PATH with standard options is able to find an equilibrium
solution, it is much faster than the developed procedure. A general solution
framework might utilize this by first attempting to solve the problem for 10-15
seconds using PATH with standard options, and then starting the new solution
procedure if PATH is unable to solve the problem in the 10-15 seconds. This
might save time in some cases.
In the cases in Table 6.1, our procedure finds an equilibrium solution in eight
out of ten cases. With the default starting point, PATH only finds an equilib-
rium solution in three out of ten cases. Since the new procedure is not able
to find equilibrium solutions in all the cases, a second approach was tried.
This approach is to change the solver settings, and is described in the next
section.
6.2 Adapting Solver Settings
The settings for PATH can be set manually as option values before the PATH
solver is invoked [Dirkse and Ferris, 1994]. Moreover, PATH restarts itself with
new settings, if it determines that no progress is being made [Ferris and Mun-
son, 2000]. The settings that most often give good solutions can be used in
order to determine what settings are good to start with when trying to solve
the problem. For example, the following restart settings were used by PATH in
method 5 in the algorithm above when it led to a solution in a variation with
αp = 0.95 for P UKR and P POL and high probability of a ban on shale gas:
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1 Restart Log
2 proximal perturbation 0
3 crash method none
4 crash perturb yes
5 nms initial reference factor 2
6 lemke search type slack
7 proximal perturbation 1.0000e−001
To utilize the fact that these settings led to a solution, we start the solution
procedure for method 5 with these settings, hoping that this will help PATH
find a solution more quickly. We do the same thing for the other methods.
We then attempt to solve the variations of the problem with the new settings.
The results are presented in column ”NewSettings” in Table 6.2 together with
the results without the new settings (column ”NewSolve”). For the variation
of the data instance that was used to find the settings (αp is 0.95 for P UKR
and P POL and high probability of a ban on shale gas), the solution time was
cut from 468 to 395 seconds, a 15.5% decrease. However, when the settings
were used for other variations, the solution time and which method solved the
problem changed. For instance, for αp is 0.90 for P UKR and P POL and high
probability of a ban on shale gas, the method changed from 7 to 2, and the time
increased from 357 to 552 seconds. Method 7 is attempted before method 2, so
this implies that the new settings caused method 7 to fail. Some instances that
were solvable with the standard settings using Algorithm 1 were not solvable
with the new settings. Based on these findings, we conclude that changing
settings based on one data instance did not help solve the problem in general.
However, changing the settings is effective when solving the specific instance it
is based on, and can therefore be useful when solving the same problem several
times.
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Table 6.2: Solution time in seconds for different variations of the instance from Chapter
5 with and without new settings for the PATH solver. M. denotes method.
Pr(ban) = 0.05 Pr(ban) = 0.25
α p New
solve
M. New
set-
tings
M. New
solve
M. New
set-
tings
M.
1.00 28.3 1 21.7 1 14.6 1 14.3 1
0.95 234.5 7 188.9 7 467.7 5 395.1 5
0.90 304.5 7 522.6 2 356.6 7 552.4 2
0.85 664.3 2 - - 325.6 7 - -
0.80 - - - - - - 637.8 2
6.3 Numerical Limitations
In this section, some of the models numerical limitations and the efforts made
to surpass them are discussed.
6.3.1 Degrees of Risk Aversion
Table 6.1 presents the solution time for different variations of the instance used
in Chapter 5. The difference between the variations is the value of αp for P UKR
and P POL and the probability of a shale gas ban. The table shows that solution
time increases for increasing degrees of risk aversion. Only the two least risk
averse variations were solvable with using the PATH solver with default option
values, while the methods developed in this chapter enable us to solve for
values of αp down to 0.85.
The solution time is much longer for the developed solution procedures than
for PATH with standard option values, but the new solution procedure is also
able to solve more of the cases. PATH with the default initial point was only
able to solve three of ten instances, while the developed solution procedure
solved eight of ten. In the instances studied, very high degrees of risk aversion
were not solvable when using the procedures outlined here.
When the new solution procedure is not able to find an equilibrium solution,
PATH reports ”Other Error”. PATH does not run out of memory and the re-
source usage (in seconds) is the less than the limit. We speculate that the
problem is related to lack of convergence. The reason for this might be that
114
CHAPTER 6. SOLUTION PROCEDURES AND MODEL LIMITATIONS
the objectives of the problems that the MCP describes are relatively flat. We
speculate this based on the observation that the producers expected profits did
not change much when the producers decisions changed as a consequence of
different values of αp in Chapter 5. We think that the flat objective might make
it difficult for PATH to prove that it has converged to an equilibrium solution.
Based on this theory, it might be possible to improve the solution procedure
by adjusting the convergence tolerances in the PATH solver settings. With the
limited amount of time available for this work, we did not prioritize to test
this, but it might be a good way to improve the number of cases that can be
solved.
6.3.2 Problem Size
The problem size seems to be a complicating factor for the solution of the
problem. In Chapter 4, a model with 407 variables was solvable for values of
αp down to 0.40. With the instance in Chapter 5 with 8,316 variables, values of
αp down to 0.85 was solvable. One of the findings from Chapter 4 was that extra
stages could be added to the model after the last stage in order to give a more
realistic horizon for investments in the later stages. A version of the instance
used in Chapter 5 with an extra stage at the end was therefore developed. This
instance has four stages and 14,811 variables, and was not solvable for αp lower
than 0.95, even when using the solution methods outlined here.
6.4 Summary of Solution Procedures
This chapter has shown that solving the developed model can be facilitated
by providing good initial points. An algorithm that employs different solution
methods for finding these initial points and then solving the problem has been
presented. The algorithm solved several instances that were not solvable with
standard solution procedures. Further, the chapter has found that solution
times might be improved by changing the settings for the solver PATH. This is
found to reduce solution time by 15.5% in one case.
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In the US, shale gas development have played a large role in reducing imports
of natural gas. In the recent conflict between Russia and the Ukraine, Russia
has used natural gas exports to gain political leverage. This has led to increased
interest in shale gas among producers and politicians in many European coun-
tries. To provide decision support for regulators and producers of natural gas,
we have therefore used our model to study how shale gas development in Eu-
rope will affect future market dynamics.
Risk preferences and risk averse behaviour are features of the human psyche. A
model that wishes to describe a system governed by humans should consider
including risk preferences to capture this aspect of decision making. In this
thesis we have developed a multi-stage stochastic MCP for a natural gas market
that accounts for several resources, market power and risk averse behaviour
amongst producers. The actors in the model are producers, a TSO and end
users. The different producers and the TSO have individual objective functions.
Compared to other natural gas market models, our model differs by accounting
for risk aversion through CV@R in the producers’ objective functions in an MCP
setting.
Incorporating CV@R in an MCP makes the problem harder to solve. To be able
to solve large problem instances methods for finding good starting points for
the MCP have been developed. The developed algorithm proves to be more
efficient than PATH with standard option values, solving several instances that
were not solvable with standard solution procedures. Further, we have found
that solution times might be improved by changing the settings for the PATH
solver. This allows some data instances that would not be solved by PATH with
standard option values to be solved and reduces solution time by 16% in one
of the cases we have compared.
The problem has been solved for a large portion of the European gas market
from 2015 to 2025. Analysis of the solution has shown that successful shale
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gas developments can increase the total European production of natural gas
by 15.8% from the 2015 level of 17.6 bcf/d. We have found that shale gas
development might reduce natural gas prices from 2015 to 2025. In Poland
prices decreased by 12% to 22 USD/kcf. Prices in Ukraine were reduced by
13% to 33 USD/kcf. For the European gas market as a whole, volume weighted
average prices decrease by 6.6% from 2015 to 2025 when shale gas exploration
in Poland and Ukraine is successful. This is good for the consumers because
higher quantities at lower prices will increase the consumer surpluses. The
total European consumer surplus is 4.4% higher in the scenario where a high
amount of shale gas is found compared to the scenario where there is a ban on
shale gas development. Further, shale gas development in Ukraine and Poland
can be profitable and might reduce Russian producers’ market shares by 44% in
Ukraine and by 64% in Poland. Successful shale gas development can therefore
increase Europe’s security of supply.
Whether this shale gas development will take place or not depends on several
factors outside the scope of the developed model. There has to be political will,
producers have to be willing to invest, landowners will have to approve and
the public opinion should not be strongly opposed to such development. One
single model can therefore not describe with certainty what will happen with
shale gas development in Europe, but our findings indicate that development
might be economically viable.
The impact of perceived political will has been analysed by looking at the im-
pact of the perceived likelihood of a shale gas ban. The model has shown that
an increase in the probability of a shale gas ban from 5% to 25% might lower
the investments by 11% in Poland and 49% in Ukraine. This corresponds to a
reduction of shale gas reserves expansions by 237 bcf in Poland and 522 bcf in
Ukraine. Since the perceived likelyhood of a shale gas ban affects investments,
several suggestions for how policy makers, who want to encourage shale gas
developments, can handle this has been presented. These include signaling, tax
incentives and risk sharing through joint ventures.
We have also studied how the solution changes when the producers go from
being risk neutral to being risk averse. The analysis has shown that Russian im-
ports and the producers’ expected profits are only slightly affected by higher
risk aversion. In 2015, shale gas investment in Poland are 16% lower when the
producer is risk averse compared to the risk neutral case. This corresponds
to a lowering of shale gas reserves expansions by 94 bcf. In Ukraine, the in-
vestments are 1.5% lower in 2015 compared to the risk neutral case, a lowering
of shale gas reserves expansions by 74 bcf. Due to the hedging with conven-
tional gas exploration by the producer in Poland and the fact that investments
made by the producer in Ukraine are only slightly reduced, the expected prof-
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its are not noticeably smaller in the risk averse solution, even though CV@Rp
is reduced by 4-5%. We have shown that risk aversion alters the decisions on
investments and that shale gas in itself could be an effective way to reduce
Russian imports. Therefore, modeling with risk aversion gives a better picture
of how investments in shale gas could play out in the real world.
Since CV@R complicates the problem greatly and the solution is only altered
slightly, there exists a trade off between a realistic representation of investment
behaviour and added complexity. The inclusion of risk preferences in this type
of market model is at an early stage. Possible future development of this model
could take several directions. One direction could be to incorporate our CV@R
approach for a larger data instance and a longer time horizon. Another direc-
tion could be to work on increasing the levels of risk aversion the model is able
to solve to optimality. The last one will require further work on solution proce-
dures to find more equilibrium solutions. We believe that a good starting point
for this further work would be to have a look at the convergence tolerances in
the PATH solver.
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A Input data for the problem in Chapter 4
Units are given in Chapter 3
Miscellaneous parameters
Outcome Low Mid High
Pr(u) 1/3 1/3 1/3
∆Rprnu(ξ) 0.02 0.8 5
Attribute Value Unit
Du 1825 days
Discount factor 5% per year
BTSOu 1 bUSD
Attribute 1. Stage 2. Stage 3. Stage
γu 1 0.77 0.60
A
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Market parameters
Countries INTnu SLPnu
NED 0.05 0.01
NOR - -
Arc parameters
Arc CAPA0a CFa C∆Aa
NOR NED 8.90 0.001 1
Producer dependent parameters
Producers αp δp,NED
P NOR
Case specific
P NED
Producers CAPP0p,conv,NED CAP
P0
p,shale,NED
P NOR 10.3 0
P NED 7.6 0
Producers BPpu [bUSD] RP0p,conv,n RP0p,shale,n
P NOR 60 7207.5 0
P NED 10.8 3953.9 63
B
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Producers CLPp,conv,n C
QP
p,conv,n C
LP
p,shale,n C
QP
p,shale,n
P NOR 0.0027 0 - 0
P NED 0.0019 0 0.0018 0
Producers C∆Rp,conv,n C∆Rp,shale,n C∆Pp,conv,n C∆Pp,shale,n
P NOR 0.00029 - 0.0028 -
P NED 0.00029 0.023 0.0013 0.003
C
B Partial Derivatives in a Stochastic Model
When taking partial derivatives with respect to variables that appear in con-
straints and equations in several scenario tree nodes, special care has to be
taken.
As an example, consider how the partial derivative of Equation (3.3) (repeated
on the form gprnu(x) 6 0 below, see Setion 2.3.1) with respect to ePprnu would
be. Let x be a vector with the variables ePprnu , qprnu.
qprnu − CAP
P0
prn −
∑
u′∈pred(u)
ePprnu′ 6 0 ∀ p, r,n,u (λPprnu) (B.1)
For the purpose of simplifying the explanation, consider a situation where there
is one producer p in one country node n producing one resource type r. The
equation above can then be written like this:
qu − CAP
P0 −
∑
u′∈pred(u)
ePu′ 6 0 ∀ u (λPu) (B.2)
The entire problem has the form presented in Section 2.3.1:
min f(x) (B.3)
s.t. gi(x) 6 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m (B.4)
hj(x) = 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . , l (B.5)
Now, say we want to find the stationarity equation for the problem with respect
to ePu1. Let the objective be f(x) and disregard all constraints except the set of
gu(x).
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The component of the stationarity condition we are interesting is:
∂f(x)
∂ePu1
+
∑
u∈U
λu
∂gu(x)
∂ePu1
= 0 (B.6)
The next step is to find the partial derivatives of gu(x) with respect to ePu1. To do
this, we type up gu(x) for the nodes in the scenario tree. For this example, we
use the scenario tree presented in Figure 3.1. We look at the variable ePu1, and
therefore omit the two scenario tree nodes to the right in the third stage.
Figure B.1: Equation (B.2) illustrated for a small tree. Duals in parenthesis.
From Figure B.1, we see that the partial derivatives become −1 for all the sce-
nario tree nodes that are successors of u1, and zero for all the other scenario
tree nodes.
This yields the following:
∂f(x)
∂ePu1
+
∑
u∈U
λu
∂gu(x)
∂ePu1
=
∂f(x)
∂ePu1
+
∑
u′∈succ(u1)
λ ′u(−1)
= 0 (B.7)
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To derive the stationarity conditions and the rest of the KKT conditions in the
model, the same procedure can be used.
B.1 Economic Interpretation
For an economic interpretation, let the objective function be simplified as f(x) =∑
u∈U Pr(u)(C
∆PePu −m ∗ qu), where m is the margin of sales (here, the price
and cost are constant). Looking at just the variable ePu for the left side of the
tree in Figure B.2, the KKT conditions are:
0 6 Pr(u0)C∆P − λPu1 − λPu3 − λPu4 ⊥ ePu0 > 0 (B.8)
0 6 Pr(u1)C∆P − λPu3 − λPu4 ⊥ ePu1 > 0 (B.9)
0 6 Pr(u3)C∆P ⊥ ePu3 > 0 (B.10)
0 6 Pr(u4)C∆P ⊥ ePu4 > 0 (B.11)
The following interpretation can be made. Investments in reserve expansions
in u0 will be made if the sum of the increase in the objective value by increasing
the capacities in scenario tree node u1, u3 and u4 (λu1 + λu3 + λu4) is greater
than the probability weighted cost of investments in expansion of production
capacity. The same can be seen for investments in u1, except that the increased
objective function value gained from increasing capacity in scenario tree node
u1 (λu1) is not included. In the third stage, no investments will be made as
there are no future periods where increased capacity can increase the objective
function values. In mathematical term, the two last expressions do not contain
λu’s, forcing ePu3 and e
P
u4 to be zero.
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C GAMS Code
The GAMS code is included bellow. The problem is coded in different files:
• Main: ties the files together and is used for file selction
• Model: includes the mathematical formulation from Chapter 3
• Solve and report: includes solution procedures and file output manipula-
tion
• Calculations: includes post solve calculations
• Data files: Different data instances used for different cases are coded in
sepperate files.
The GAMS files are available in the attached .zip archive.
C.1 Main
1 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
2 ∗NATURAL GAS MARKET MODEL ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
3 ∗W/RISK AVERSION AND MARKET POWER∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
4 ∗WRITTEN BY KALV AND WALLE−HANSEN∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
5 ∗MAY 2014∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
6 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
8 $ontext
9 MAIN
11 This file controls solution of the probem.
12 It uses separate files for:
13 − solving and settings
14 − calculations (via solve procedures)
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15 − data input
17 UPDATED: 23.5.
18 $offtext
20 ∗Output the 100 first of all sets of constraints for bug searching.
21 option limrow=100;
22 $eolcom #
24 ∗Select data set.
25 $INCLUDE UKRRN POLRN LOWBAN.txt
27 ∗Include model file
28 $INCLUDE models.gms
29 Use "solve mcp..." for standard solution procedure, new solve.gms for
special solution procedure, new solve settings.gms for special
solution procedure with specialized settings.
30 ∗solve mcp using mcp
31 $INCLUDE new solve.gms
32 ∗$INCLUDE new solve settings.gms
34 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
35 ∗SETTINGS FOR CONVERSION OF NLP MODEL TO MCP∗∗
36 ∗THIS IS USED FOR CHECKING KKT CONDITIONS∗∗∗∗∗
37 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
39 ∗$call rm −f tmpmcp.gms convert.op9
40 ∗$echo "NLP2MCP tmpmcp.gms" > convert.op9
41 ∗$echo "dict dict.txt" > convert.op9
43 $ontext
44 file coop9 / ’convert.op9’ /;
45 putclose coop9 ’NLP2MCP tmpmcp.gms’
46 / ’dict dict.txt’
47 /;
49 $call sed −n −e "s:ˆ ∗\([exbi][0−9][0−9]∗\) \(.∗\):s/\1/\2/g:gp" dict.txt
| sed −n "1!G;h;$p" > mod.txt
50 $call sed −f mod.txt gams.gms
52 cvarOpt.optfile = 9;
53 option nlp = convert;
54 solve cvarOpt using nlp min cvarObj;
55 ∗ test that tmpmcp.gms was created
56 execute ’=test −e tmpmcp.gms’;
57 abort$errorlevel ’we did not find tmpmcp.gms from convert run’;
59 execute ’gams tmpmcp.gms lo=#GAMS.lo#’;
60 abort$errorlevel ’tmpmcp.gms did not execute cleanly’;
61 $offtext
H
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C.2 Model
1 $ontext
2 MODEL
4 This file contains the declarations of everything needed for the model.
5 There are three models declared: the mcp model developed in the thesis
6 and two optimization models used for generating initial solutions for
7 the mcp.
9 This file is controlled by main.gms
11 UPDATED: 26.5.
12 $offtext
14 #CONSTANTS
15 parameter yearsPerStage, discountRate, branches;
17 set
18 a #arcs
19 n #country nodes
20 p #producers
21 r #resources
22 u #nodes in scenario tree
23 ;
24 alias
25 (pp,p)
26 (nn,n)
27 (uu,u)
28 (uuu,u)
29 ;
30 set
31 aPlusn(n,a) #inward arcs a to node n
32 aMinusn(n,a) #outward arcs a from node n
33 nProd(p,n) #nodes n where p has production
34 nPlus(a,n) #end node n of arc a
35 nMinus(a,n) #start node n of arc a
36 pred(u,uu) #predecessor nodes in scenario tree
37 succ(u,uu) #predecessor nodes in scenario tree
38 endNodes(u) #end nodes in scenario tree
39 temp(u,uu,uuu) #temp used for making b
40 b(u,uu,uuu) #used for matching deltaR eR and rhoP in eRStat
41 flag(u,uu) #used for making b
42 dirsucc(u,uu) #direct successors uu of u
43 uMinus(u,uu) #direct predecessor uu of u
44 match(u,uu) #used for matching node u to its succeeding
45 #endnodes uu
46 ;
47 Parameter
48 prev(u) #Used for matching deltaR and eR
49 alpha(p) #Risk aversion parameter
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50 BP(p,u) #Producers expansion budget in scenario tree
51 #node u
52 BTSO(u) #TSO expansion budget in scenario tree node u
53 CAPA0(a) #Arc a flow rate cap
54 CAPP0(p,r,n) #Initial production rate capacity for p
55 #producing r in n
56 CL(p,r,n) #Linear production cost term for producer p r
57 CQ(p,r,n) #Quadratic production cost term for producer p r
58 CF(a) #Arc a operational cost
59 CdeltaA(a) #Cost per unit of arc capacity expansion
60 CdeltaP(p,r,n) #Cost per unit of production rate expansion
61 CdeltaR(p,r,n) #Cost per unit of reserve expansion
62 D(u) #Days in a stage
63 deltaR(p,r,n,u) #Realised reserve expansion
64 delta(p,n) #Market power parameter
65 GAMMA(u) #Discount factor in scenario tree node u
66 INT(n,u) #Intersection of inverse demand curve in country
67 #node n in scenario tree node u
68 prob(u) #Scenario tree node probabilities
69 RP0(p,r,n) #Initial Reserve for p
70 SLP(n,u) #Slope of inverse demand curve in country node n
71 ;
73 #VARIABLES
74 positive variables
75 eA(a,u) #capacity flow rate expansion
76 eP(p,r,n,u) #production rate cap expansion
77 eR(p,r,n,u) #reserve cap expansion
78 f(p,a,u) #flow rate for producer p on a
79 q(p,r,n,u) #production rate
80 qS(p,n,u) #sales rate
81 s(a,u) #flow rate
82 z(p,u) #positive part of k−f(x) in CVAR
83 lambdaP(p,r,n,u) #Dual to prodCap restriction
84 rhoP(p,r,n,u) #Dual for expRes
85 muP(p,u) #Dual to prod exp budget
86 lambdaT(a,u) #Dual to TSO flow cap
87 muT(u) #Dual for TSO budget
88 sigma(p,u) #dual to cvar linearization
89 y(p,u) #variable from linearizaton of cvar
90 k(p) #quantile variable from CV@R function
91 ;
93 variables
94 tau(a,u) #congestion fee on arc a
95 phi(p,n,u) #Dual to mass balance eq
96 cvarObj #value of cvar objective function
97 socwelfObj #value of socwelf objective function
98 pi(n,u) #price from inverse demand function
99 ;
101 #Equations
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102 equations
103 eq prodCap(p,r,n,u) #production capacity constraint
104 eq massBalance(p,n,u) #mass balance
105 eq ProdExpBudget(p,u) #expansion budget for producer
106 eq expRes(p,r,n,u) #expansion of reserves
107 eq flowCap(a,u) #flow rate capacity constraint
108 eq TSOExpBudget(u) #expansion budget for TSO
109 eq nodePrice(n,u) #inverse demand curve in market n
110 eq arcFlow(a,u) #arc flow constraint
111 eq qStat(p,r,n,u) #Stat eq for prod wrt q
112 eq qSStat(p,n,u) #Stat eq for prod wrt qS
113 eq eRStat(p,r,n,u) #Stat eq for prod wrt eR
114 eq ePStat(p,r,n,u) #Stat eq for prod wrt eP
115 eq fStat(p,a,u) #Stat eq for prod wrt f
116 eq sStat(a,u) #Stat eq for TSO wrt s
117 eq eAStat(a,u) #Stat eq for TSO wrt eA
118 eq kStat(p) #Stat eq for prod wrt kP
119 eq yStat(p,u) #Stat eq for prod wrt y
120 eq lin(p,u) #Constraint for linearization of cvar
121 eq cvarObj #CV@R optimization obj fun
122 eq socwelfObj #socwelf optimization obj fun
123 eq linOpt(p,u) #Constraint for linearization of cvar
124 #for optimization
125 ;
127 #Stationarity
128 eq kStat(p) .. − 1 + sum(endNodes(uu), sigma(p,uu)) =G= 0;
130 eq yStat(p,u)$(endNodes(u)) .. 1 / alpha(p) ∗ Prob(u) − sigma(p,u) =G=
0;
132 eq qStat(p,r,n,u)$(nProd(p,n)) ..
133 GAMMA(u) ∗ D(u) ∗ (CL(p,r,n) + 2 ∗ CQ(p,r,n) ∗ q(p,r,n,u)) ∗
134 sum(match(u,uu), sigma(p,uu))
135 + lambdaP(p,r,n,u)$(nProd(p,n))
136 − phi(p,n,u)
137 + rhoP(p,r,n,u)$(nProd(p,n)) ∗ D(u) + sum(succ(u,uu), D(uu) ∗
138 rhoP(p,r,n,uu)$(nProd(p,n)))
139 =G= 0;
141 eq qSStat(p,n,u) ..
142 − GAMMA(U) ∗ D(u) ∗
143 (delta(p,n) ∗ (INT(n,u) − SLP(n,u) ∗ (sum(pp, qS(pp,n,u)) +
144 qS(p,n,u))) + (1 − delta(p,n)) ∗ (INT(n,u) − SLP(n,u) ∗ sum(pp,
145 qS(pp,n,u)))) ∗ sum(match(u,uu), sigma(p,uu))
146 + phi(p,n,u) =G= 0;
148 eq ePStat(p,r,n,u)$((not(endnodes(u)) and (nProd(p,n)))) ..
149 GAMMA(u) ∗ CdeltaP(p,r,n) ∗ sum(match(u,uu), sigma(p,uu))
150 − sum(succ(u,uu), lambdaP(p,r,n,uu))
151 + muP(p,u) ∗ CdeltaP(p,r,n)
152 =G= 0;
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154 eq eRStat(p,r,n,u)$((not(endnodes(u)) and (nProd(p,n)))) ..
155 GAMMA(u) ∗ CdeltaR(p,r,n) ∗ sum(match(u,uu), sigma(p,uu))
156 − sum(dirsucc(u,uu), deltaR(p,r,n,uu) ∗ rhoP(p,r,n,uu))
157 − sum(succ(u,uu), sum(b(u,uu,uuu), deltaR(p,r,n,uuu)) ∗
158 rhoP(p,r,n,uu))
159 + muP(p,u) ∗ CdeltaR(p,r,n)
160 =G= 0;
162 eq fStat(p,a,u) ..
163 GAMMA(u) ∗ D(u) ∗ tau(a,u) ∗ sum(match(u,uu), sigma(p,uu))
164 − sum(nn$nPlus(a,nn), phi(p,nn,u))
165 + sum(nn$nMinus(a,nn), phi(p,nn,u))
166 =G= 0;
169 #CONSTRAINTS
171 #Profits(u) means profits in node u.
172 eq lin(p,u)$(endNodes(u)) ..
173 y(p,u) − k(p)
174 #profits(pred(u)
175 + sum(Pred(u,uu), GAMMA(uu) ∗ (sum(n, D(uu) ∗ qS(p,n,uu)
176 ∗(delta(p,n) ∗ (INT(n,uu) − SLP(n,uu) ∗ sum(pp, qS(pp,n,uu))
177 ) + (1−delta(p,n)) ∗ (INT(n,uu) − SLP(n,uu)
178 ∗ sum(pp, qS(pp,n,uu)))) )
179 − sum(a, D(uu) ∗ tau(a,uu) ∗ f(p,a,uu))
180 − sum(r, sum(n, eR(p,r,n,uu)$(nProd(p,n)) ∗ CdeltaR(p,r,n) +
181 eP(p,r,n,uu)$(nProd(p,n)) ∗ CdeltaP(p,r,n)))
182 − sum(r, sum(nProd(p,n), D(uu) ∗ (CL(p,r,n) ∗ q(p,r,n,uu) +
183 q(p,r,n,uu) ∗ q(p,r,n,uu) ∗ CQ(p,r,n)) ))) )
184 #profits(u)
185 + GAMMA(u) ∗ (sum(n, D(u) ∗ qS(p,n,u) ∗(delta(p,n) ∗
186 (INT(n,u) − SLP(n,u) ∗ sum(pp, qS(pp,n,u))) + (1−delta(p,n))
187 ∗ (INT(n,u) − SLP(n,u) ∗ sum(pp, qS(pp,n,u)))) )
188 − sum(a, D(u) ∗ tau(a,u) ∗ f(p,a,u))
189 #No investments in last stage
190 − sum(r, sum(nProd(p,n), D(u) ∗ (CL(p,r,n) ∗ q(p,r,n,u)+
191 q(p,r,n,u) ∗ q(p,r,n,u) ∗ CQ(p,r,n)) )))
192 =G= 0;
195 #In optimization, congestion cancels out and is removed.
196 eq linOpt(p,u)$(endNodes(u)) ..
197 y(p,u) − k(p)
198 #profits(pred(u)
199 + sum(Pred(u,uu), GAMMA(uu) ∗ (sum(n, D(uu) ∗ qS(p,n,uu)
200 ∗(delta(p,n) ∗ (INT(n,uu) − SLP(n,uu) ∗ sum(pp, qS(pp,n,uu)))
201 + (1−delta(p,n)) ∗ (INT(n,uu) − SLP(n,uu)
202 ∗ sum(pp, qS(pp,n,uu)))))
203 # − sum(a, D(uu) ∗ tau(a,uu) ∗ f(p,a,uu))
204 − sum(r, sum(n, eR(p,r,n,uu)$(nProd(p,n)) ∗ CdeltaR(p,r,n) +
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205 eP(p,r,n,uu)$(nProd(p,n)) ∗ CdeltaP(p,r,n)))
206 − sum(r, sum(nProd(p,n), D(uu) ∗ (CL(p,r,n) ∗ q(p,r,n,uu)+
207 q(p,r,n,uu) ∗ q(p,r,n,uu) ∗ CQ(p,r,n))))) )
208 #profits(u)
209 + GAMMA(u) ∗ (sum(n, D(u) ∗ qS(p,n,u) ∗(delta(p,n) ∗ (INT(n,u)
210 − SLP(n,u) ∗ sum(pp, qS(pp,n,u))) + (1−delta(p,n)) ∗(INT(n,u) −
211 SLP(n,u) ∗ sum(pp, qS(pp,n,u)))) )
212 # − sum(a, D(u) ∗ tau(a,u) ∗ f(p,a,u))
213 #No investments in last stage
214 − sum(r, sum(nProd(p,n), D(u) ∗ (CL(p,r,n) ∗ q(p,r,n,u)+
215 q(p,r,n,u) ∗ q(p,r,n,u) ∗ CQ(p,r,n)))))
216 =G= 0;
218 eq ProdCap(p,r,n,u)$(nProd(p,n)) ..
219 CAPP0(p,r,n)
220 − q(p,r,n,u)
221 + sum(pred(u,uu), eP(p,r,n,uu))
222 =G= 0
223 ;
225 eq massBalance(p,n,u) ..
226 sum(r, q(p,r,n,u)$(nProd(p,n)))
227 + sum(aPlusn(n,a), f(p,a,u))
228 − qS(p,n,u)
229 − sum(aMinusn(n,a), f(p,a,u))
230 =E= 0;
232 eq ProdExpBudget(p,u)$(not(endNodes(u))) ..
233 BP(p,u)
234 + sum(r,sum(nProd(p,n),
235 − CdeltaP(p,r,n) ∗ eP(p,r,n,u)$(nProd(p,n))
236 − CdeltaR(p,r,n) ∗ eR(p,r,n,u)$(nProd(p,n))
237 ))
238 =G= 0;
240 eq expRes(p,r,n,u)$(nProd(p,n)) ..
241 RP0(p,r,n) − sum(pred(u,uu), D(uu) ∗ q(p,r,n,uu)) − D(u) ∗
242 q(p,r,n,u)
243 + sum(pred(u,uu), deltaR(p,r,n,uu) ∗ eR(p,r,n,uu −
244 prev(uu))$(nProd(p,n)))
245 + deltaR(p,r,n,u) ∗ eR(p,r,n,u − prev(u))$(nProd(p,n))
246 =G= 0;
248 #TSO equations
249 eq eAStat(a,u)$(not(endNodes(u))) ..
250 Prob(u) ∗ GAMMA(u) ∗ CDeltaA(a)
251 − sum(succ(u,uu), lambdaT(a,uu))
252 + CDeltaA(a) ∗ muT(u)
253 =G= 0;
255 eq sStat(a,u) ..
256 − Prob(u) ∗ GAMMA(u) ∗ D(u) ∗ (tau(a,u) − CF(a))
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257 + lambdaT(a,u)
258 =G= 0;
260 eq flowCap(a,u) ..
261 CAPA0(a)
262 + sum(pred(u,uu), eA(a,uu))
263 − s(a,u)
264 =G= 0;
266 eq TSOExpBudget(u)$(not(endNodes(u))) ..
267 BTSO(u) − sum(a, CDeltaA(a) ∗ eA(a,u))
268 =G= 0 ;
270 #Market clearing equations
271 #substituted out of the MCP:
272 eq nodePrice(n,u) .. INT(n,u) − SLP(n,u) ∗ sum(p, qS(p,n,u)) − pi(n,u)
273 =E= 0;
275 eq arcFlow(a,u) .. s(a,u) − sum(p,f(p,a,u)) =E= 0;
277 #Optimization objectives
278 eq cvarObj .. cvarObj =E=
279 − sum(p,
280 k(p) − (1 / alpha(p) ) ∗ sum(endNodes(uu), Prob(uu) ∗
281 y(p,uu) ))
282 − sum((a,u), Prob(u) ∗ GAMMA(u) ∗( s(a,u) ∗ D(u) ∗ ( − CF(a)) −
283 CDeltaA(a) ∗ eA(a,u)$(not(endNodes(u)))))
284 − sum((n,u), Prob(u) ∗ GAMMA(u)∗ (INT(n,u) − (INT(n,u) −
285 SLP(n,u) ∗ sum(pp, qS(pp,n,u)))) / 2 ∗ sum(p, qS(p,n,u)) ∗ D(u))
286 ;
288 eq socwelfObj .. socwelfObj =E=
289 − sum(p,
290 + sum(n, sum(u, Prob(u) ∗ GAMMA(u) ∗ D(u) ∗ qS(p,n,u) ∗
291 (INT(n,u) − SLP(n,u) ∗ sum(pp, qS(pp,n,u)))))
292 − sum(nProd(p,n), sum(u, sum(r, Prob(u) ∗ GAMMA(u) ∗
293 D(u) ∗ (q(p,r,n,u) ∗ CL(p,r,n) + q(p,r,n,u) ∗
294 q(p,r,n,u) ∗ CQ(p,r,n) ) ) ))
295 − sum((n,u,r), Prob(u) ∗ GAMMA(u) ∗
296 (eR(p,r,n,u)$((nProd(p,n))and(not(endNodes(u)))) ∗
297 CdeltaR(p,r,n) +
298 eP(p,r,n,u)$((nProd(p,n))and(not(endNodes(u)))) ∗
299 CdeltaP(p,r,n) ) ))
300 + sum((a,u), Prob(u) ∗ GAMMA(u) ∗( s(a,u) ∗ D(u) ∗
301 CF(a) ))
302 + sum((a,u), Prob(u) ∗ GAMMA(u) ∗ CDeltaA(a) ∗
303 eA(a,u)$(not(endNodes(u))))
304 − sum((n,u), Prob(u) ∗ GAMMA(u)∗ (INT(n,u) − (INT(n,u)
305 − SLP(n,u) ∗ sum(pp, qS(pp,n,u)))) / 2 ∗ sum(p,
306 qS(p,n,u)) ∗ D(u))
307 ;
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309 #MCP MODEL
310 Model mcp
311 /eq kStat.k
312 eq yStat.y
313 eq qStat.q
314 eq qSStat.qS
315 eq eRStat.eR
316 eq ePStat.eP
317 eq fStat.f
318 eq ProdCap.lambdaP
319 eq expRes.rhoP
320 eq prodExpBudget.muP
321 eq massBalance.phi
322 eq lin.sigma
323 eq sStat.s
324 eq eAStat.eA
325 eq flowCap.lambdaT
326 eq arcFlow.tau
327 eq TSOExpBudget.muT
328 /
330 #OPTIMIZATION MODEL WITH RISK AVERSION
331 Model cvarOpt
332 /eq ProdCap,
333 eq expRes,
334 eq prodExpBudget,
335 eq massBalance,
336 eq flowCap,
337 eq arcFlow,
338 eq TSOExpBudget,
339 eq linOpt,
340 eq nodePrice,
341 eq cvarObj
342 /
344 #OPTIMIZATION MODEL WITH RISK NEUTRALITY
345 Model socwelfOpt
346 /eq ProdCap
347 eq expRes
348 eq prodExpBudget
349 eq massBalance
350 eq flowCap
351 eq arcFlow
352 eq TSOExpBudget
353 eq socwelfObj
354 eq nodePrice
355 /;
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C.3 Solve and report
1 #This is new solve. It attempts to solve the problem using
2 #different starting points
4 set alphaIter
5 deltaIter;
7 #Report parameters for file output
8 parameter
9 sstat(∗,alphaIter,deltaIter),
10 mstat(∗,alphaIter,deltaIter),
11 qSave(∗,alphaIter, deltaIter, p,n,u)
12 expProfit(p,alphaIter, deltaIter)
13 scenprofit(p,u,alphaIter,deltaIter)
14 cumprofit(p,u,alphaIter,deltaIter)
15 rev(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
16 prodcost(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
17 production(p,r,n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter)
18 cumulativeProd(p,r,n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter)
19 totalReserves(p,r,n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter)
20 expansion(p,r,n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter)
21 transcost(p, alphaIter, deltaIter, u)
22 scenConsumerSurplus(n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter)
23 cumConsumerSurplus(n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter)
24 expConsumerSurplus(n,alphaIter, deltaIter)
25 invest(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
26 expTSOProfit(alphaIter, deltaIter)
27 scenTSOProfit(alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
28 cumTSOProfit(alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
29 CVAR(p,alphaIter, deltaIter)
30 errorFlag
31 reserveExpansion(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
32 price(alphaIter,deltaIter,n,u)
33 scensocialWelfare(alphaIter, deltaIter, u)
34 cumsocialWelfare(alphaIter, deltaIter, u)
35 expsocialWelfare(alphaIter, deltaIter)
36 report(∗,alphaIter,∗,∗,∗,∗)
37 method
38 ;
40 #Find an initial solution
41 solve socwelfOpt min socwelfObj using nlp;
43 set alphaIter /j1∗j1/;
44 set deltaIter /i1∗i1/;
45 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 0;
46 parameter storedAlpha(p), storedDelta(p,n);
48 #Solve the problem using the methods mentioned in Ch 6
49 #for solving the problem using different starting points
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50 loop(alphaIter,
51 loop(deltaIter,
52 errorFlag = 1;
53 storedAlpha(p) = alpha(p);
54 storedDelta(p,n) = delta(p,n);
56 #Method 1: Solve normally
57 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 11;
58 solve socwelfOpt minimizing socwelfObj using nlp;
59 solve mcp using mcp;
60 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
61 display alpha, delta;
62 errorFlag = 0;
63 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 1;
64 else
65 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 12;
66 );
68 if(errorFlag = 1,
69 #Method 7: Set alpha = 1, delta inbetween
70 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 71;
71 alpha(p)$(alpha(p)<> 1) = 1;
72 delta(p,n)$(delta(p,n) <> 1) = delta(p,n)
73 + 0.25 ∗ (1 − delta(p,n));
74 solve mcp using mcp;
75 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
76 alpha(p) = storedAlpha(p);
77 delta(p,n) = storedDelta(p,n);
78 solve mcp using mcp;
79 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
80 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 7;
81 errorFlag = 0;
82 display alpha, delta;
83 );
84 );
85 alpha(p) = storedAlpha(p);
86 );
87 if(errorFlag = 1,
88 #Method 8: Set alpha = inbetween, delta inbetween
89 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 81;
90 alpha(p)$(alpha(p)<> 1) = alpha(p) + 0.7 ∗ (1 − alpha(p));
91 delta(p,n)$(delta(p,n) <> 1) = delta(p,n)
92 + 0.25 ∗ (1 − delta(p,n));
93 solve mcp using mcp;
94 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
95 alpha(p) = storedAlpha(p);
96 delta(p,n) = storedDelta(p,n);
97 solve mcp using mcp;
98 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
99 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 8;
100 errorFlag = 0;
101 display alpha, delta;
Q
APPENDIX C. GAMS CODE
102 );
103 );
104 alpha(p) = storedAlpha(p);
105 );
106 if(errorFlag = 1,
107 #Method 6: Set alpha = 1, delta inbetween
108 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 61;
109 alpha(p)$(alpha(p)<> 1) = 1;
110 delta(p,n)$(delta(p,n) <> 1) = delta(p,n)
111 + 0.5 ∗ (1 − delta(p,n));
112 solve mcp using mcp;
113 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
114 alpha(p) = storedAlpha(p);
115 delta(p,n) = storedDelta(p,n);
116 solve mcp using mcp;
117 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
118 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 6;
119 errorFlag = 0;
120 display alpha, delta;
121 );
122 );
123 alpha(p) = storedAlpha(p);
124 );
125 if(errorFlag = 1,
126 #Method 5: Set delta=1
127 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 51;
128 delta(p,n) = 1
129 solve mcp using mcp;
130 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
131 delta(p,n) = storedDelta(p,n);
132 solve mcp using mcp;
133 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
134 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 5;
135 errorFlag = 0;
136 display alpha, delta;
137 );
138 );
139 delta(p,n) = storedDelta(p,n);
140 );
141 if(errorFlag = 1,
142 #Method 2: Perturb alpha
143 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 21;
144 alpha(p)$(alpha(p)<> 1) = alpha(p) + (1 − alpha(p))/2;
145 solve mcp using mcp;
146 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
147 alpha(p) = storedAlpha(p);
148 solve mcp using mcp;
149 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
150 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 2;
151 errorFlag = 0;
152 display alpha, delta;
153 );
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154 );
155 alpha(p) = storedAlpha(p);
156 );
157 if(errorFlag = 1,
158 #Method 3: SOCWELF−>CVAR−>MCP
159 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 31;
160 solve socwelfOpt min socwelfObj using nlp;
161 solve cvarOpt min cvarObj using nlp;
162 solve mcp using mcp;
163 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
164 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 3;
165 errorFlag = 0;
166 display alpha, delta;
167 );
168 );
169 if(errorFlag = 1,
170 #Method 9: Perturb alpha a little more
171 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 91;
172 alpha(p)$(alpha(p)<> 1) = alpha(p) + 0.7 ∗ (1 − alpha(p));
173 solve mcp using mcp;
174 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
175 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 92;
176 alpha(p) = storedAlpha(p);
177 solve mcp using mcp;
178 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
179 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 9;
180 errorFlag = 0;
181 display alpha, delta;
182 );
183 );
184 alpha(p) = storedAlpha(p);
185 );
186 if(errorFlag = 1,
187 #Method 4: Set alpha = 1
188 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 41;
189 alpha(p)$(alpha(p)<> 1) = 1;
190 solve mcp using mcp;
191 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
192 alpha(p) = storedAlpha(p);
193 solve mcp using mcp;
194 if(mcp.modelstat = 1,
195 method(alphaIter,deltaIter) = 4;
196 errorFlag = 0;
197 display alpha, delta;
198 );
199 );
200 alpha(p) = storedAlpha(p);
201 );
202 #Perform calculations after solving the problem
203 $INCLUDE calculations.tex
204 );
205 );
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207 display method;
209 #Output to .gdx file. "Run" is defined in the data file.
210 execute unload "%run%"
211 qS.l, price, invest,
212 scenConsumerSurplus, cumConsumerSurplus, expConsumerSurplus,
213 scenProfit, cumProfit, expProfit, cvar,
214 scenSocialWelfare, cumSocialWelfare, expSocialWelfare,
215 scenTSOProfit, cumTSOProfit, expTSOProfit,
216 method, reserveExpansion,
217 report, qSave, mstat, sstat, rev, prodcost,
218 production, cumulativeProd, totalReserves, transcost
C.4 Calculations
1 $ontext
2 CALCULATIONS
3 This file contains the calculation statements.
5 UPDATED: 20.3.
6 $offtext
9 #PRODUCER RELATED
10 transcost(p,alphaIter, deltaIter, u)
11 = sum(a, GAMMA(u) ∗ f.l(p,a,u) ∗ tau.l(a,u) ∗ D(u));
13 rev(p,alphaIter, deltaIter, u) =
14 sum(n, GAMMA(u) ∗ D(u) ∗ qS.l(p,n,u) ∗ (INT(n,u) − SLP(n,u) ∗ sum
(pp, qS.l(pp,n,u))));
16 prodcost(p,alphaIter, deltaIter, u) = sum(n,
17 sum(r, GAMMA(u) ∗ D(u) ∗ (q.l(p,r,n,u) ∗ CL(p,r,n)
18 + q.l(p,r,n,u) ∗ q.l(p,r,n,u) ∗ CQ(p,r,n))) ) ;
20 invest(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u) = sum((n,r), GAMMA(u) ∗ (
21 eR.l(p,r,n,u) ∗ CdeltaR(p,r,n)
22 + eP.l(p,r,n,u) ∗ CdeltaP(p,r,n)) );
24 scenProfit(p, u, alphaIter, deltaIter)=
25 + rev(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
26 − transcost(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
27 − prodcost(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
28 − invest(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u);
30 cumProfit(p,u,alphaIter, deltaIter)$(endNodes(u)) =
31 sum(pred(u,uu), rev(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,uu)
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32 − transcost(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,uu)
33 − prodcost(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,uu)
34 − invest(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,uu))
35 + rev(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
36 − transcost(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
37 − prodcost(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
38 − invest(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u);
40 expProfit(p,alphaIter, deltaIter) = sum(u, Prob(u) ∗(
41 rev(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
42 − transcost(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
43 − prodcost(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
44 − invest(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u)));
46 cvar(p,alphaIter, deltaIter) = k.l(p) − 1 / alpha(p)
47 ∗ sum(endNodes(u), Prob(u) ∗ y.l(p,u));
49 #TSO RELATED
50 scenTSOProfit(alphaIter, deltaIter,u) = sum(a, GAMMA(u)
51 ∗( s.l(a,u) ∗ D(u) ∗ (tau.l(a,u)− CF(a))
52 − CDeltaA(a) ∗ eA.l(a,u)));
54 cumTSOProfit(alphaIter, deltaIter,u)$(endNodes(u)) =
55 sum((a,pred(u,uu)), GAMMA(uu) ∗( s.l(a,uu) ∗ D(uu)
56 ∗ (tau.l(a,uu)− CF(a))
57 − CDeltaA(a) ∗ eA.l(a,uu)))
58 + sum(a, GAMMA(u) ∗( s.l(a,u) ∗ D(u) ∗ (tau.l(a,u)− CF(a))
59 − CDeltaA(a) ∗ eA.l(a,u)));
61 expTSOProfit(alphaIter, deltaIter) = sum((a,u), Prob(u)
62 ∗ GAMMA(u) ∗( s.l(a,u) ∗ D(u) ∗ (tau.l(a,u)− CF(a))
63 − CDeltaA(a) ∗ eA.l(a,u)));
66 #SOCIAL WELFARE RELATED
67 scenConsumerSurplus(n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter) =
68 GAMMA(u) ∗ (INT(n,u) − (INT(n,u) − SLP(n,u)
69 ∗ sum(pp, qS.l(pp,n,u)))) / 2 ∗ sum(p, qS.l(p,n,u)) ∗ D(u);
70 cumConsumerSurplus(n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter)$endNodes(u) =
71 sum(pred(u,uu), GAMMA(uu) ∗ (INT(n,uu) − (INT(n,uu)
72 − SLP(n,uu) ∗ sum(pp, qS.l(pp,n,uu)))) / 2
73 ∗ sum(p, qS.l(p,n,uu)) ∗ D(uu))
74 + GAMMA(u) ∗ (INT(n,u) − (INT(n,u) − SLP(n,u)
75 ∗ sum(pp, qS.l(pp,n,u)))) / 2 ∗ sum(p, qS.l(p,n,u)) ∗ D(u);
76 expConsumerSurplus(n,alphaIter, deltaIter)
77 = sum(u, prob(u) ∗
78 scenConsumerSurplus(n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter));
80 scenSocialWelfare(alphaIter, deltaIter,u)
81 = sum(n, scenConsumerSurplus(n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter))
82 + sum(p, scenProfit(p,u,alphaIter, deltaIter))
83 + scenTSOProfit(alphaIter, deltaIter, u);
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84 cumSocialWelfare(alphaIter, deltaIter,u)$(endNodes(u)) =
85 sum((n,pred(u,uu)),
86 scenConsumerSurplus(n,uu,alphaIter, deltaIter))
87 + sum((p,pred(u,uu)), scenProfit(p,uu,alphaIter, deltaIter))
88 + sum(pred(u,uu), scenTSOProfit(alphaIter, deltaIter, uu))
89 + sum(n, scenConsumerSurplus(n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter))
90 + sum(p, scenprofit(p,u,alphaIter, deltaIter))
91 + scenTSOProfit(alphaIter, deltaIter, u);
92 expSocialWelfare(alphaIter, deltaIter) =
93 sum(n, expConsumerSurplus(n,alphaIter, deltaIter))
94 + sum(p, expProfit(p,alphaIter, deltaIter))
95 + expTSOProfit(alphaIter, deltaIter);
97 price(alphaIter,deltaIter,n,u) =
98 INT(n,u) − SLP(n,u) ∗ sum(p, qS.l(p,n,u));
101 #PRODUCTION AND QUANTITY RELATED
102 production(p,r,n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter) = D(u) ∗ q.l(p,r,n,u);
104 cumulativeProd(p,r,n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter)$(ord(u)=1) =
105 production(p,r,n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter);
106 cumulativeProd(p,r,n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter)$(ord(u)>1) =
107 production(p,r,n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter)
108 + sum(pred(u,uu), production(p,r,n,uu,alphaIter, deltaIter));
110 expansion(p,r,n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter) =
111 sum(uMinus(u,uu), eR.l(p,r,n,uu) ∗ deltaR(p,r,n,u));
113 totalReserves(p,r,n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter)$(ord(u)=1) = RP0(p,r,n );
114 totalReserves(p,r,n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter)$(ord(u)>1) = RP0(p,r,n)
115 + sum(pred(u,uu), expansion(p,r,n,uu,alphaIter, deltaIter))
116 + expansion(p,r,n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter);
118 reserveExpansion(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u) =
119 sum((n,r,pred(u,uu)), eR.l(p,r,n,uu) )
120 + sum((n,r),eR.l(p,r,n,u));
122 #Put all the parameters in a report parameter
123 report("qS",alphaIter,deltaIter,p,n,u) = qS.l(p,n,u);
124 report("price",alphaIter,deltaIter,"Price[$/cf]",n,u) =
125 price(alphaIter,deltaIter,n,u);
126 report("invest",alphaIter,deltaIter,p,"−",u) =
127 invest(p,alphaIter, deltaIter,u);
128 report("scenConsumerSurplus",alphaIter,deltaIter,"−",n,u) =
129 scenConsumerSurplus(n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter);
130 report("cumConsumerSurplus",alphaIter,deltaIter,"−",n,u) =
131 cumConsumerSurplus(n,u,alphaIter, deltaIter);
132 report("expConsumerSurplus",alphaIter,deltaIter,"−",n,"−") =
133 expConsumerSurplus(n,alphaIter, deltaIter);
134 report("scenProfit",alphaIter,deltaIter,p,"−",u) =
135 scenProfit(p,u,alphaIter, deltaIter);
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136 report("cumProfit",alphaIter,deltaIter,p,"−",u) =
137 cumProfit(p,u,alphaIter, deltaIter);
138 report("expProfit",alphaIter,deltaIter,p,"−","−") =
139 expProfit(p,alphaIter, deltaIter);
140 report("CVAR",alphaIter,deltaIter,p,"−","−") =
141 CVAR(p,alphaIter, deltaIter);
142 report("scenSocialWelfare",alphaIter,deltaIter,"−","−",u) =
143 scenSocialWelfare(alphaIter, deltaIter, u);
144 report("cumSocialWelfare",alphaIter,deltaIter,"−","−",u) =
145 cumSocialWelfare(alphaIter, deltaIter,u);
146 report("expSocialWelfare",alphaIter,deltaIter,"−","−","−") =
147 expSocialWelfare(alphaIter, deltaIter);
148 report("scenTSOProfit",alphaIter,deltaIter,"−","−",u) =
149 scenTSOProfit(alphaIter, deltaIter, u);
150 report("cumTSOProfit",alphaIter,deltaIter,"−","−",u) =
151 cumTSOProfit(alphaIter, deltaIter, u);
152 report("expTSOProfit",alphaIter,deltaIter,"−","−","−") =
153 expTSOProfit(alphaIter, deltaIter);
154 report("method",alphaiter,deltaIter,"−","−","−") =
155 method(alphaIter, deltaIter);
156 report("alpha",alphaIter,deltaIter,p,"−","−") = alpha(p);
157 report("delta",alphaIter,deltaIter,p,n,"−") = delta(p,n);
158 report("arcExp",alphaIter, deltaIter,"−",a,u) = eA.l(a,u);
159 report("shaleResInvest",alphaIter, deltaIter,p,n,u) =
160 eR.l(p,’shale’,n,u);
161 report("convResInvest",alphaIter, deltaIter,p,n,u) =
162 eR.l(p,’conv’,n,u);
163 report("shaleProdCapInvest",alphaIter, deltaIter,p,n,u) =
164 eP.l(p,’shale’,n,u);
165 report("convProdCapInvest",alphaIter, deltaIter,p,n,u) =
166 eP.l(p,’conv’,n,u);
167 report("Production",alphaIter, p,r,n,u) = q.l(p,r,n,u);
C.5 Data
The data input files for the different cases can be found in the attached .zip
file.
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